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especially tiredness, and this ski 4? increases with ex- 
perience. Anxiety was considered o-Terestiia Jed by all 
the nurses. The role of stereotype use and personal 
identification with the patient were examined in relation 
to these judgements. 
The conclusions that emerged from the first half 
of the study were suggestions for further work with 
design modifications that would all oar clarification of 
an association between adopting a particular strategy and 
accurate performance. The second part of the study pro- 
vided an initial overall description of the nurses' 
judgements of 5 different patient moods. Suggestions were 
made for a more detailed analysis of patient affect. The 




A considerable body of research has accumulated 
documenting the fallibility of human judgement in 
clinical and non-clinical settings (Einhorn, 1972: 
Goldberg, 1968: Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
There has been controversy about the accuracy of pre- 
dictive clinical judgements made by doctors, njychiatrisis 
and clinical psychologists. Evidence has been cited 
suggesting that the clinical predictions made by these 
professionals under the inevitable conditions of uncertainty 
were made as well, if not better., by the application of a 
simple statistical formula (Meehl, 1951. ). The implication 
was that the sign and symptom information upon which a 
clinician relies was handled better by a statistical model. 
Higgins (1980), discussing decision making in general 
practice, made the distinction between two processes that 
should be involved in a medical diagnosis. The collection 
of sign and symptom information and the doctor/patient 
contact. He suggests that the latter area is neglected in 
much medical training and the evidence from psychology 
concentrates mainly on the former. 
0 
The issues surrounding clinical judgements are 
important to nurses. A necessary pre-requisite for a nurse 
effectively caring for a patient is that she accurately 
perceives that patient's current need. This has obvious 
implications for a 'nursing process' or problem solving 
approach to patient care (McG llowwway, 1980). Identification 
of a patient problem is dependent upon a decision by the 
nurse about the current physical and emotional state of the 
patient in her/his care. Further, this would help to 
clarify a definition of nursing 'care'. If nursing care 
is seen as starting with the identification of a patient 
problem, it is necessary to ensure that nurses are equipped 
to do this. 
1 
Of added importance is the trend in North America 
to extend the role of the nurse/nurse practitioner. 
This is, in part, a response to economic pressures 
reflected by the rising cost of health care and a non- 
uniform distribution of family doctors. The result for 
the nursing profession is that nurses are making decisions 
that were previously the province of medicine. With a 
similar economic climate in this country and a concomitant 
desire on the part of some nurses to expand their role 
(Bowling, 1981), a similar trend could emerge in Britain. 
This makes an examination of clinical judgement and 
decision making of particular interest to nurses. But 
nursing decisions are very varied. They involve the 
manipulation of sign and symptom information leading to 
diagnosis of a physical problem. They also involve 
evaluation of their patients' psychological well being. 
Higgins (1980) had noted the lack of emphasis on 
the doctor/patient communication component of clinical 
judgement. For these reasons the work reported within 
this thesis focused on both types of judgement, but 
separately rather than simultaneously. This was considered 
to present a more realistic approach to the study of 
clinical judgements made by nurses. The first half of 
this thesis reports two experiments examining a strategy 
employed by nurses when starting to seek information that 
leads to the making of a physical diagnosis. The literature 
background is that of decision theory and information 
processing. The research - focused on the conse: iuences 
for judgement of adopting a specific strategy to initiate 
the process. The second half of the thesis reports a shift 
of emphasis from physical diagnosis to that of the judge- 
ment of affective well being. The focus is concerned more 
with the accuracy of nurses' perception of their patients' 




Review of the Literature for the ý''xDerirnent s 
Diagnosis or clinical judgements are predictions 
or decisions made about uncertain events. There can be 
no such things as error-free diagnosis because a cue 
(symptom) and the criterion (disease state) with which 
it is associated are not functionally related. That is, 
any symptom or sign does not have a one-to-one relationship 
with a particular disease or patient condition. It is 
typically indicative of more than one disease state. It 
is the configuration of the sign and symptom cluster and 
the relative weights of the individual cues that suggest 
a diagnostic category (Einhorn, 1972", 1974). 
The areas of clinical- judgement and Behavioural 
Decision Theory encompass an extensive body of work and 
a complete review is beyond the scope of this study. 
Kleiter, Gashowetz & Huber (1976) cited in excess of two 
thousand individual references at that time. It is intended 
to select a relevant sample of the various work in the area 
as a whole, dividing the literature review into discrete 
sections. The objective of the review is to evaluate the 
theoretical frameworks that have been proposed to describe 
decision making and to consider decision aids currently in 
use with the aim of isolating a method that could be applied 
to facilitate a nursing decision. 
In order to consider experimental evidence concerned 
with decision making and judgement it is necessary 
to have 
a conceptual framework within which to operate. 
Hogarth & 
Tr1akridakis (1981) proposed the framework illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Fiere 1 
Model of Judgement from Hogarth & Yakridakis (1961) 
The operations that are involved in making a 
decision or judgement can be broken down into different 
stages. Firstly there is the acquisition of information, 
followed by the processing of the information that has 
been accessed, and then output. Output implies taking an 
action based on that decision. this action and external 
factors present in the environment result in an outcome. 
The knowledge of that outcome feeds back into the decision 
maker's schema or mental representation and can also affect 
the task environment. At the same time the schema influences 
the perception of the task environment and its complexity, 
the problem identification, the tasks involved, the type of 
actions. required and the objectives of those actions. 
k. 
Task environment 
This general model provides a framework within which 
to discuss the processes involved in making decisions. The 
evidence will be reviewed with reference to this model, al- 
though not in the logical sequence, rather, an historical 
approach will be adopted. The type and range of judgements 
studied will be discussed initially, followed by the models 
adopted that eventually resulted in theories of decision 
making. The decision environment and cognitive factors will 
be discussed, followed by theories of decision making. ''fork 
specifically relating to nursing and medical decisions and 
decision aids will be considered, although the clinical 
relevance will be referred to throughout. Then the whole 
review will be related to the stages of the general model. 
The final section will be concerned with an appraisal of 





The area divides broadly into the study of clinical 
judgement ranging over a variety of different disciplines 
and the study of judgements adopting a garbling or "risky 
choice"paradigm. The whole area of judgement/decision 
making will be considered in relation to an identification 
of underlying principles and unifying theory. The types 
of judgements studied have included forecasts made by 
economists and business managers, the selection of per- 
sonnel and post-graduate students, as well as clinical 
judgements or diagnoses made by clinicians. 
However, all the work shares the common factor that 
it is concerned with "clinical" judgements or predictions 
rather than objective projections. All the decisions rely 
on information that can be incomplete, is often subjective 
and is invariably probabilistic. As was stated earlier, 
by probabilistic is meant that there is no functional 
relationship between a criterion and the cues that relate 
to that criterion. In terms of a nursing decision, what 
the nurse has to decide is the liklihood that a particular 
sign or symptom predicts a particular patient state. 
Abelson (1976), proposing a theory of decision making, 
noted that remarkably little was known about how people 
make decisions. The study of decision making had been 
dominated by the model of "rational man" in economic theory. 
This approach has been less than adequate, as will emerge. 
But, it has provided useful insights into what people cannot 
do and insights into some of the "biases" that operate as 
judgemental heuristics or strategies in certain circumstances 
and form the basis of recent theory. It is arguable that 'a 
normative prescriptive approach adopted by decision theorists 
will ever be adapted to describe the cognitive processes 
that take place when people make decisions. But nor yative 
and statistical models have prescribed a criterion of objective 
6 
performance, that has been assumed to be optimal, against 
which a natural decision can be compared. Inferences 
about decision processes were made when the human decision 
tailed to correspond to that prescribed by the model. The 
approach is much the same as that adopted in the study of 
human memory, where failure of recall has been suggestive 
of possible mechanisms. 
The danger of this approach for theory is when pre- 
scribed or potential competence in a situation is confused 
with naive expectations of the descriptive power of a 
normative model, ie. hors the task should be performed by 
the person. But the usefulness of normative procedures in 
prescribing and aiding certain decisions, ie. medical 
decisions, is very real, as will be discussed. But what 
does characterise much of the work in this area is a lack 
of performance invariance. This has made the identification 
of a small number of underlying principles, that can describe 
observed behaviour complicated (Payne, 1982). The following 




Eaýrlý Models Adopted 
During the 1950's there were many studies comparing 
judgements/decisions made by actuarial techniques with 
those made by clinical techniques. Meehl (1954) reviewed 
all the studies prior to that date and arrived at the 
conclusion that no study gave a clear superiority to 
clinical techniques. Actuarial predictions were consistently 
as good, if not superior. The ability of people to 
combine information from different sources when making a 
prediction was no better than applying a simple statistical 
formula to that information. As often as not, it was worse. 
Holt (1958) presented data describing the predictions 
of success of individual doctors engaged in psychiatric 
training. He found that, in this instance, clinical Pro- 
cedures produced superior predictions. This was an 
isolated - nstan ce, of superior clinical performance at that 
time and posed the question of tree types of decisions best 
suited to clinical techniques. Richards (1963), in an 
attempt to answer this question, suggested that statistical 
techniques are maximally sensitive to differences between 
classes of people or items. They have an accurate stereo- 
type of the predicted behaviour of the members of a class 
of items. Whereas, predictions based on clinical insights 
are best suited to situations where these predictions are 
concerned with differences between members of the same 
class, predictions about people who belong to the same 
category eg. have the same diagnosis. However,, many clinical 
decisions are concerned with distinguishing between cate-- 
gories, not projecting differences in behaviour by different 
members of the same patient group. 
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The two inter-related theoretical aspects of work 
will be reiterated. There is Normative Theory, 'which is 
concerned with prescribing a course of action which ad- 
heres to expectations of decision competence 1e. reflects 
the beliefs of the decision maker. The second type of 
theory, Descriptive Theory, is concerned with how people 
perform the task (Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
Slov''ic et al. suggested that the early descriptive studies 
consisted mainly of rather superficial comp: ri. cons of 
actual behaviour and normative models. 
The considerable effort that has been devoted to 
studying how people perceive, process and evaluate the 
ý the 
probabilities of ý uncertain events is a reflection reflection of oft., c. 
assu:, ed importance of probabilistic reasoning to decision 
making. The early research of Peterson & Beach (1967) on 
'intuitive statistics' lead to the optimistic conclusion 
of a rational, if 'conservative', decision maker. This 
work was followed by model-based paradigms, that is 
normative models in descriptive research. The suggestion 
was to begin with a normative model and adjust its form or 
parameters to produce a descriptive model (Barclay, Bench 
& Lrai thv ai ; e, 1971). The normative model was to be ad- 
justed to reflect the processes underlying performance 
(Fig. 1). The study of 'conservatism' demonstrated that 
in certain situations people have a tendency to produce 
posterior probabilities that are nearer to the prior 
probabilities than those specified by a normative model 
when they are integrating probabilistic information. 
They acted with more caution than the statistical model 
would prescribe, a rational if conservative approach. 
But, the question was whether or not they would 
adopt the same strategy regardless of differences between 
experimental Exceptions we ye soon :e celicited task r.: ý. to 
ý'a11, t j Gý_s this 11. i1:. 1-týg a. si . ý. ''-ý4gf cý ý, 




' ne- and suggested that question 
the 'conservatism' demonstrated by subjects was a fu` c . 
ior 
of the experiman el tact -- a highly simplified tack. 
9 
Real-life problems often have several stages, each stage 
relying on information which is itself an inference from 
unreliable observations or reports (Slavic et al. 1977). 
An example given by Slovic et al. is the physician who 
uses the condition of the patient' s lungs as a -cue for 
diagnosis. She/he must first infer that condition from 
unreliable data, eg. the sound of a thumped chest. 
Descriptive studies of multi-stage inference found 
that people consistently demonstrated posterior proba- 
bilities that were more extreme than those prescribed by 
the normative model (Funaro, 1975, Peterson, 1973, Steiger 
& Gettys, 1972). This is in direct contradiction to the 
'conservatism' findings. The extremity of response has 
been suggested to occur because of the use of a simple, 
but inappropriate 'best guess' strategy which is insensitive 
to considerations of data unreliability (Gettys, Kelly & 
Peterson, 1973; Snapper & Fryback, 1971). Subjects did 
not adopt and use the principles of normative theory when 
making intuitive decisions/judgements. But whether the 
strategy was that of a 'best guess' can be questioned. 
Thus far it is impossible to detect how people do 
use probabilistic information in terms of the general raodel 
(Fig. 1), processing is infer red from output where ac quisit -I on 
is controlled by the experiment design. This early work 
can say little about how information is acquired or processed 
by a natural decision maker. The following section reviews 
further evidence of statistical naivety that was suggested 
to be characteristic oz natural decision making. But, this 
work was -among the first to provide examples of specific 




Heurivtics and Biases 
Tversky & Kahneman (1971; 1973) & Kahnernan & Tversky 
(1973), in a, series of studies showed that people did not 
attend to or failed to learn about the statistical 
realities that are assumed to be present in the environment 
when making predictive decisions under uncertain conditions. 
Prior probabilities, even when supplied, tended to be 
ignored at worst and neglected at best. Predictions tended 
to be too extreme and were not properly regressive. They 
tended to be insensitive to the reliability of the data as 
a source of information. Normative theory prescribes that 
predictions should be more regressive, that is, less extreme 
with increased data unreliability. Further, people demon- 
strated an unjustified confidence in their judgement as a 
function of consistent or extreme information. 
The subjects in these studies demonstrated a limited 
number of'biases" that appeared to serve as judgemerital 
heuristics. Judgemental heuristics being simple strategies 
that were adopted by subjects when performing a decision 
task. The nature of the heuristic/strategy used was 
determined by the nature of the task, and the use of a 
particular heuristic being inferred from performance. In 
terms of the general model (Fig. 1) they may provide a 
suggestion as to how information is acquired but are in- 
ferred at the response stage. The more recent descriptive 
studies, rather than simply comparing behaviour with 
normative models, have attempted to uncover how the under- 
lying decision process is affected oy both the limitations 
of the decision maker and the demands of the task. It was 
the demonstration of judgement heuristics that gave impetus 
to this change. 
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A 'representativeness' heuristic or strategy is 
probably most important when people are deciding the 
category or group to which a person belongs. In the 
study that described 'representativeness' subjects de- 
cided whether fictional characters were either engineers 
or lawyers on the basis of their apparent similarity to 
a social stereotype of an engineer and lawyer (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1973). 'Representativeness' was said to be 
assessed by an examination of the essential features of, 
for example, two items X and Y. In order to gauge the 
probability that item Y belongs to class X, the degree 
of similarity between the two items is assessed. The 
degree of similarity is the determining factor. When Y 
is very similar to X, then its probability of belonging 
to class X is judged to be high. Kahneman & Tversky 
found that a short description depicting the social 
stereotype of an engineer would lead people to predict 
that the person described was an engineer. This was de- 
spite contradictory base-rate information stating the 
number of engineers in the population that was being 
evaluated. 
In other situations an 'availability' heuristic 
appeared to be used when making predictive decisions. An 
event, such as a particular disease, is judged as being 
likely or having a high incidence if it is easy to recall 
relevant instances from memory. This is often a valid cue 
because frequent events . are often easier to recall than 
those that are less frequent. But availability can also 
be influenced by other factors that are unrelated to actual 
frequency., eg. the emotional saliency of a cue., the recency 
of previous experience or its discrimi nability. An example 
in the current context of decision making is one concerned 
with media coverage of killer diseases. Those diseases, 
eg. lung cancer and all accidents, that received more 
coverage by the media were rated as killing more people 
(have a higher incidence) than those diseases that received 
little media coverage, eg. stomach cancer and strokes 
(Slavic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, 1976). 
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A third heuristic described was 'anchoring and 
adjustment' .A natural starting, point, or an anchor 
is used as a first approximation to the judge: ent, for 
example after having received one or t; *ýo items of in- 
formation such as knowledge of a couple of symptoms. 
The anchor is then adjusted to accommodate the impli- 
cations of additional information such as a physical 
examination. The anchor can be imprecise and adjustment 
insufficient. An earlier study had de; r-ionst-r-ated this 
effect (Hammond, Kelly, Schneider & Vancini, 1967). Nurse 
subjects revised their judgements about the probability 
of a fictional patient having a particular condition about 
one-third-as much as a normative model would prescribe 
when presented with a fresh piece of information. 
These findings have been obtained in numerous 
similar studies (Vise & : Jockovat, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 1973: 
1974; Hammerton, 1973; Lyon & Slovic, 1976; Nisbet t& 
Borgida, 1975). However, there have been criticisms of 
the work in terms of artificiality, the relevance of 
normative theory and post-hoc explanations of the data. 
Cohen (1979) suggested that Kahneman & Tversky 
assume that the human mind has only one legitimate frame- 
work within ;, lhich to reason about uncertain events ie. 
probability theory. He stated that to accuse someone of 
a computational error within a logical or mathmatical 
system, you need first to be sure that you have correctly 
interpreted what system is being used. But, in order to 
study decision making it is necessary to have an objective 
criterion of competence. The simple normative model, 
Baye `s Theorem, serves to set a criterion of potential 
competence against which a natural decision can be compared. 
The problem arises with an assumption of opt _mal performance 
and optimal modes. At the en?. of the day what are considered 
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to be optimal outcomes are evaluated by judgement. Out- 
comes as a result of a process that is considered to be 
rational and desirable, and the axioms are thought to be 
reasonable (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). It is with this 
qualification that apparent deviation from a normative 
prescription can be interpreted. A normative approach, 
despite descriptive shortcomings, has stimulated con- 
siderable work but whether it reflects the natural 
environment is questionable. Kahneman & Tversky (1982a) 
identified a need for a positive account that explains 
errors via heuristics and a negative account explaining 
why the correct rule has not been learned. It appears to 
have been the emphasis on the notion of 'error' or 'bias' 
in judgement that has been controversial. These points 
will be returned to at a later stage. ' 
Olson (1976) suggested that a fundamental problem 
with the 'representativeness' heuristic is in inferring 
use from a post-hoc analysis of the data. It is necessary 
to have a prior specification of the essential character- 
istics of the salient features against which the judge 
will assess 'representativeness'. This criticism does 
apply to the numerical prediction studies, but is less 
cogent with respect to category prediction. In this case, 
the 'representativeness' of a social category was an in- 
dependent variable that was systematically varied, although 
those characteristics that were essential have not been 
precisely identified. The strategy employed by people 
in 
a condition of an uninformative description, who still 
ignore base-rates cannot be interpreted from this evidence. 
Rather, the mode of presentation of base-rate information 
is worthy of consideration and this will be discussed 
in 
the next section. 
Overall, the strategies or heuristics that subjects 
employed can be inferred from performance as an 
initial 
step in examining how natural decisions are made. 
It is 
14 
interesting to examine why people fail to learn about or 
are unable to use statistical realities, if this is the 
case, and apply them to prediction. The evidence re- 
viewed thus far suggests that the heuristic or strategy 
selected, the way it is employed and the "accuracy" of 
judgement are all very problem specific. Heuristics are 
inadequate as a general theory of judgement because of 
the difficulty of knowing which one will be applied in 
any particular situation. However, whether a general 
theory will predict the strategy employed in all situations 
is open to debate. The next section considers why people 
fail to learn the conditional probabilities of the decision 
environment, and questions further the use of optimal models. 
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1.4 
The Task Environment 
The task environment in which nurses and doctors 
typically function will be discussed in relation to the 
persistence of an "illusion of validity" that is commonly 
held about judgement accuracy. Self-confidence in 
judgements made by a group of clinicians has been found 
to increase as a function of the amount of information 
available to them, but without any corresponding increase 
in judgemen ýal accuracy (Oskamp, 1965). People have been 
found to show most confidence when information is consis- 
tent and/or extreme. But the presence of extreme infor- 
mation is a situation of maximum regression, when maximum 
caution and least confidence should be exhibitied (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1973). 
Castalian (1977) emphasised the importance of under- 
standing the environmental characters tics in which 
behavour occurs. The decision making environment is very 
complex, with many factors operating. Estes, (1976) stated 
two general conditions for an accurate estimation of 
probabilities: 
1. Alternative events involved in a 
situation must have equal opportunities 
of occurence, and 
2. the learner must attend to and encode 
occurences of all the alternative events 
with equal uniformity and efficiency' 
However, these preconditions are violated when a 
judgement leads to an action. The choice of one alternative 
excludes others, therefore, outcomes that are contingent 
on actions taken and not taken will typically have unequal 
opportunities of occurence. Further to this the independent 
16 
variables in the environment must be disentangled by 
cognitive activity, and therefore be subject to effects 
such as memory loss, information overload, recency and 
primacy effects (Hammond, 1978). 
Einhorn & Hogarth (1978) examined the decision 
environment comprehensively where the basic tasks con- 
sidered involved judgements made for choosing between 
actions. They observed that most studies simply 
correlated judgements with criteria and neglected choice 
between actions. A model for learning and maintaining 
confidence in judgement was the result and the role of 
positive (successful decisions) and negative (unsuccessful 
decisions) outcome feedback were considered. In the real 
world, decisions are made for the purpose of choosing 
between actions. The outcome feedback, or information 
about the accuracy and appropriateness of the decision, 
only being available after the action has been taken and 
is often the only available source of information. 
Evidence was cited that suggested that people judge 
the strength of a relationship by frequency information 
rather than probabilities (Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 
1963; 1966; Ward & Jenkins, 1955). It has also been shown 
that people have difficulty using disconfirmatory evidence 
(Wason, 1960; 1966; 1968; 1969). Einhorn & Hogarth (1978) 
suggested that the principle difficulty lay with the 
structure of judgemental tasks in the natural environment 
as this determines the conditions in which inferential 
learning can occur. 'Alhere a nurse selects patients for a 
treatment or people for nurse training, what is unknown is 
the response of people for treatment or training who were 
not selected. 
The model developed relating positive hits (correct 
choice of action) and false choices of. action (false 
positives) to confidence in judgement made two basic 
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assumptions. Firstly, evidence about outcomes that are 
contingent on actions that are not taken is frequently 
missing, or if the outcomes are available attention is 
not paid to them. Secondly, action/outcome combinations 
are coded as frequencies rather than probabilities. The 
model considered two possible actions denoted A and B, 
where'X was an overall evaluate judgement and Xc was a 
cut-off point. Therefore: - 
if ýC> (c choose action A 
if j(<- 'c choose action B 
In order to compare decision? ( to a standard, the ex- 
istence of a criterion Y was assumed to serve as a basis 
for evaluating the accuracy of judgement ie. outcome 
feedback with cut-off point Y c, there foreY> Yc andY4! c. 
The two types of error would be: - 
false positives (Y<Yc/'» c) and 
false negatives (Y$Yc/'X<«c) 
The probability of observing a successful outcome was 
stated to depend on: - 
1. Nc, the base rate 
2. '(c, the selection ratio 
3. )X1 , "true" judgemental ability 
ie. the correlation that would 
occur in the absence of treatment effects 
4. t, the size of the treatment effects 
These four factors were systematically varied in a 
simulation experiment and the observable positive hit rate 
was shown to be maximally affected when judgement was highly 
selective (low selection ratio ) and when the base rate and 
selection ratio were close to each other. Figure 2 illustrates 
the effect of treatment and the assumptions of the model 
upon observable judgement. 
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Fig. 1. Effects of treatment on the observed positive 
hit rate (from Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978) 
The dotted -elipse represents the "true" relationship 
between judgements and outcomes and the shaded portion 
c 
indicates only the outcomes that can be observed. 'here 
treatment is weighted to reflect its relative size all actions 
given A are increased by a constant amount, so the observed 
number of positive hits is greater than would be the case in 
the absence of treatment. The feedback to the decision maker 
is contaminated, in that the number of positive hits is in- 
flated with a concomitant obscuring of false negatives, those 
who would have responded had they been selected. The 
rationale behind the methodology of chemotherapeutic research 
is to clarify the observation of outcomes. Where two drugs 
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are being compared with each other and (ideally) a placebo, 
a substantial group of patients with a comparable disease 
status are randomly ascribed to one of the three conditions. 
The main conclusions from Einhorn & Hogarth (1978) 
can be summarised. Outcomes that are contingent on actions 
taken and not taken will, typically, have unequal oppor- 
tunities of occurence. If there is equality, disconf irraing 
evidence may be ignored. If symptom X implies disease Y, Y 
is unlikely to be considered in the absence of X. The 
simulation results indicated high observed positive rates 
in many situations. Also, if information in the natural 
environment is acquired sequentially ie. is processed item 
by item, memory for disconfirming instances needs to be 
aided. 
Judgements and actions are taken in particular task 
environments. Factors, such as base-rates, selection 
ratios, treatment effects, uncertainty of the task, serial 
vs, simultaneous presentation of information, completeness 
of judgement/action combinations can all vary between 
different environments. The combination of judgements, 
actions and environments produce outcomes. If awareness 
of environmental variables and their effects is lacking, 
outcome feedback will be ineffective. There is work to 
show that this is the case (Cas Callan, 1977; Slovic ýL 
Lichtenstein, 1971). Also, in the absence of adequate 
control or understanding of environmental factors, in- 
ference regarding caudal relationships between judgements, 
actions and outcomes is problematic. Therefore, if in 
many situations people are unable to observe and learn 
the real distribution of outcomes and have insufficient 
evidence to refute the validity of their judgements, an 
illusion of validity will persist and will be difficult 
to change. People do not have the opportunity to assess 
probabilities. 
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Einhorn & Hogarth (1981) questioned the prevelance 
of normative models in the study of decision making and 
their absence in other branches of science. As discussed 
earlier, they isolated a need for a criterion of optimal 
performance. An optimal criterion where behaviour is 
assumed tobe purposeful and goal-directed, the objective 
being to attain those goals with maximum benefit and 
minimum cost. In other words an assumption of functionality. 
They defined optimality as: - 
"...., decisions or judgements that maximise 
or minimise some explicit and measurable 
criterion (eg. profits, errors, time) con- 
ditional on certain environmental assumptions 
and specified time horizon". 
The emphasis was on the conditional nature of opti- 
mality. Simon (1979) observing the complexity of the 
environment had suggested that it is necessary either to 
construct optimal models by making simplifying environmental 
assumptions, or maintain greater environmental realism 
through heuristic models. 
Einhorn & Hogarth (1981) observed a lac1 of con-- 
sideration of the conditional nature of optimal models. 
They took the frequent finding ihat people are insufficiently 
regressive in their judgements and suggested that the 
situation of a changing process, as opposed to stability, 
had been ignored. They suggested that with a changing pro- 
cess regressive predictions are suboptimal. The example 
given was, where large financial losses suffered by a 
company are attributed to be due to poor management and 
worsening conditions, a realistic forecast would anticipate 
even more extreme losses. The process of change is mediated 
by the decision makers' attribution of causality. A 
statistical model would assume that the recent losses were 
generated by a stable process and would predict that profits 
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would regress to their mean level. 
Further assumptions surrounding a normative model's 
prediction of optimal performance were criticised in this 
review. Much of the work assumed conditional independence, 
perfectly reliable data and well-defined sample spaces that 
may not be representative of the information in the natural 
environment. Other work has questioned an interpretation 
from the studies employing statistical models that suggested 
that people inevitably ignore base rates (Christensen- 
Szalanski & Beach, 1982). The abstract nature of a base 
rate summary statistic used in many of these studies may 
not have been salient enough for the subjects to recognise 
the relevant population that defined that base rate. In 
an experiment where pre--training was given about base rate 
information, subjects learned and used that information. 
Also, physicians' diagnoses of the presence/absence of 
pneumonia suggested that information about the base rate 
prevalence of pneumonia was being used (Christensen- 
Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981). Further the mode of presen- 
tation of information about risk influenced the perceived 
importance of that risk when subjects estimated the importance 
of five diseases as causes of death (Harding, Fiser. & 
Kristiansen, 1982). 
Overall, environmental factors have been largely 
ignored when predicting optimal performance. The outcome 
feedback that people observe often prevents them from learn- 
ing about "true" relationships and those "true" relationships 
only hold under specific conditions that may not be reflected 
in the natural environment. These criticisms were directed 
largely at assumptions of competence predicted by statistical 
models. A normative cost/benefit theoretical approach 
attempts to make allowances for the environmental limitations 
imposed upon the cognition of the decision maker 
(Beach & 
Mitchell, 1978) This will be discussed further in a later 
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section, the issue for a medical decision is that base 
rate information can be neglected and decision making 
can be aided by the use of a simple formula. The next 
section discusses a broader range of work that explores 
further cognitive factors that influence the way in which 




As was stated earlier, the need for a dual account 
of the findings of-experiments employing normative models 
has been recognised (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a). They 
suggested a need for a positive account that explains 
errors via heuristics and a negative account explaining 
why the "correct" rule has not been learned. The pre- 
ceding discussion was concerned with the context of the 
decision environment and there is a large amount of work 
that has studied how people process and learn to use 
probabilistic cues when making judgements about events 
(for a short review Castallan, 1977). The early work 
adopted a binary-value single cue task, ie. the cue was 
valued at either 0 or 1 (Atkinson, Bogartz & Turner, 1959; 
Burke & Estes, 1957; Atkinson, 1961; Summers, 1968). But 
this simplified methodology could only touch on the problem. 
Other work was concerned with concept learning under con- 
ditions where the feedback that was given was either in- 
formative or misinformative. 
A combination of the early paradigms has resulted 
in studies that involve people in multi-cue probability 
learning (McPL) -tasks. These tasks required subjects to 
integrate information from two or more stimulus dimensions, 
where the validity of a cue predicting an event must be 
inferred. The results from the studies found that subjects 
attended to both dimensions in a task where two were used 
and further, they attended to both even when one was less 
relevant (Castallan & Edgell, 1973). This interferred 
with performance most when the relevant cue was of low 
validity (Castallan, 1973). The overall findings from the 
MCPL studies demonstrated that people can learn to pro- 
cess information about cue dimensions and configurations 
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of cues when it is appropriate to do so. But, in 
probabilistic judgement tasks, subjects did not adopt 
optimal response strategies. They did not learn to 
ignore irrelevant information, even when they were told 
that it was irrelevant (Castallan, 1977). Knowledge 
about the structure of the task did not necessarily lead 
to learning. 
Models and theories of decision making will be 
reviewed in the following section, but Estes (1976) noted 
that no single model of decision-making could fully 
account for all the probability-learning data to that 
date. Although different models did account for and 
predict portions of the total data of the vast number of 
experiments in this area, Estes pointed out that in all 
cases, what is learned by the judges has to be inferred 
from performance in an experimental situation and con- 
cluded that the likelihood of one general model accounting 
for all the findings was low. In order to try and under- 
stand why different models were required to deal with 
different situations, Estes took a step back and considered 
the influence of memory on performance. He considered how 
and what people learn about probabilities. 
Tulving (1972) postulated a distinction between two 
components of memory, an episodic store and a semantic 
store. These stores being seen as conceptually, as opposed 
to physically, distinct. The episodic store is concerned 
with the recording of instances of events whereas the 
semantic store is concerned with meaning, or, in the current 
case, relative frequencies. It was apparent to Estes that 
different models were concerned with different components. 
But the typical probability paradigm represents a mixture 
of contributions from episodic and semantic memory. When 
the effects of the two different components were experi- 
mentally separated, subjects were found to be very efficient 
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at storing information about probabilities as relative 
frequencies. They appeared to scale the frequencies of 
events in memm: ory. But stimulus per se did not influence 
the choice of probability. Estes suggested that subjects 
category sed the events involved in a tasllr and then learned 
the relative frequencies within classes. But they did not 
always carry the process of categorisation far enough, 
possible because of limited memory performance. 
Sniezek (1980) attempted to distinguish betvvreen the 
ability to acquire information about probabilistic events 
and the ability to use that information. In an experiment 
where subjects had to learn the relationship betv, v,? een cues 
and the. criteria that were predicted by those cues, they 
were also required to retrieve information from memory 
about the probabilistic relationship between the cues and 
criteria. Performance demonstrated that subjects could 
ascertain the probabilistic information, however, this 
ability was negatively affected if they were asked to re- 
call specific past events. The cognitive load required 
to simultaneously learn and apply probabilistic relation- 
ship , plus make a prediction, was 
too much for these 
subjects. The materials involved in the experiment were 
all numerical and the implied application of the proba-- 
b: ilistic information required arithmetical calculation and 
manipulation which made this a very difficult task to do. 
The implication is that the "expert" in a clinical 
judgement situation, in this case a doctor or nurse, can 
successfully extract information about signs and symptoms 
and the patient condition that they s-J.. gnify. It is the 
combination process that could be problematic. "1 ork 
looking at the role of the "expert" in a decision task 
made the distinction between data collection and the 
method of combination of that data (Einhorn, 1972). 
Einhorn' s study was an intensive investigation of three 
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pathologists who each viewed the slides of 193 patients 
who -had died as a result of Hodgkin's disease. Their 
task was to predict survival time in months on the basis 
of nine histological signs that the subjects had previously 
specified. The patients had all had histological in- 
vestigations on entry to hospital, and their survival 
time was known. The nine components used did correlate 
with actual survival time. However, the clinicians 
overall global judgement of severity did not show the 
anticipated negative correlation with actual survival time, 
rather the correlations were random. 
The thrust of Einhorn' s work was to consider the 
role of machines in aiding the task of diagnosticians. 
The suggestion being that the expert defines the relevant 
cues that need to be combined, and the combination is done 
mechanically. Clarke (1982) suggested decision analysis 
for doctors as a supplement to the acquisition of 
scientific knowledge in the education of surgical residents. 
Taking the mechanisms underlying information pro- 
cessing a stage further, it is now intended to consider 
characteristic encoding biases that occur as a result of 
the categorisation process. In terms of the general model 
the concern is with selective acquisition and processing. 
Grosz& Grossman (1968) studied the response of five 
pyschiatrists and found. that they each had an idiosynchriatic 
way of handling clinical data. They found a tendency for 
the individual. clinicians to show a consistent overall bias 
in their, judgements of routine psychiatric examinations, a 
bias that was independent of the data. This small study 
gave an indication of an effect worthy of more systematic 
study. Hammond (1970) investigated the poor reliability 
of judgements made by clinical psychologists, attempting 
to identify the sources of variance that result in poor 
reliability. Hammond made the point that there is a 
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difference between judgements of physical attributes, 
eg. size and weight, and a personality variable, eg. 
dependency or aggressiveness. The former are identifiable 
and measurable by virtue of possessing a generally 
agreed-upon definition and procedure for assessment, 
whereas, the latter are not. 
As has already been discussed the context of 
occurrence alters expectations. In a study of perceptual 
processes, subjects viewing a rapidly rotating cross 
saw a cross or a square, dependent on what they were told 
to expect (Hochberg & Brooks, 1977). This suggested 
integration of information into a schematic map appropriate 
to expectancies, which in this case was probably not 
verbally mediated. Hammond observed a highly significant 
statistical relationship between cognitive structure and 
the concepts that the clinicians inferred from the 
clinical material. Gillmore & Hill (1981) found that 
nurses' reactions to patients with pain were affected as a 
result of an ambiguous diagnosis. The influence of four 
sociological factors, characteristics of the patient, of 
the clinician, the clinician's interaction with the pro- 
fession and the health care system have been reviewed in 
relation to medical decision making (Eisenberg, 1979). 
Taking this work a stage further, Arkes & Harkness 
(1980) liken diagnoses to schematic representations. 
Bransford, Barclay & Franks, (1972) found that people 
falsely recognise having seen related idea units as being C 
contained within the same sentence, even when they had 
been presented independently. They naturally integrated 
related ideas into a whole. Arkes & Harkness found that 
the effect of reaching a diagnosis was to falsely 
recognise related symptoms that had not been originally 
presented in the judgement task. Subjects also displayed 
more confidence that they had seen related symptoms before 
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than they did at having seen unrelated symptoms. However, 
there was a positive effect of more accurate rejection of 
new unrelated evidence. 
Medin, Alton, Edelson & Freko (1982) in an experiment 
involving initial training about a fictitious disease, some 
symptoms were correlated with each other and others were 
independent. When choosing new cases, subjects tended to 
choose the case that preserved the correlation in preference 
to the case that broke it, even when the case with correlated 
symptoms had fewer typical symptoms. When judging which 
disease was present in a single case, subjects diagnoses 
were determined by the correlated symptoms. However, 
Johnson, Hassebrock, Duran & Tholler (1982) in a thinking 
aloud paradigm found that the treatment of ambiguous in- 
formation by doctors varied as a function of experience. 
It can be concluded that people do not merely encode 
the original symptoms. The diagnosis is a schematic 
representation that is a coalescence of related information. 
An implication is that consistent symptoms will later be 
thought to have been present when the diagnosis was made, 
even though they may not have been actually present. The 
work of Sulin & Dooling (1974) suggests that this effect 
will increase with time. They found that a judgement was 
better recalled than the information on which it was based. 
The task and environment structure plus memory organisation 
form a context that'can suggest how the "availability" 
heuristic is mediated. 
Pollard (1982) considered the similarity between the 
"availability" heuristic and a "matching" bias used to 
describe subjects' response in syllogistic reasoning 
tasks. He considered work looking at abstract and thematic 
syllogistic reasoning and interpreted the results in terms 
of the "availability" heuristic. Abstract material typically 
29 
induced a response from subjects that appeared to be 
mediated by "matching" the available material in the 
stimulus presentation. The responses to thematic material 
appeared to be mediated by the availability of represen- 
tative past experience and context. The work reviewed 
above studying memory organisation would predict this 
effect. There is a need for further experimentation 
regarding the conditions under which "availability" or 
"representativeness" would mediate response and the in- 
teractions between the two heuristics. 
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1.6 
Descriptive Theories and Models of Decision Making 
The evidence that has been reviewed has documented 
some descriptive shortcomings of normative models and 
corresponding problems of optimal performance. But the 
work has isolated the use of strategies that may serve 
as a basis for descriptive theories. 
Any general theory of decision making would have 
to explain and predict the processes involved in the 
acquisition of information, processing that results in a 
decision and external ? actors that can affect both these 
stages (Fig. 1), and incorporate a description of the 
values and beliefs of the decision maker. Kahneman & Tversky 
(1982b) suggested that recent psychological studies of 
judgements made under uncertainty have treated all forms 
of uncertainty in terms of a single dimension of probability 
or belief. Berkeley & Humphrey (1982) identified seven 
different forms of uncertainty about outcomes that are 
contingent on preceding and subsequent events, the effect 
of extraneous events, the role of prior information, how 
to conceptualise worth, how to precede, how to act and the 
extent of a persons ability to influence change. The 
scope required of a general theory coupled with a precise 
knowledge of processes suggests a reason why there is no 
one theory that adequately accounts for all the findings 
in this area. 
The work reviewed so far has, in the main, employed 
the statistical model Bayes' theorem as a normative model 
prescribing optima. performance. Other work looking at 
the risky choice and gambling paradigms has applied other 
formulations of cost-benefit principles to strategy 
selection that have led to a theoretical framework (Beach 
& Mitchell, 1978). A variety of simple strategies have 
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been identified that have not been discussed within this 
review, rather the emphasis has been on those strategies 
relevant to the theoretical base of the study to be 
described. 
The cost-benefit theoretical framework of Beach & 
Mitchell (1978) has resulted from work with model based 
paradigms and adjustment of parameters to meet descriptive 
requirements. The framework suggests that strategy 
selection is as a result of a compromise between the desire 
to make a correct decision and the desire to minimise 
effort. Payne (1982) reviewed studies of contingent 
decision behaviour and theoretical models that have been 
postulated to account for findings. The model suggested 
by Beach & Iditchell (1978) related the value of a correct 
decision and the costs of applying various decision 
strategies to eight variables. These variables pertained 
to the task structure and context, and the assumption was 
that the process selected would maximise the anticipated 
benefits or significance of a correct decision against the 
cost of using the process. The combination of cost/benefit 
considerations was assumed to follow an additive rule. 
These ideas have been further reviewed (Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1981). 
Payne (1982) reviewed several questions regarding 
which factors are most important to strategy selection, 
whether selection is a compensatory or non-compensatory 
process and the extent to which strategies are selected 
at the start or at multiple points during the process. 
It was suggested that the notion of strategy selection as 
a higher level decision that involves consideration of cats 
and benefits provided a framework for task effects and 
contingent processing behaviour. It also maintains an 
assumption of rationality on the part of the decision 
maker. The use of a suboptimal decision rule would be 
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seen as the result of a rational cost-benefit approach 
to strategy selection (Christiansen-Szalanski, 1978; 
1980). This framework is also in line with the early 
decision research (Simon, 1955; Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 
1956). But the meaning of cost/benefit is dependent on 
the task representation, thus context. A tax* cut could 
be seen by an individual as a reduced loss from income or 
a welcome gain. Further, this analysis can always be 
applied after the event and can therefore be circular 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). 
Tversky. & Kahneman (1981) suggested that people 
were normally unaware of alternative frames of reference 
and the potential attractiveness of options. Through a 
simple rewording of a decision problem subjects were in- 
ferred to have been employing a gain/loss encoding of 
possible outcomes rather than an encoding in terms of 
absolute wealth. In a decision task where subjects had to 
decide between two alternative immunisation programmes 
against a lethal disease, rewording the problem from a 
statement of lives saved to one of lives lost produced 
differing results. Two sets of the two alternative pro- 
grammes were used, the first set was stated in terms of 
the number of lives saved and the second in terms of the 
number lost, but the sets involved identical statements of 
risk. Tversky & Kahneman suggested that the change in 
wording resulted in a pronounced shift from risk evasion 
(where problem stated as lives saved) to risk taking (where 
stated as lives lost). 
They proposed Prospect Theory, an extension of the 
older expected utility model, which distinguished two 
phases in the decision process (Tverksy & Kahneman, 1981). 
An initial phase where the problem is edited into a simpler 
representation followed by a phase of evaluation. The 
editing phase is seen as the primary source of context 
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effects in decision making. The same set of options might 
be edited in different ways depending on the context in 
which it appears. Once the editing phase is completed, 
the basic evaluation is invariant across representations. 
The editing phase can be seen as processing of context 
information at the acquisition stage of the process (Fig. 
1). 
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) suggested that the editing 
phase is a perceptual and pre-conscious process and made 
an analogy with visual perception. Perception is veridical 
relative to the reference point of the observer ie. the 
context of observation. The basic problem is how per- 
ceptual strategies have developed (Payne, 1982). Further, 
if perceptual strategies are as a result of pre-conscious 
automatic processes they should be invariant across subjects 
- given common experience. Prospect theory does accommodate 
findings of risky choice studies but not others (Payne 1952). 
The theoretical models described so far have attempted to 
extend the role of normative, prescriptive models to that 
of a descriptive model. Other work has been concerned with 
the way in which algebraic models can adequately describe 
the differential use of cues by decision makers. 
Shanteau (1972; 1975) proposed an algebraic model 
based on Anderson's integration theory. Anderson (1972) 
used a regression approach to develop a model that described 
the way people weight and combine information. By using 
a simple differential weighting of cues, Anderson described 
configurality present in clinical judgement that had pre- 
viously been observed by standard regression techniques. 
Goldberg (1968) had concluded that a linear, additive model 
appeared -to predict the judgements made by doctors and 
clinical psychologists quite well. Anderson pointed out 
that a direct application of regression techniques to the 
study of judgement is misleading because they obscure 
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configurality that may be present in the data. A simple 
regression technique depends on additive, equally weighted 
beta parameters and can impose linearity on data that may 
not be linear. It does not allow the person to differentially 
weight different signs or symptoms, seeing some as more 
serious or significant than others. Anderson proposed a 
differential weighting and averaging model which successfully 
described configurality in judgement which had been obscured 
in, the linear model. This can be seen as a good surface 
description of the decision/judgement process but the 
underlying cognitive processes may be rather different to 
the surface form of the model as has been indicated by 
other work reviewed. Wallstan (1972; 1977) has formulated 
a. model similar to that of Anderson (1972) and assumed that 
people process cues for the purpose of evaluating one 
hypothesis relative to another. Which in a natural decision 
situation may-be an over simplification, where more than 
two possibilities may be under consideration by the decision- 
maker. 
A very different model was proposed by Abelson (1976). 
He suggested a model of script processing based on the 
concept of a "cognitivescript", a cognitive script being 
"a coherent sequence of events expected by the individual 
involving him. either as a participant or an observer". A 
script in this case would be a diagnosis stored with the 
associated signs and symptoms, and the expectations of 
occurrence based on previous experience and learning. It 
is possible to postulate a role for both the "represen- 
tativeness" and the "availability" heuristics, where a 
script may be accessed. Either because the situation in 
which the decision is being made is sufficiently similar to 
a previously encountered situation, or because of a judge- 
ment based on frequency. 
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The process by which Abelson suggested cognitive 
scripts are formed will be described, followed by t=ie 
theory of how people use them to make decisions. Firs try, 
a vignette recording a single episode may be stored as 
a single unit and this can happen repeatr_ýdly. It is 
suggested that similarity groupings can then build up 
categorical vignettes from many single experiences of a 
given type of situation. The similarity groupings are 
said to occur as a result of a feature abstraction from 
a single vignette and a pattern recognition decision being 
made on the basis of feature matching or similarity. It 
is still unclear as to how people do assign objects or 
experience to categories, whether it is by a matching of 
features (Selfridge, 1959) or by a more abstract description 
of the structural functional dimension of an object or 
experience (Sutherland, 1973). Abelson suggested that y°ýi th 
enough experience in a single domain, lists of features 
can be processed instead of each vignette that makes up 
the script, ie. the script as a whole is processed. 
Abelson suggested that in natural decision-making, 
it is clear that statistical decision models are inadequate 
to reflect actual cognitive processes or predict outcomes. 
People do not ordinarily make decisions based on combinations 
of prognostic cues (Dawes, 1976). In terms of decision- 
. making, Abelson suggested the three levels at which scripts 
are formed reflect three levels of later use. First is the 
episodic level where a past, single case recalled is similar 
to the present case. Then there is what is called the 
categorical level, where a generic type is involved, eg. 
stereotype of a particular patient group. Lastly, there 
is the abstract/hypothetica L level which consists of bundlý: s 
of pro's and con's, where success is a hypothetical vac iabl e 
contingent on all important innumerable features. It is at 
this level that the work described until now has assumed to 
be the level at which people operate ixhen making decisions. 
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Abelson suggested that this may not be the case. He 
conjectured that they are predisposed to operate at the 
first and second categorical levels in many instances. 
The "availability" bias would suggest the first level and 
the "representativeness" bias the second. 
The model can be seen to be concerned with infor- 
mation acquisition, the way it is processed and the resulting 
output. Abelson (1981) described a script as nothing more 
or less than the simultaneous activation of a set of events, 
any of which may become involved in local inference. But 
there are differing levels of inference and not every simple 
inference involves a script. Therefore, for a script to 
have status as a cognitive structure, it must embody more 
than a simple inference rule. 
There is good evidence of a simultaneous activation 
process (Anderson, 1980). The priming of one script event 
from a story lead to especially fast recognition of another 
script event from that story. The priming of the script 
name led to faster recognition of script events 
(den Uyl 
& van Oostendorp, 1980). A major test of the power of 
scripts to organise understanding was the gap-filling 
phenomenon found in studies of prose comprehension. People 
have shown a strong tendency to falsely recognise non- 
mentioned script events (Bower, Black & Turner, 1979; 
Graesser, Woll, Kowalski & Smith, 1980). This effect was 
discussed earlier in relation to the work of Arkes & 
Hark- 
ness (1980) who found that the effect of making a 
diagnosis 
was to falsely recognise related symptoms. 
Further, the 
strong preference shown to maintain correlation 
between 
symptoms suggested a script--like organisation 
(Medin, 
Altom, Edelson & Freko, 1982)o 
Convergent work concerned with processes of social 
categorisation can lend indirect support 
for the notion of 
a script. Stereotypes 
(Ta j fel., 1978), "schema" (Markus, 
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1977: Taylor & Crocker, 1981), implicit personality 
Theories (Schneider, 1973), "prototypes" (Cantor & Nischel, 
1977) and scripts can all be seen to be conceptually very 
similar. That is when the script is being used at the 
first or second categorical level. Social categories can 
lead to encoding biases (Hamilton, 1976: 1979: Hamilton 
& Rose, 1980). That is they can determine the acquisition 
stage or processing and subsequently encoding by determining 
what information in the environment or about a person is 
selected ie. setting up prior expectations that are then 
sought to confirm. Behavioural consequences resulting from 
bias have also been observed (Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid, 
1977). 
One of the major problems for a theory of decision 
making is the lack of'performanee invariance characteristics 
of much of the work. This has made the identification of a 
small number of underlying principles that can describe 
decision behaviour complicated (Payne, 1982). Abelson's 
model allows different strategies to be incorporated at 
different levels The problem arises as to how the level 
of decision performance is determined and to define precise 
mechanisms and processes that are encompassed within an 
"all embracing" theory that can predict strategy use. 
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1.7 
Studies of Nursing; /Medical Decisions 
Clinical inferences made by nurses first became 
the subject of study in the mid-sixties with a series 
of studies that looked at, amongst other things, the 
information units used by nurses and the search strategies 
that they employed (Hammond, Kelly, Schneider & Vancini, 
1966; Hammond, Kelly, Castallan, Schneider & Vancini, 
1966). The results were disappointing and this was 
largely due to a lack of understanding of natural decision 
making and an assumption of statistical reasoning. 
Medical decision making has received considerable 
attention (Eistein & Bordage, 1979). A major focus of 
decision improvement has been computer--based aids (Short- 
life, Buchanan & Feigenbaum, 1979). It is intended to 
give a very brief overview of work concerned with natural 
medical decisions and then consider a study of nurses' 
decisions. Many studies of medical decisions have been 
directed towards medical education. Expert performance 
has been analysed identifying aspects of that performance 
to be emphasised when teaching students (Elstein, Shulman 
& Sprafka, 1978). Other work has been concerned with 
attempting to identify the organisation of factual knowledge 
and inference rules necessary for effective clinical 
decisions (Kassirer & Gorry, 1978). As has already been 
discussed, the consequencies of making a diagnosis for 
later symptom pairing and recall have been studied (1viledin, 
Altom, Edelson & Freko, 1982; Arkes & Harkness, 1980); 
and the interpretation of medical information has been 
found to vary as a function of experience (Johnson, Hassebrock 
Duran & Moller, 1982). Yet, Elstein, Holmes, Ravitch, 
Rovner, Holzman & Rothert (1983) in a brief review of work 
in this area, noted that it still remains to integrate the 
results of studies of medical decisions into a more general 
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theory of information processing. 
Elstein et. al. (1978) adopted a problem-solving approach to examine 
clinical reasoning. They sought to describe the thoughts and steps that 
characterise a doctor solving a clinical problem in a paradigm that is 
more representative of the medical setting. The method employs verbal 
protocols and direct observation. The transcripts are analysed and from 
this an account of reasoning is constructed. This paradigm exercises less 
control over the type of information sought and collected than is true of 
a normative approach. Generalisation is not from a tightly controlled 
(but artificial) research setting, rather account is taken of clinical 
reality where problems are more "open" and less well defined. 
Fig. 3 Stages in diagnostic problem-solving (from Weinman, 1981) 
Elstein et. al. (1978) found that clinicians engaged in diagnosis:: 
conmonly employed the strategy of generating and testing hypothetical 
solutions to the problem. They formulated hypotheses early in the task 
and these were used to guide the search for further information and an 
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acceptable 
solution. This was contrary to accounts of diagnostic 
reasoning that assumed that the clinician amassed a large body of 
information prior to forming any diagnostic hypotheses,.. which were 
suggested by the overall pattern of that inform tion. The stages in 
the problem-solving process that were found to characterise medical 
problem-solving are illustrated in Figure 3. The initial presenting 
symptoms or complaints led to the generation of hypotheses . The 
choice and ranking of these hypotheses was influenced by several 
factors. There was the clinician's orientation (eg. psychosocial), 
considerations of disease incidence, the seriousness and treatability 
of the disease, and personal knowledge of the patient and the patient's 
background. All these factors were found to contribute to the initial 
formulation of hypotheses. This stage wa. s followed by a search for 
attributes such as signs, symptoms and test results to support or 
refute these hypotheses. But clinicians have been found to have 
difficulty testing negative attributes (McWhinney, 1972). 
Given the natural limits imposed on processing capacity, this 
reasoning process transforms the ill-defined "open-ended" problem of 
"What is wrong with the patient? " into a series of better defined 
problems (Elstein & Bordage, 1979). By constructing a set of hypothesised 
end-points (diagnoses), it becomes possible for the clinician to 
work backwards from the diagnostic criteria suggested by each hypothesis 
to the examination to be conducted. The search for information is 
simplified because only certain items will be sought. Elstein et. al. 
(1978) observed that hypotheses were retrieved using very few cues and 
the number of hypotheses considered simultaneously was usually limited 
to four or five. It was the salience of cues that was considered 
critical to retrieval because of the suggestion that "availability" 
as subjective probability was experienced as vivid, salient possibities 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
The theoretical perspective adopted by these studies was the 
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information processing or problem-solving model of Newell & Simon (1972). 
The tasks employed by Newell and Simon were moderately difficult problems 
of an abstract nature, including chess, symbolic logic, and algebra- 
like puzzles. From this work an essentially dynamic model was developed, 
which assumes a limited capacity for rational thought. The model suggests 
that hypotheses are generated and tested in order to work to a solution. 
Central, is the theoretical reduction in size of the problem space, and 
changes in the representation of a problem can change the solution process 
significantly. The first step in solution was suggested to be the 
development of an understanding of the nature of the problem and deriving 
an internal representation through the processing of key features. 
At this stage an understanding of the nature of the goal, particular 
conditions imposed and the type of information available is established, 
and as a result plans for solution are made. The distinction is made 
between alogritlims and heuristics. Newell & Simon suggested a predominant 
reliance on heuristics or strategies to find direction and guidance to 
solution in many situations. Critical is the generation of hypotheses 
of how a solution can be obtained, and the device and use of strategies 
to that end. The conversion of an "open" problem to a "closed" problem 
where the goal is defined as one of a limited set of possible goals 
(eg. diagnoses) reduces the number of attributes or items of 
information requiring testing. This would predict a limited search, 
and revision of hypotheses would predict a longer search. 
The problem-solving process was suggested to progress from one 
state of knowledge to another by the application of a all set of 
heuristics. If new information is obtained, progress is made to solution. 
But, where no new information is obtained and an impass is reached, 
revision takes place. A corrrnon and powerful heuristic is to find 
analogies between the present problem and those experienced in the past. 
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Gordon (1980) studied nursing diagnosis and took 
a different approach to that of workers engaged in 
decision analysis adopting the approach of early decision 
theorists (Bruner, Austin & Goodnow, 1956). Gordon 
suggested that, given processing limitations a "risky" 
but manageable strategy in a diagnostic task was to 
reduce the total number of possible diagnostic hypotheses 
to a manageable set, the alternative being to test every 
possible diagnostic hypothesis sequentially until a 
decision was reached. The first strategy implied an 
initial collection of information that was high in in- 
formation content and allowed a discrimination at the 
start of a task as to the most likely diagnoses. The 
distinction was made between general, relatively static 
information that could serve to place the patient in 
context eg. age, type of surgery and more specific, 
relatively changeable information such as signs and symptoml. s. 
The nurses studied were a group of sixty Master of 
Science in nursing graduates and their task was the 
diagnosis of a post-operative complication. Two complications 
were used, atelectasis and haemorrhagic shock, from a 
possible six. A list of these six cornplica uions, in all 
possible combinations, making a total of 32 possible patient 
conditions, were given to each nurse. The nurses were 
instructed that their task was to determine the current 
condition of a patient. The only information given was 
that the patient was post-operative following general sugery. 
A selection paradigm, using a modification of the game of 
Twenty Questions, was employed. Subjects were able to con- 
trol the type and sequence of information that they obtained 
by asking for each item singly. Each request 
for information 
was treated as a trial and provided 
information about the 
attribute being tested and 
the number of hypotheses the 
nurse said that she was 
testing. The statement of the 
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diagnosis reached was made at the end. The two patient 
conditions were a condition of unrestricted information, 
where atelectasis was always the post-operative compli- 
cation, and a condition where item requests were restricted 
to twelve and haemorrhagic shock was always the complication. 
The main findings were, in the first half of the 
task, significantly more multiple hypothesis testing 
took place, more so in the restricted condition (p<0.001) 
than in the unrestricted condition (p <0.01). People used 
more general items to set the scene and provide a context. 
Further, inaccurate subjects in the unlimited condition 
used more predictive testing in the second half of the task 
(p<0.001) than subjects who were accurate. These findings 
imply that predictive testing early in the task set the 
scene, ie. the use of general information to reduce the 
number of hypotheses provides an effective strategy early 
in a diagnostic task, especially when a person is restricted 
due to constraints of time. 
There was, however, a difference in performance 
between the two diagnostic tasks performed. In the un- 
limited condition, where people could request as many items 
as they felt they needed, 4.8f of the subjects attained a 
correct diagnosis. But where people were limited to twelve 
items, 88/ö of people were accurate. This was a surprising 
finding, from the preceding review, it would have been 
reasonable to predict that the accuracy of performance on 
the two tasks would be equivalent. Higher confidence levels 
would have been expected for the unlimited condition because 
of the association of confidence increasing with the amount 
of information (Tversky & Kahneman, 19'13). However, the 
mean confidence level in the unlimited condition was '17% 
and in the limited condition it was b1%. 
The differential levels of accuracy could have 
several explanations. The design of the tasks could 
have 
imposed excessive strain on memory in the unlimited condition. 
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People , teere required to recall the items that their needed 
to know from memory. Then they needed to evaluate and 
retain the information that they were given. It is -c, ossible 
that where the information was restricted, people organised 
inforrration more efficiently. However, a problem of ex- 
perimental control does make any interpretation equivocal. 
In the unlimited condition the correct diagno: 2is was al-, ays 
atelectasis, and in the limited condition it was always 
haemorrhagic shock. There is no reason to assume that 
these diagnoses were equivalent in difficulty, therefore 




Aids to Decision Makin 
Aids to medical decision making have largely con- 
centrated on computer based techniques. The potential 
of decision analysis and analytic epidemiology has been 
recognised for some time (Beck, 1983). This includes 
both clinical medicine and medical education, but 
acceptance has been slow, although software (programmes) 
has been becoming available allowing a variety of 
different analyses. Beck (1983) noted two hindering 
factors, the first being a lack of accessible computer 
facilities and secondly a lack of statistical skills 
among physicians. The lack of statistical skills is re- 
flected by an underuse of Bayes' theorem which only 
requires a pocket calculator. 
Bayes' theorem has been used and has been shown to 
perform as well, if not better, than the clinician 
(Slovic et al. 1977). Einhorn (1972; 1974) demonstrated 
the effectiveness of "bootstrapping" expertly defined and 
weighted variables with an algebraic model of that 
weighted policy. This showed how expert judgement and 
statistical techniques can incorporate poorly defined and 
hard to measure variables into a judge's model. With the 
advent of the microcomputer a variety of decision analyses 
can be more conveniently employed. Decision tree programmes 
that allow probabilities and utilities to be calculated 
and sensitivity analyses (Corrections for uncertainty) are 
available and relatively simple to master (Silverstein 
1983; Lau, Kassiter & Parker, 1983). These methods allow 
risk analyses of alternative causes of action to be calcu- 
lated, they are not simply confined to aiding diagnosis. 
Another development has been that of expert systems 
where the machine is programmed with sufficient 
information 
about a clinical area, plus a mode of decision analysis 
to 
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simulate the role of an expert in that clinical area. 
The first programme of this type was 41YCIN which was de- 
veloped for use by clinicians who were not experts in 
the field of bacteriology or pharmacology to aid their 
correct use of antimicrobial therapy (Shortliffe, 1976). 
This work is in the early stages of development but holds 
promise. for the future in terms of making expertise 
available to non-expert practitioners. 
The techniques that have been employed to aid 
medical diagnosis and decision making can be seen to be 
the result of evidence that natural decision makers can 
positively benefit from employing statistical models when 
combining information from different sources. But, useful 
as this approach may be for many medical applications, it 
can be seen as yet to have limited application for nursing. 
There are several problems. Firstly the use of relatively 
sophisticated quantitive techniques has appeared to daunt 
many medical practitioners (Beck, 1983). Nurse training 
does not develop necessary skills nor do many nursing 
decisions warrant that degree of sophisticated intervention. 
But, the development of the use of information technology 
in intensive care units offers the possibility of in- 
vestigating machine decision aids for nursing decisions in 
the future. 
Decision aids employed. in management and business 
mostly rely on taking a problem, such as identifying a 
potential market, and decompose the total problem into a 
series of structually related parts. The decision maker 
provides subjective assessments of the component parts 
(Slovic et al. 1977). Humphreys & McFadden (1980) 
suggested that the usefulness of decision aids may be as 
a result of structuring tze task and consequently clarifying 
the nature of the goals ie. helping people to evaluate 
information that has already been acquired. Russo (1977) 
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found that when unit prices were presented to supermarket 
shoppers in organised lists that were ordered by the 
relative size of the unit prices, thus giving a simultaneous 
presentation of information, purchasing patterns -;; ere 
changed. The patterns were changed for people who had 
this information compared with shoppers with no information 
or when the information was simply indicated next to the 
products on the shelves (implying sequential acquisition) . 
This decision aid, instead of helping people to evaluate 
information that had already been acquired eg. through 
"bootstrapping", reduced the strain on memory and attention 
by aiding the acquisition process. But a better under- 
standing of attention and memory processes is necessary for 
the approach to predict success (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). 
Decision-tree formats have been widely applied. 
Fischnoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, (1978) presented expert 
and novice judges with diagnostic check-lists represented 
in a decision tree form known as fault trees. The diagnosis 
was the cause of mechanical failure of a car and the results 
indicated that the apparently comprehensive format of the 
fault tree blinded both groups of judges to the possibility 
of missing causes of malfunction. Einhorn & Hogarth (1981 ) 
emphasise the role of attention and memory in the decision 
process and also discuss the relevance of context. They 
noted that context had typically been defined in terms of 
task variables and they emphasise the importance of the 
decision maker's past experience and learning, plus the 
cognitive apparatus. The role of context that is set by 
past experience has been curiously overlooked or ignored 
in much of the work in decision making. 
The following section presents a summary of the in- 
fluences on the natural decision process in the stages of 
the general model presented in Figure 1. 
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1.9 
Summary of Some of the Biases Operating at Different 
Stages of the Judgement Process 
BIAS DESCRIPTION 
AVAILABILITY The ease with which instances can be 
remembered affects judgements of 
frequency 
SELECTIVE People seek and anticipate infor- 
PERCEPTION mation that is consistent with their 
own hypotheses, often ignoring 
disconfirmatory evidence 
0 
. ri FREQUENCY People judge the relationship between 
0 a cue and criterion by its observed 
ö frequency rather than by its observed 
4-1 relative frequency 
"CONCRETE" People tend to ignore base-rates or 
o THINKING information about prior probabilities 
° ILLUSORY The belief that two variables co- ±1 CORRELATION vary when they do not 
"ý DATA The context in which an event is 
PRESENTATION observed can affect the perception 
of that event.. 
Order effects of primacy/recency 
where the first or last cues en- 
countered assume undue importance 
ö CONSERVATISM Decisions that are more regressive 
"H than Baye's theorem would predict 4-5 
0 
Pq REGRESSION Extreme judgement made with in- 
0 BIAS sufficient evidence CH 
ANCHORING & Decision made by anchoring on a cue 
ö ADJUSTII[ENTT and then adjusting for new in. f or- 
mation W z 
"ý REPRESENTAT- Likd-ihood that two people belong to 
IVENESS the same category judged by the de- 


























GORDOII' S Less accurate nurses used predictive CONTEXT ITEMS context items late in the decision. 
Could be "best-guess" or lead to cog- 
nitive strain 




k COMPLEXITY People unable to experimentally con- 
trol and vary elements in the environ- 
ment - cognitive strain 
STRESS Emotional stress can lead to panic 
judgements 
(Janis & Mann, 1977) 
CONTEXT Task variables plus the decision 
maker's past experience and learning 
SCALE EFFECTS Scale on which responses recorded can 
affect responses (Slovic & Lichten- 
stein, 1971) 
ILLUSION OF Activity concerning an uncertain event 
CONTROL can in itself induce feelings of con- 
trol over that event (Langer, 1975) 
ACTION Effect of taking an action destroys 
the likelihood of the equal occurrence 
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of later falsely rec- 







2.1 Rationale for The Experimental Work 
The objective of the first part of the work re- 
ported within this thesis was to attempt to identify 
a means of helping nurses to make more accurate de- 
cisions. Several points emerged from the work discussed 
in the review. It was, found that feedback or information 
about the outcome of a decision had litte or no effect 
on the accuracy of subsequent decisions. Nor can people 
be turned into normative decision makers. Computer 
applications were discussed in relation to their use in 
medical decision making, but the usefulness to nursing 
decisions is, as yet, uncertain for several reasons. 
First there is a lack of knowledge available about the 
information that nurses use to make many of their 
decisions and secondly, computer techniques may not be 
appropriate for many, apparently less complex decisions. 
Decision-tree formats, although widely applied, have 
been found to obscure possible cues or variables because 
. of 
their apparent completeness (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lich- 
tenstein, 1978). Einhorn & Hogartb. (1981) T noted the l . ck 
of attention paid to the role of context set by past 
experience and learning in much of the work in decision 
making. Although, by contrast, an interesting observation 
was that of Russo (1977) who found that aiding the order 
of acquisition of related information helped people to 
make more use of that information. 
A diagnosis has been proposed to be analogous to a 
schema stored in memory along with associated cues. 
Among 
the cues stored with any diagnosis are those that relate 
to-the context in which a particular diagnosis may be 
expected. Therefore, a diagnosis can be viewed as a 
coalescence of signs and symptoms, patient characteristics 
and the context in which they could occur as well as 
the 
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category/diagnostic label. All the evidence reviewed 
indicated the difficulty in isolating a small number of 
principles underlying decision making. But one general 
observation has emerged that suggested that the strategy 
people employed when making a decision was one that made 
the cognitive task manageable ie. tended to simplify the 
task. 
An examination of the totality of the processes 
involved in making a decision has been shown to be a very 
complex exercise. It was the initial phase of the pro- 
cess and the consequences for the subsequent phase that 
was examined in this work. This could be of more interest 
to nurses in terms of patient problem identification and 
a specific method of planning care eg. the Nursing Process. 
It was of interest to investigate how nurses set about 
searching for information when making a clinical decision 
ie. identifying a problem. 
Bruner, Austen & Goodnow (1959) identified two 
potential search strategies that are available when making 
decisions. In the first instance the decision maker could 
hold in memory all potential clinical judgements, and when 
all the available information has been collected select a 
judgement that fits most closely. Alternatively the de- 
cision maker could start out with a small set of likely 
judgements based on initial information, then search for 
evidence to test them. The first strategy is very 
difficult as it imposes considerable strain on the cog- 
nitive apparatus. The second requires an initial selection 
of information that allows an identification of likely 
judgements, and consequently the amount of information that 
needs to be manipulated. Mhen deciding about 
the current 
condition of a patient, information that serves 
to set the 
patient in a context can help to reduce 
the number of 
judgements needing to be examined. This would be general, 
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background information about that patient. Kassirer & 
Gorry (1978) showed that specific diagnostic hypotheses 
were generated often with little more information than 
the patient's age, sex and presenting complaints. 
Gordon (1980) adopted a similar approach although 
there were problems of task difficulty. One diagnostic 
task induced a ceiling effect. But, nurses did initially 
select this type of information more often at the beginn- 
ing of a diagnostic task than later. Further, when the 
nurses could ask for as much information as they required, 
those who asked for the general information later in the 
task were less accurate. This suggested that it was the 
initial use of general, context information to predict 
the relevance of one hypothesis versus another at the be- 
ginning of a task that served to make the task orderly and 
manageable, but predicting from general information at a 
later point served to confuse. Almost as if another 
diagnostic schema was accessed with its associated infor- 
mation and caused confusion. These nurses were very highly 
educated in surgical nursing and had considerable experience, 
they would have been familiar with the patient condition 
that required diagnosis. The more accurate nurses demon- 
strated an orderly strategy that made their task manageable, 
it was considered to be of interest to investigate whether 
less experienced nurses did the same. In the U. K. the 
nurses with the closest contact with patients are inexperienced 
learners supervised, in many situations, by recently 
qualified staff. 
It was found by Russo (1977) that aiding information 
acquisition can facilitate the use of that information. 
But a better understanding of memory and attention 
processes is necessary to predict success 
(Einhorn & Flogarth, 
1981). The paradigm that Gordon employed required the nurses 
to rely entirely on their memories for both recalling what 
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they wanted to know and remembering the answers given. 
It is unclear whether nurses were inaccurate because of 
an inefficient search strategy or because of an excessive 
retentive load on memory. It is also unclear as to whether 
similar findings would be observed when the retentive load 
is removed. Given that search/attention and memory, al- 
though inter-related, make differing contributions to the 
total decision process, attention serves to facilitate 
recognition of the relevance of information that is being 
subject to manipulationwhere there appears to be a limited 
processing capacity (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974: Kahneman 1973). 
Further, in the natural decision environment much infor- 
mation is provided, such as general patient characteristics, 
signs and symptoms. What is required is frequently the 
recognition of the relevance of this information. 
The possibility that was considered to follow from- 
this was that if inaccuracy was further found to be 
associated with a use of general information later in the 
task rather than predominantly at the start when the effects 
of memory and attention were disassociated, this could be 
potentially useful. Nurses could be taught to use context 
information at the start of a decision task. But, the use 
of general, context information later could serve to pre- 
dict fresh possibilities where initial hypotheses had not 
been confirmed, where a retentive burden is removed. 
The evidence reviewed did indicate the use of a 
"representativeness" heuristic in many judgement situations. 
This heuristic is closely connected to the strategy dis- 
cussed and it was considered to be of interest 
if some 
people were more predisposed to make use of 
this heuristic 
than others, and whether this could be implied 
by their 
level of cognitive complexity 
(Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Lobeck, 
Miller & Tripoldi, 19.70). Cognitive complexity refers 
to 
the number of dimensions that a person uses 
to describe 
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their social world. People are considered to be relatively 
complex if they use many dimensions. It was speculated 
that a person who was more complex would use more general 
information to evoke a more complex background context. 
It was decided to partially replicate and extend 
Gordon's experiment using a recognition paradigm and in- 
corporating an intervention designed to induce the early 
use of context information. Levels of cognitive complexity 
were also measured. The next chapter describes pilot work 
in which the materials were developed and the intervention 
was tested for feasibility. 
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2.2 Pilot Stuäy 
The procedure used b ,T Gordon (1980) will be briefly 
outlined. Subjects were i, -rasters graduates surgical 
nursing. They were instructed that their task was to 
evaluate the condition of a patient who had recently under- 
gone general surgery. The diagnoses were post-operative 
complications. They were called upon to recall from 
memory the information that they needed to know. They 
asked questions to request information serially and the 
type of information was recorded ie. general background 
and relatively stable information and specific sign and 
symptom information. The hypothesis that the subject re- 
ported to be testing was also recorded. In one task they 
could ask as many questions as they wished, in the other 
task they were restricted to twelve questions. 
This pilot study employed a recognition paradigm 
and did not restrict the amount of information that could 
be requested, included the intervention and a measure of 
cognitive complexity. The hypotheses were not formally 
proposed at this stage. The concern was the feasibility 
of the materials and the intervention. 
Method 
Design 
The independent variables .,, ere: - 
1. Type of information available 
a) General information 
b) Specific information 
2. Experimental intervention 
3. Cognitive Complexity 
The dependent- variables were: - 
1. Accuracy 




General information was defined as relatively stable facts 
about the condition of a patient. 
Specific information was defined as changeable facts about 
the condition of a patient. 
The task was to diagnose the current condition of a< eneral 
surgical patient 
The only information given was that the patent had 
received general surgery. The general surgical condition 
selected was appendectomy, a commonly occurring surgical 
procedure. The conditions for clinical diagnosis were three. 
post-operative complications: - 
A- Paralytic Ileus 
B- Pulmonary Embolism 
C- Urinary Retention 
The sequence of presentation was partially balanced as follows: -. 





Where two tasks, the first being for practice were 
follo\; t 
by the intervention and the third task as control for task 
difficulty and practice. 
Questions were asked serially and euere asked on 
the basis 
of recognition of an appropriate 
item from an item list. 
The intervention was an illustrated lecture, pre-wri ý. 
t en 
to standardise preseýýtations between 
the groups (App 1). 
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SUBJECTS 
Twenty-two student nurses at the end of their second 
year of training at a London Teaching Hospital. The age 
range was 20-32 years. The population was female with a 
range of educational achievement from five G. C. E '0' levels 
to nine '0' levels and three 'A' levels. This comprised 
one set of student nurses who had completed their surgical 
module and had all had surgical nursing experience. The 
surgical module contained formal teaching about post- 
operative complications and the associated pre-disposing 
states, plus signs and symptoms. 
MATERIALS 
1. A two-part questionnaire (App 2) assessed: - 
a) Personal details, ie. age, sex and educational 
qualifications 
b) Cognitive complexity measure (Bieri et al. 1970) 
Four of the roles were altered to reflect a hospital 
setting le: - 
ROLE 
! j. A patient you'd like to help 
8. A patient wive whom you feel most 
uncomfortable 
9. Ward Sister 
10. Patient difficult to under. stand 
2. Standardised lists of questions for requesting information 
(App 3). An example of the layout being: 
Question: - . `, 'hat or how much? 




2e Pain now 
1 5 
The general and specific questions were blocked 
in logical groups, eg. all vital sign information appeared 
sequentially and the blocks were randomised. There were 
a total of 39 questions. The information about the sign 
and symptom clusters associated with the chosen compli- 
cations was taken from a standard text known to be used 
as ready reference by this population of student nurses 
(Fream, 1978 "Notes on surgical nursing, App. 4). Only 
one diagnosis was appropriate for each task. 
3. A list of nine possible patient conditions, including 
the three target conditions, in randomised order 
(App. 5). 
tý. Packs of 39 individual "playing" cards with the 
answer to a request on one side and the sequence oil 
the reverse, eg. for Question 1 above, condition B. 
40 
per day 1B 
Three packs,. one for each diagnostic condition 
5. A pre-written lecture with 
transparencies instructing 
the subjects to use general. 
background information 
initially to set the scene, and then 




The session was conducbd in a classroom of the 
School of Nursing of a London Teaching Hospital. 
Questionnaires bearing the subject number had been placed 
on each desk, next to the appropriate subject number, 
face down, prior to the arrival of the subjects. When 
they arrived, the subjects were asked not to look at the 
questionnaire immediately. The researcher then introduced 
herself and gave a brief explanation of the research pro- 
ject in which they were about to take part (App. 6 General 
Instructions) . The intention of investigating reasoning 
strategies that could be taught was explained. 
Reference was then made to the questionnaire and 
the subjects were told that this would be followed by two 
short tasks, instructions for the task being given after 
questionnaire completion. Instructions were given about 
not writing names on any of the test materials. No mention 
was made at this point of the intervention or the third 
task. The subjects were then asked to complete the 
questionnaire, not pausing for too long on any one item, 
having first read the instructions. The questionnaires 
were collected on completion. 
Two packs of cards were then given to each subject, 
plus two lists of information requests and a 
list of 
possible patient conditions. The packs and 
lists had pre- 
viously been ordered and marked for 
the appropriate running 
order for individual subjects. 
Instructions were then 
given as to how to proceed with 
the tasks (App. 7). The 
subjects were asked to imagine 
that they were caring for 
a general post-operative patient. 
Their task was to assess 
the current condition of that patient. 
That condition 
would be one of the conditions 
that appeared on the list 
they had been given, and for. each task the condition would 
I 
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be different. It was explained that in order to do the 
task, they should take the first list and pack. Then 
select from the list the item of information that they 
required. They were told to take from the pack the card 
bearing the appropriate number. Then to look on the 
reverse side and the information they required would be 
available. They were asked to record the order in which 
the card was selected, and the information contained on 
it in the appropriate columns on their lists. Repeating 
this procedure with each item until a diagnosis was made. 
The subjects were asked not to look at the task 
being done by their neighbours or consult with each other. 
they were told that they could start anywhere on the list, 
there was no logic in the order and asked not to start 
with Item 1 first, unless they really wanted that piece 
of information. It was stated that not all the questions 
would be relevant to the task that they were doing and 
that they would probably need to ask about one-third of 
those available. When they had finished, the diagnosis 
reached was recorded in the space provided. Each subject 
did the first task, followed immediately by the second. 
When they had finished all the test materials were collected. 
The experimental intervention was then given by 
the researcher, accompanied by overhead transparencies. 
The intervention was in the form of a pre-written lecture 
(App. 1) which attempted to provide a strategy for making 
a diagnosis. The types of information were related to a 
script theory of human memory where diagnoses are postu- 
lated to be Gestalts of all the relevant information items. 
This was followed immediately by the 3rd task. Subjects 
were then thanked for their co-operation and 
told the 
identity of the task diagnoses. They were asked not to 
discuss what they had done with any of their colleagues as 
they could be possible subjects of further sessions. 
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Result s 
Table 2.1 Table Of. Means Of The Number Of General And 
Specific Items Used For All Subjects 
TASK 
1 st 2 Task 
General Specific 
2nd 2 Task 
General Specific 
1 2.5 4.1 1.1 6 13.8 
2 2.04 3.5 1.04 5.01 11.6 
3 3.2 3.2 0.8 5.9 13.1 
N= 22 
As can be seen from Table 1, more general questions 
were asked in the first half of the task compared with the 
second half. 
Of the total 22 subjects, only one subject was in- 
accurate in the first task, three were inaccurate in the 
second task, and two in the third task. Therefore, no 
analysis were performed. The "ceiling" effect present in 
this data, and possible reasons for it, will be discussed 
in the following section. 
A X2 analysis compared subjects who asked a total of 
12 questions in Task 2, with subjects who asked < 12 
questions. The pieces of general information considered 
were type of surgery and length of time since surgery. It 
appeared that subjects asking >12 questions were signifi- 
cantly more inclined to ask these general questions at the 
beginning of the task (X2 = 5.32: p <0.05 App. 8). A X2 
on the same basis failed to show any significant differences 
for Task 3 (App. 9). 
All subjects successfully completed eight of the ten 
roles of the cognitive complexity questionnaire. 
However, 




8. A patient with whom you feel most uncomfortable 
10. A patient difficult to understand 
No analyses could have been performed with this 
measure in view of the findings that indicate that when 
making negative decisions people use more information 
(Wallstan, 1977; Morlock, 1967). The negatively toiled 
roles imply that more constructs could be used by most 
people, therefore any overall mean score would be 
distorted. 
Discussion 
This pilot study demonstrated that the diagnostic 
tasks, as they stood were not only within the subjects' 
range of competence, but were too easy. This ceiling 
effect that was present in the data indicated a need 
for modifications to make the -task more difficult. The 
running of the session was the first area in which al- 
terations needed to be made. Subjects did whisper 
throughout, therefore, the range of possible diagnoses 
could emerge, and as the blocking procedure did not con- 
trol that, people sitting next to each other should have 
done different 'tasks, it was possible to copy. For 
future sessions it was intended to adjust the blocking 
so that no two neighbours ever did the same task, and to 
run the session in silence. The experimental instructions 
could be modified to imply a wider range of possible 
diagnostic tasks being attempted by subjects. The list 
of possible diagnoses could be extended, therefore, making 
'a guessing strategy less effective. 
As can be seen from Table 1 in the results section, 
a common strategy in the pre-intervention task was to use 
general items more in the first half of the task than in 
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the second half. An X2 analysis of task 2 revealed that 
people who used fewer items, ie. ? 12, used different 
pieces of context information. The subjects used the 
items "type of surgery" and "length of time since surgery" 
significantly more often (p<0.05) in positions 1,2 and 
3 than did subjects using <12 items. This was not 
apparent in the third post--intervention task. 
There were problems with the measure of Cognitive 
Complexity for reasons mentioned earlier. The negatively 
toned roles, patient with whom you feel most uncomfortable 
and a patient difficult to understand, was not completed 
by a proportion of subjects. The finding that when making 
negative decisions people use more information (Wallstan, 
1977; Morlo-ek, 1967. ) implies more-. complex use of -constructs 
as a general effect. This would make any compensatory 
method taken for the loss of two scores, eg. taking a mean 
for all roles completed and multiplying by the total number 
of roles, biased toward relative cognitive simplicity. 
The modifications intended to tighten the design for 
the next pilot were: - 
1. Alternation of balanced conditions so that people 
sitting beside each other did not do the same task 
2. Run the session with instructions that asked people 
not to talk at all 
3. Extension of the list of possible complications 
from which to choose 
4. Revert to the original format of Bieri et al. (1970) 
in the cognitive complexity questionnaire 
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2.3 Pilot Study 2 
Method 
Design 
As for Pilot 1, except for the balancing of the 
sequence of presentation. 
Partial Balancing Order 





Where subjects were allocated in serial progression to the 
four different orderings. 
Subjects 
29 Student nurses at the end of their second year of 
training at a London Teaching Hospital. The age range was 
19-28 years, the mean being 20.8 years. 27 subjects were 
female, 2 were male. 5 subjects were graduates, the re- 
mainder were educated. to '0' or G. C. E. 'A' Level. 
Material s 
Were unchanged, apart from the extended list of 
possible complications: - 
1. Peritonitis 
2. No complication 
3. Pulmonary embolism 
4. Haemorrhagic shock 
5. Chest infection 
6. Paralytic ileus 
7. Urinary retention 
8. Th. rombophl. ebitis 




12. `Wound infection 
13. Reduced blood pressure 
14. Asphyxia 
15. Burst wound 
16. Hernia 
17. Pelvic abscess 
18. Subphrenic abscess 
19. Iliac abscess 
20. Adhesions 
And the cognitive complexity roles which were now: - 
8. Person with whom you feel most uncomfortable 
10. Person difficult to understand 
4. A person you would like to help 
PROCEDURE 
The procedure was identical to the first pilot study, 
with the exception of the inclusion of specific instructions 
for silence and no collaboration. "Please do these -tasks in 
complete silence, I do not want you to discuss anything 
with your neighbour, even when you have finished..... People 
sitting alongside you will never be doing the same task.... " 
RESULTS 
The subjects were not distinguished between on The 
basis of level of educational attainment. One of the five 
graduates performed all three tasks correctly. One got 2 
out of 3 correct, and 3 got 1 out of 3 correct. This is 
similar to the. group's performance as a whole. 
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TABLE 2.2 
1st 2 general 
ASK II specific 
2nd 2 general 
specific 
1st 2 yo general 
ASK II y specific 
2nd z% general 
specific 
1st 2 general 
ASK III jo specific 
2nd -2 j general 
specific 
TOTAL 






















































MEANS AND STANDARD DEVILiAi'IOSTS FOR OONTE , Cl ,T AND STATE I' ýi AS A 
FUNTCT IO OF TASK HALF AND ACCURACY 
Table 2.2 presents the mean percentage scores of ge. ner 1. 
and specific questions for the first and second half of the 
task. Standard deviations were also comipu red. The means of 
the percentage of general and specific question use for the 
accurate and inaccurate subjects is presented. The mean 
number of questions asked overall range from 12-13.55. 
The tasks had been divided into two halves and the 
proportion of general and specific questions were calcu-- 
lated for each half. This allowed an exploratory analysis 
of the data. 
6L. 
TA BLEB 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUT81ARY TABLE HERE GENERAL INFORMATION 









EFFECTS 15337.8 2 7668.9 21.14 . 001 
COMPLEXITY 58.8 1 58.8 . 162 . 689 (n. s) 
TASK 15279.02 1 15279.02 42.13 . 001 
COMP x TASK 425.703 1 425.7 1.2 . 284 
EXPLAINED 15763.556 3 5254.519 14.490 . 001 
RESIDUAL 18857.213 52 362.639 
An analysis of variance was performed on Task 2 where 
context information items were examined as a function of task 
half and cognitive complexity (Table 3), task half being 
either the first or second half of the task. The Anova per- 
formed was from the S. P. S. S statistical package, the assumption 
of independence of the measures employed was violated in this 
design. The scores for the state and context items were 
correlated, each set of scores being percentages totalling 
100y10. In the main experiment it will be necessary to analyse 
the data in a manner that does not violate assumptions. How- 
ever, this- was not considered to be of major importance at the 
pilot stage. 
The main effect of a significant difference between the 
use of context information as opposed to state information 


































































The main effect for half of task was also highly 
significant (F - . 2.12: p <0.001). Graph I illustrates 
that this finding is a reflection of the use of more 
context items in the first half of the task and more 
state items in the second half. 
There was no main effect of cognitive complexity, 
nor was there an interaction of complexity with any of 
the other variables. 
Anovas of practise Task 1 and post-intervention 
Task 2 showed a similar pattern: - 
MAIN EFFECTS 
TASK 1 CONTEXT TASK 2 
F= 12.9 (p<0.001) 
TASK 3F= 25.18 (p<0.001) 
F= 25.7 (p c0.001) 
F= 49.096 (p <0.001) 
The post-intervention task did indicate a clearer 
distinction between the task halves and the use of the two 
types of items. The use of context information also in- 
crease compared with Task 1, although this difference in 
F value was considerably less between tasks 2 and 3 (F _ 
21.14 F= 25.71). 
Separate Anovas looking at the state item use for 
the three tasks were not separately computed. The state 
and context scores being perfectly correlated, totalling 
100, this Anova would be a mirror image of that examining 
the context item use. 
Tests for homogeneity of variances for the three 
tasks were computed: - 
Task 1 Variable: - Context information. 
Cochran' sC (13-4) = . 38913, p <. 178 
Bartlett-Box F (3.4867) = 1.31917, p c. 267 
Task 2 Variable: - Context information 
Cochran' sC (13-4) = . 43929 p <. 
06 
3 Bartlett--Box F (3.4867) = 2.2437243, P <. 0b 
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TASK 3 Variable: - Conte xt informat . on 
Cochran's C (13. L) = . 32337, p< . 564 
-3artlet t-: 'Do: F (3.4867) _ . 70157, p <. 551 
The Null hypothesis v. as, therefore, not, rejected at 
the p 0.01 level, and homogeneity of variance can be 
assumed for each of the tasks. 
The data for subjects who were correct compared with 
those who were incorrect (see Table 2.2) suggests a trend 
in the direction of a reduction of use of context items by 
the more 1`14. c--i-irate subjects in the second half of the task 
for Tasks 1 and 2, the reverse being the case for Task 3. 
Students t-tests for independent groups were performed and 
no comparison reached an acceptable _level of significance 
(App. 10). 
Comparison was made between subjects who asked the 
general questions: - 
7. Type of surgery 
8. Time since surgery 
39. Disease state 
earlier in the task in terms of the mean rank order as a 
function of accuracy, and this is displayed in Table 3. 
TABLE 2. L 
TASKS 
123 
Correct 9.5 5.2 4.2 
(N=17) (N=20) (x`=17) 
Incorrect 10.66 9.7 3.7 
(N=12) (NN=9) (N, = 12) 
MEAN ORDER OF USE OF ITEI! 'iS 7,8 a' 39 
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This comparison was not subjected to sta-Lis uical 
analysis. A trend is present for the more accurate sub- 
jects in Tasks 1 and 2 to use these items earlier in the 
task. However, this trend is reversed in the third task. 
More subjects were incorrect in the third task and this 
could be an effect of confounding v ith task difficulty 
which will be discussed in the following section. 
TABLE 2.5 r 
TASK ACCURACY BY DIAGNOSTIC CO DITIONi 
PARALYTIC PUUMO GARY URINARY 
A. ILEUS B. E iBOLI S ,f C. RETL,, '>>i0N (corr) (incorr) ; core) (incorr) (corn) (incorr} 
TASK 1 10 7 2 3 5 2 
TASK 2 10 2 4 6 6 1 
TASK3 5 9 12 3 
n= 29 
This table reflects an effect of practice for the 
diagnoses paralytic ileus and urinary retention, where 
performance overall is more accurate in the 2nd or 
3rd 
task than in the 1st task. A similar trend is not app- 
arent for the condition pulmonary embolism. 
It is also apparent that the balancing procedure 
for 
the diagnostic tasks is far from perfect. Both these ob- 
servations will be discussed at 
length in the following 
section, as any, result must 




The results of this pilot study demonstrated a 
highly significant differential use of general and 
specific questions between the 1st and 2nd halves of the 
test (P. <0.001). General information served to start 
processing and lead to the use ... of specific information 
about the condition of the patient. 
However, no further interpretation was appropriate 
because of an unknown effect of task difficulty. The 
bulk of errors in task 3 occurred in the diagnostic 
condition, pulmonary embolism. This was the only condition 
of the three that did not improve with practise. It was 
partly compounded by the partial balancing procedure which 
necessitated condition A, paralytic ileus, appearing in 
tasks 1&2, and conditions B&C being over-represented 
in task 2&3. This shortcoming in the balancing would 
have been justifiable had the tasks been perfectly equal 
in difficulty, which they patently were not. The reason 
for partial balance as opposed a fully balanced design 
was because the condition A was the. example in the inter- 
vention. 
The intervention, in its present form appeared to 
have been of doubtful effect. Although there was no 
formal statistical analysis Table 2.5 illustrates for the 
diagnosis pulmonary embolism there was a deterioration in 
performance across the tasks, more people were wrong 
in 
task 3 than in task 1 (9 v'3). The same' pattern to a rr1uch 
lesser extent was observed for the diagnosis, urinary 
retention (3 V 2). But the confounding of 
task difficulty 
for the diagnosis pulmonary embolism made definite inter- 
pretation equivocal. It was therefore 
decided to retain 
the intervention in a modified form dropping the example 
of the diagnosis paralytic ileus. 
It was also considered 
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to be advisable to concentrate solE! V on the role of 
general and specific information in memory and drop the 
example of stereotype as information sources - that may 
merely have served to confuse people. 
Inspection of the list of complications revealed 
that the reason for the difficulty with task B was 
possibly due to an over-representation of respiratory 
conditions. Apart from pulmonary embolism, there were 
three alternatives. Chest infection, atelectasis and 
asphyxia were listed as possible diagnoses. But, there 
was only one complication of the urinary tract and one 
affecting gastric motility. It seemed sensible to equate 
the three systems for probability of occurrence. 
Although the measure of cognitive complexity showed 
no association with the type of questions asked it was 
decided to retain this measure because of analysis of a 





The research hypotheses tested were: - 
1. A higher proportion of general questions would be 
asked in the first half of the task in order to set 
the patient context compared with the second half 
of the task. 
2. People who were relatively less cognitively complex 
would ask more general questions. 
3. A decrease in accuracy would be associated with the 
use of general questions in the second half of the 
tasks. 
People who asked their general questions earlier in 
the task would ask fewer questions overall than those 
asking them later because they reduced the number of 
available diagnostic hypotheses that needed to be tested. 
5. This strategy was considered to be a more efficient 




De si. n 
The independent variables were: - 
1" Type of information available 
a) General information 
b) Specific information 
2. Cognitive complexity 
3" Modified teaching intervention (App. 11). The de- 
pendent variables were: - 
a) Accuracy 
b) The number of questions of the different 
types of information 
General Information was again defined as relatively stable 
facts about the condition of a patient. 
Specific Information was defined as changeable facts about 
the condition of a patient. 
The task was to diag nose the current condition of a general 
sur gical patient. 
Again, the only information given was that the patient 
had received general surgery the general surgical con- 
dition was again appendicectomy) 
The three post-operative complications for clinical 
diagnosis were: - 
A= Paraly tfic ileus 
B= Pulmonary Embolism 
C= Urinary retention 
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The sequence of presentation was fully balanced and 
subjects were allocated in serial progression to the 
different orderings. 
Patient Conditions 
A, B, C 
A, C, B 
B, A, C 
C, A, B 
B, C, A 








The first task provided practice prior to the second 
task, the intervention and the third task. 
Questions were again asked sequentially and on the 
basis of recognition of an appropriate question from the 
list (App. 3). 
Subjects 
Forty-eight student nurses in their third year of 
training at a London Teaching Hospital. The age range 
was 20-35 years and the range of educational achievement 
was GCE '01 level to degree level, the majority of subjects 
being educated to GCE 'A' level. This represented two sets 
of student nurses who had completed their surgical module 
and had all had surgical nursing experience. 
Materials 
1. A two-part questionnaire (App. 2) assessed: - 
a) Personal details, ie. age, sex and 
educational qualifications 
b) Cognitive complexity measure 
2. The standardised lists of questions 
for requesting 
information, as before (App. 3). 
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3. An extended list of 22 possible patient conditions, 
including the three target conditions, in randomised 
order (App. 12). 
ý-. Pack of 39 individual "playing" cards with the answer 
to a request on one side and the sequence in the list 
of questions on the reverse. There were three packs, 
one for each diagnostic condition. 
5. Modified teaching intervention dropping both the ex- 
ample of paralytic ileus and the discussion of stereo- 
types (App. 11). 
6. The task instructions. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as that of the pilot studies. 
A general introduction and instructions were given initially 
(App. 6) followed by the completion of the questionnaire. 
The task instructions were read by the subjects at the same 
time as the researcher read them aloud (App. 7) modified for 
the inclusion of specific instructions for completing the 
tasks in silence and with no collaboration. Queries were 
answered by the researcher on an individual basis. The 
first two tasks were completed, they were followed by the 




An analysis of variance was computed to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2, and t- tests were computed to test 
hypothesis 3. Further ANOVn' s were computed to test 
hypotheses 4 and 5 more directly, looking at the 
position in the tasks that the general questions N-, ere 
asked in relation to the total questions, asked and 
accuracy. The results section will give details of 





To test hypotheses 1 and 2 an analysis of variance 
for one between and two within subject variables was 
computed. The anova was for the special case of a nested 
3 factor design with repeated measures einer 1962: 
Appendix 13). The between subjects variable was cognitive 
complexity ie. subjects were divided into two groups of 
16 representing the highest scoring - on the Rep 
Grid, and the lowest scoring "3. This represented 
subjects who were assumed to be relatively less complex 
and those who were relatively more complex, respectively. 
The within subject variables were: - 
1. The three tasks that were sequentially completed. 
This was regardless of the diagnostic conditions 
which v, 7ere completely balanced overall. 
2. Each task was divided into two halves and the first 
half was then compared with the second. The comparison 
was made on the basis of The %'o of general questions 
asked of all questions asked in the first half of the 
task in relation to the second_ half. That is the of 
general questions and the % of remaining questions 
were calculated for both halves of the task. The 
of general questions were then compared. 
A Hartley test for homogeneity of variance was 
computed, (Appendix 13), where F max was observed as 
2.2, d. f. (6)31). From tables at the level of p<0.01, 
d. f. (6) 30) F=3.81. Therefore the observed value fails 
to reach an acceptable level of significance and the Null 
Hypothesis need not be rejected. 
Table 3.1 gives the ANOVA summary table 
(App. 13)o 
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Table ?. 1 
ANOVA of Co unitive Corr lexity, the 3 't'asks &- H lf of Task 
Source of d. f. Sums of i, ean Sa ua e V. R. p Variance Squares 1 
Cognitive 
Complexity 15,30 3.5 0.233 . 0006 ns (C. C) 
Tasks 2560 186.6 93.3 . 78 ns 
C. C. x 2,60 379.4 189.7 1.6 ns Tasks 
Half of 1130 26273.5 26273.5 142 <. 001 Tasks 
lack x 2,60 4270.24 2135.12 4.9 <. 025 
Half of 
Task 
C. C. x 2,60 155.06 77.5 . 177 ns 
asks x 
Half 
A main effect of half of task was observed (p< 0.001) 
where significantly more general questions were asked in the 
first half of the task compared with the second half, this 
is shown in Graph 3.1. There is also a task x half of task 
interaction (p< 0.025) , where the differences 
in the use of 
general questions between the two task halves increases over 
tasks (graph 3.1). No other observations reached an acceptable 
level of significance. Levels of Cognitive Complexity 























































The third hypothesis that people who ask relatively 
more general questions in the second .. 
half of the task 
compared with other subjects are also less accurate than 
other subjects was tested. T-tests for independent means 
comparing general information use in the second halves of 
the tasks between accurate and inaccurate subjects were 
calculated for tasks 1,2&3. No significant differences 
were observed (App. 14,15 & 16)* 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 suggested that an efficient 
strategy would result in fewer total questions asked and 
increased accuracy. Table 3.2 shows the overall means of 
the total number of questions asked by correct and in- 
correct subjects. 
Table 3.2 
Means of the Number of Questions Asked as a Function of 
Accuracy 
Correct Incorrect 
Task 1 15.4 (33) 16.4 (15) 
Task 2 13.5 (27) 13.9 (21) 
Task 3 13. /i (39) 15.9 (9) 
* Number of subjects 
There was a very slight tendency for accurate subjects 
to ask between'L -2.5 fewer questions, this would not be a 
significant effect. 
An analysis of increasing accuracy over the tasks was 
not performed. There was no simple increase 
in accuracy, 
rather a large increase between 
tasks 2 and 3 ie. 21 subjects 
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1 
were wrong in task 2 and only 9 in task 3. Ho-.,,, ever this 
can be seen to be offset by a decrease between tasks 1 and 
2 ie. 15 cf. 21. 
In order to look at hypotheses 1 and 5 in more detail, 
the general questions that could be used to set the pa ie! it 
in a context were looked at specifically. These general 
questions were-. - 
6. Type of admission 26. 
7. Type of surgery 27. 
8. Time since surgery 28. 




Reason for surgery/dii_ cease 
state 
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Table 3 -4 sho,. v s the number of general questions asked as 
a whole by accurate and inaccurate subjects. 
Table 3.4 
Number of General Questions Asked in the Tasks as a Function 
of Accuracy 
Correct Incorrect 
Task 1 3.33 3.7 
Task 2 3.3 3.9 
Task 3 3.3 3.2 
There can be seen to be no appreciable differences 
in the numbers of general questions asked by accurate and 
inaccurate subjects, nor is there any difference between 
the tasks. 
Subjects were divided into three groups for each 
task. The EARLY group asked the general questions that 
they asked more often in positions 1-3 than later in the 
task. The QUAL group asked the general questions that 
they asked as often in positions 1-3 as later in the task 
and the LATE group asked their general questions later in 




Tables the ee`n - of the Total of Quest ion ý7, Asked 
for the Three Grow L_1Ls 
T,; ore General 
Questions Task 1 Task 2 la-ý 3 
Corr ect EARLY 12.8 (14) 12.2 (17) 12.9 (27) 









EQUAL 14 (3) 11.25(4) 18 (1) 
LATE 18.25(8) 19.25(2) 
n 
Frequently distributions were graphed out for tasks 
1 and 2 (App. 17 & 18). Visual inspection suggested dis- 
tributions within normal ranges, where in task 1 the mean 
was 15.6 and the median 11+, and in task 2 the mean was 
13.8 and the median vas -1)4. 
Two 2x2 A1' OVAs for unequal cell frequencies with 
a least--squares solution (Winer 1962) were computed for 
tasks 1 and 2. The tasks were not combined into a single 
AN OVA because the derived measures would then have been 
e correlated, correct and incorrect subjects could change 
categories between tasks. lOo analysis was made for task 
3 because of a markedly skewed distribution in the 
direction of the early group. 
The analyses considered t Le position that the 
general questions were asked enabling subject; 
to set the 
patient in context, in relation to 
the total nu-. n-)er of 
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questions that they asked. In task 1a main effect of 
questions asked demonstrated that subjects asking the 
general questions that they asked earlier in the task 
asked significantly fewer questions overall (F=6.4, d. F. 
(2,41) p-<0.01 : App. 19). The interaction between 
accuracy x questions asked failed to approach an acceptable 
level of significance (F=. 26, d. f. (2,41) p x. 25).. 
The analysis for task 2 failed to reach the 5 
level of significance, however a trend Evas observed in 
the same direction as in task 1 (F=3.03, d. f. (2)42) 
p -0.10 : where F=3.23, p<0 . 01 : App. 20). 
An alternative method of analysis looked at fre- 
quencies. Table 3.5 illustrates the number of correct 
subjects asking general questions early in the tasks 1, 
2 and 3 to be 11+, 17 and 27 respectively, compared with 
11,8 and 3 later in the task. A X2 analysis found this 
to be a significant difference at the p<0.025 level 
(X2 = 8.175, d. f. (2) p-1,0.025 : App. 21). Correct subjects 
who asked their general questions equally often early or 
late were dropped from the analysis because the expected 
frequencies differed with respect to the observed fre- 
quencies in terms of less than one whole number. 
A similar trend was observed for inaccurate subjects. 
Fisher exact probabilities were computed because of the 
small cell values involved. This necessitated 2,2 x2 
matrices rather than 3x2, therefore task. 1 was first 
compared with task 2 and then with task 3. The comparison 
between tasks 1 and 2 revealed no significant differences, 
However the comparison between tasks 1 and 3 showed that 
as the tasks progressed subjects asked the general questions 
at the beginning of the task. In task 3 no subject asked 
general questions later in the task. This effect was 




The results of er some support for the experimental 
hypothesis of an initial strategy of setting a patient 
context that could serve to direct sui: sequent diagnostic 
hypotheses. In the first task that subjects per. forrýýec 
the people who asked useful general questions initially 
asked fewer questions overall compared with the people 
who asked these. same questions at a later point. Ho, Jx - 
ever, there can be seen to be no clear relationship 
between this strategy and diagnostic accurac, - ý-'ithin 
this experiment, which runs contrary to the findings of 
Gordon (1980). Gordon' s work suggested that subjects who 
were less efficient in reducing the n>> ber of available 
alternative diagnoses were also less accurate as a direct 
result of this inefficiency. 
Taking the overall use of general questions, both 
those that could be deemed to be useful in reducing 
alternative diagnoses and those that , -, would have been less 
useful, subjects did ask more of these questions in the 
first half of the task than in the second h If (p<0.001). 
This effect increased as a result of practise as the tasks 
proceded (p <0.025). The conclusion of the inn-,, eased ovI,, e-a l 
use of general questions earlier being ar ;o ice effect 
and not due to instructions in the teas: _n n; intervention, 
can be seen from inspection of Graph 1. The r: major gain or 
general question use in the first half of t he task is 
between tasks 1 and 2, as is the major loss, of these fiter s 
from the second half. 
Differential levels of cognitive com e ity failed 
to predict the use of general as opposed to =ore specific 
questions by subjects. A hypothesis a -°el ýtively 
less complex person could be predi. spc--ed to aý:. ore enequestions 
initially and fewer ques tlo n. ý oar: ýrý s no 
supported. The hypothesis v. -as 
tenuoý an)d . '-e results 
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observed question whether constructs could be seen to be 
synonymous with facts about a person. It ",, V7as suggested 
that this was a poor piece of theorising and was subse- 
quently dropped from the design. 
The conclusion that increased accuracy between 
tasks 1 and 3 was the result of practice and not the 
result of teaching people to ask general questions 
initially was supported in several ways. There was no 
significant differences in any oä. -the tasks when the 
proportion of general question in the second halves of 
the task was compared between accurate and inaccurate 
subjects. The same number of useful questions were asked 
by both accurate and inaccurate subjects, and no significant 
differences in initial useful question use were observed. 
In task 3 both groups of subjects asked their useful 
questions earlier than they had done in tasks 1 and 2. 
This may well have been the result of the teaching in- 
structions but was unrelated to accuracy. Therefore, the 
teaching intervention can be seen to have had no useful 
effect. 
The more interesting observation was that in task 1 
those people asking their useful questions earlier in the 
task did ask fewer questions overall (p<0.01). However 
this effect was not observed in task 2. No analysis was 
performed for task 3 because of the paucity of subjects 
asking these general questions later in the task. A con- 
verging observation, ho ,? ever, was that a significantly 
increasing number of correct and incorrect subjects asked 
these questions more in positions 1-3 than later as the 
tasks progressed. The effect'observed in task 1 suggests 
that by setting a patient context initially subjects were 
then able to reduce available diagnotic alternatives and 
arrive ata decision earlier than subjects who 
did not 
adopt this policy. These subjec-Ls could ne righ.. or wrong 
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in this decision. Two factors are evidently present, 
one of early patient context leading to earlier fore- 
closure and another involving accuracy. Both of which 
improved as the result of practise with the tasks, but 
are apparently unrelated. 
In order to suggest possible reasons for these 
observations it is necessary to consider design features. 
The design of this experiment differs in several ways 
from Gordon' s study. The tasks involved recognition 
rather recall and recognition decisions. Gordon asked 
her subjects to recall from memory the questions that they 
needed to ask in order to diagnose the current condition 
of the patient. The only information that was provided 
was that subjects were told that the patient had had 
general surgery and subjects were given lists of possible 
diagnoses. Two conditions were employed, a condition of 
unlimited information and a condit-. ion of information being 
limited to 12 questions. The present experiment employed 
only the unlimited condition, it also presented subjects 
with a list of 39 questions that they could ask. 
Gordon found that where the same group of subjects 
were restricted to the use of 12 questions, their per- 
formance Y,, as vastly superior to when they could ask an 
unlimited number of questions. This observation was 
complicated, however, by a failure to balance the 
diagnoses between conditions although they were balanced 
for practice. In the unlimited condition inaccurate 
subjects were characterised by asking 
for general infor- 
mation later in the task. That the diagnostic 
tasks were 
not balanced does not explain the association 
in the un- 
limited condition between inaccuracy and the 
late use of 
general_ information. 
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This finding was not replicated in the present case 
and could be attributed to the use of a recognition para- 
digm which was confined to a limited set of 39 items. In 
a recall paradigm where people had a free hand the initial 
strategy of setting the patient in context and eliminating 
unlikely diagnoses may contribute to a more accurate decision. 
For subjects who failed to employ this strategy the task 
could have been very difficult. They had to do several 
things, they had to retain-all the information that they 
had asked for in a form of rehersal loop, Baddeley & 
Hitch, (1974). When eventually requesting information that 
could help to reduce decision alternatives, the working 
component of memory would be involved in correctly recog- 
nising appropriate items from those already requested, as 
well as retrieving questions that they may wish to ask. 
In the current case these effects would be avoided 
by the subject's record of questions already asked and 
answers obtained from a limited set of 39 items. Therefore, 
where subjects had failed to reduce the alternative 
diagnoses to manageable proportions they could be assured 
of success by correctly recognising an abnormal sign or 
symptom that had been either raidomly accessed or had been 
asked using the list of complications as a guide. The 
complications did break-down into discrete areas ie. cardio- 
vascular, pulmonary, urinary, abdominal and either they 
were infective or non-infective. The inaccurate subject 
can be seen to have been wrong because they were inexperienced 
and had insufficient knowledge. The design employed did 
allow several strategies to be efficient in order to succeed 
with the decision. 
The finding that asking the useful general questions 
earlier in the tasks resulted in asking fewer items overall 
is worthy of further study. It may be the case that 
this 
influences accuracy when the total set is less manageable, 
directing the information search when the burden on memory 
is removed. It would be equally interesting 
if this is not 
the case because asking nurses to write on a pre--prepared 
check-list the information 
they need to know may be a 
helpful way to improve performance 




It was considered to have been premature to attempt 
to teach a specific strategy at a stage where the effective- 
ness of that strategy was equivocal. The intervention 
did not have any beneficial effect and was therefore 
dropped from the design. This experiment concentrated 
on the use of different types of information. The design 
was adapted to include a large pool of questions as well 
as the small pool. Also, in an attempt to simulate time 
pressure, a condition was employed where subjects were 
restricted to asking 12 questions rather than as many as 
they desired. The recognition paradigm was retained. It 
was argued that with a large pool of potential questions 
that offer a large number of alternatives, asking questions 
in a non-systematic fashion would be counterproductive. 
It was considered to be more difficult to simply ask 
questions randomly until a relevant symptom was recognised. 
The Research Hypotheses were: - 
1. People who set the patient in a general context 
early in the task will ask fewer questions overall 
than those who do not adopt this strategy. They may 
also be more accurate. 
2. When subjects are confronted with a large pool of 
questions and yet are limited to asking 12, those 
asking a larger proportion of general questions in 
the first half of the task will be more accurate as 
a result of this strategy. A strategy that reduces 
the number of possible diagnoses that need 
testing 
and leaves the later part of the task 
free to seek 
the relevant information about the current condition 
of the patient. 
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3. '. "Vhen there is a large pool of questions and only 
12 can be asked, those who ask a smaller proportion 
of general questions later in th task will : he more 
accurate as a result of this strategy. This v, ould 
increase the opportunity to assess the current state 




Independent Variables: - 
1. Pool. size (a) small question pool of 39 potential questions 
(b) large question pool of 76 potential questions 
2. Restriction applied (a) no restriction of the number of 
questions that could have been asked 
(b) restricted to ask 12 questions 
3. Type of information available (a) general information 
(b) specific information 
Dependent Variables: - 
1. Accuracy 
2. Total number of questions asked 
General and specific were defined as before al-id the task 
requirement was identical, as was the information given. 
The operations selected were appendicectomy and lumbar 
sympathectozny. The two possible conditions to be di_, A nosed 
were: -- 
(a) urinary retention - (C) 
(b) wound infecLyon - (D) 
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The combination of diagnoses, restriction and pool size 













UR = Unrestricted 
LP = Large Pool 
SP = Small Pool 
f 




A= Paralytic Ileus 
13 = Pu1Tionary Embolism 
D --R 
R 
Task Il UR 
ýU 
R 
- UR - LP 
R 
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-- LP 1,9,17 - 81 
- SF 3,11,19 - 83 
- LP 7, 15, 23 - 87 
-ý SP 5, 13, 21 - 85 
ý- LP 2, 10, 18 - 82 
SP 4, 12, 20 - 84 
LP 6, 14, 22- 86 
SP 8, 16, 24 - 88 
- LP 3, 11, 19 - - b3 
-- SP 1, 9, 17 - ö1 
-- LP 5, 13, 21 - ä5 
-- SP 7, 15 , 23 - - 87 
- LP 4, 12, 20 - - 814 
- SP 2, 10, 18 - 82 
- LP 8, 16, 2L. 88 
- SP 6, 14, 22 - 86 
- SIP 
Subiects 
88 student nurses in their third year of training. 
The majority of subjects had been educated -to G. C. E. 'I' 
level. There were a small number of graduates, but level 
of education was not taken into account in the analysis 
because the numbers of graduates were small. 
Materials 
The materials were the same as for experiment 1 
except -- 
1. An extended list of 76questions, the order of which 
was fully randomised. They were typed with the s= :! '_e 
layout as the short list on three separate sheets 
stapled together. The list of questions had been 
subject to expert scrutiny (App. 21k). 
2. Additional packs of cards for the extended lists and 
additional packs, short and extended for the new 
diagnosis wound infection. Again the sign and symptom 
cluster associated a particular complication were taken 
fromm Fream (1978). All potential questions and answers 
were subject to expert scrutiny (App. 25). 
3. Modified task instructions (App. 26). 
Procedure 
A series of five identical experimental sessions was 
conducted in the same lecture theatre that had previously 
been set up for the procedure on each occasion. Beside 
each subject number were placed, face down, the practit 
lists and packs , 7,, ith the pre-arranged order of 
the 
and conditions recorded on the top of each pack and 
associated list. Each subject also 
had a list of ti-, e 2.1 





Participation was voluntary and anonymous and 
instructions were read by each subject and accornpanied 
aloud by the researcher. The task was to judge the 
current condition of general surgical post-operative 
patient.. The nurses were told that initially they would 
do this twice and that on each occasion the patient's 
condition was different. Controls for silence and 
collaboration were again instituted. The nurses were 
then asked to look at their lists of questions and they 
were told that they had a long list and a short list. 
The procedure of starting to ask questions by choosing 
a question anywhere on the list and then proceeding to 
ask subsequent questions, recording both the answers 
and the order asked was explained. It was explained 
that on one occasion they were, limited to asking twelve 
questions and on the other occasion they could ask as 
many as they wished. These instructions were also re- 
corded at the head of the question lists. The nurses 
started with their first pack and when they had, arrived 
at and recorded a diagnosis proceeded with the second 
pack. 
When the practice trials were completed the re-- 
searcher gave the experimental material to each subject 
individually explaining the completion order of the two 
tasks, which task had a small and which had a large pool, 
and in which task they were restricted to asking 12 
questions. This information was also stated on the 
materials. All subjects completed the experimental tasks. 
It was, however, noted by one subject that a rogue card 
was present in the large pool, diagnosis C, urinary 
retention. The card bearing the patient's current 
temperature stated it as 347 rather than 37, causing 
this subject to diagnose hypothermia. 
This discovery 
was made in the final experimental session. 
No other 
subject was mislea, d by the mistake 
but the misle. d sub- 
ject was excluded from the error analysis. 
The sessions 
9ii 
took one hour to complete and on completion the mýý ýerlai s 
were collected and a full explanation was given. 
1. } .2 
Analysis 
The total number of questions asked were subjected 
to an analysis of variance to ex: rine the effect of re- 
striction, pool size and the two different diagnoses. 
The first hypothesis was tested by analysis of variance 
of the unrestricted data. T-tests comparing the 
proportion of general question use in both task halves 
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`The total question use under the different con- 
ditions was examined. Inspection of the means in Table 
4.1 indicated that in the unrestricted condition in Task 
1 between 1.4 more questions were asked in diagnosis C 
compared with diagnosis D. This was not the case in Task 
2 where question use appears equivalent. An ANOVA computed 
for Task 1 demonstrated that the difference in the number 
of questions asked between the two diagnoses was significant 
(F = 5.377, d. f. 1180 p <0.023). In Task 1 subjects who 
were not restricted did ask more questions overall 
(F = 5.965, d. f. 1)80 P<0.017). However, this effect 
was shown to be confined to diagnosis C by the diagnosis 
x restriction interaction (F = 4.038, d. f. 1X80 p< 0-048). 
The main effect of differential question use between 
diagnoses C and D, plus the interaction in Task 1 can be 
shown by inspection of the means in Table 4.1 to be due 
to diagnosis D, wound infection. There can be seen to be 
less than a whole number difference between subjects 
under differing levels of restriction, suggesting that 
this was an easier diagnosis to make than C. The ANOVA 
computed for Task 2 showed no differences in question use 
between the diagnostic conditions and a significant main 
effect of restriction (F = 15.44, d. f. 1 X80 p<0-001), 
unrestricted subjects consistently asked more questions 
in both diagnostic conditions (App. 27). 
To consider the possible effects of the rogue card 
in the large poole of questions in diagnosis C, the effect 





fable L ß. 2 
difference et,, een the 1, leans of the Total Questions "sired 
in Task 1 and, 2 'i*, here Did rýos_s C (1iri_rar n `ion) v: 
tale First; Task and 'Dia nos_As (i7ound Infection) w,, -s the 
Second 
1st Condition - Diagnosis C 
Smal1. Large Small 
JLarge 
10 Unrestr. Unrestr. Re str. Res-Ur. 
Small 8 Restr . . 
Large 
Restr. ä 3.6 
Small b 2.5 Unrestr. o 
rd 
Large s_-. " 
Unrestr. 2.8 
Where subjects were exposed to the large pool, 
diagnosis C, the differences between the mean questions 
asked between the two tasks were very similar to those 
who were not exposed to this condition ie. 4.8 cf 3.6 and 
2.5 cf 2.8. 
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Table 
Difference Between the Means of the Total Questions Asked in 
Tasks 1 and 2 Where Diagnosis D Wound Infection) was the 
First Task and Diagnosis C (urinary retention) was the Second 
Task 
1st Task - Diagnosis D 
Small Large Small Large 
Unre str . Unrestr. r. Rest Re str . 
Small 
Re str . 1 
Large o 
Restr. w . 'I 
Small I 
Unrestr. M 3 
U2 
Large ,d Unrestr. 3.1 N 
Where subjects were exposed to the large pool, 
diagnosis C as the second task again the difference between 
tasks 1 and 2 were similar to those subjects who did not 
encounter this pool ie. .1 cf .1 and 3.1 cf . 3. Encountering 
a rogue card initially in the first task did not appear to 
exert a dramatic effect over the nurses performances. It 
was, therefore, concluded that-the diagnosis C, urinary 
retention, was more difficult than D, wound infection, but 
this effect was independent of the mistake with the tempera- 
ture recording. Both the diagnoses had been fully balanced 
over conditions and tasks, therefore the diagnostic conditions 
were combined for further analysis. 
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Table 4.4 gives the overall level of subjects who we .,, e 
both accurate and inaccurate for both levels of re- 











Correct 33 31 31 36 
Incorrect 11 13 13 7 
one subject excluded as previously stated 
In order to examine the hypotheses it was necessary 
to consider general question use. 
In the small pool these were: - 
6. Type of admission 
7. Type of surgery 
8. Time si nce surgery 




39. Reason for surgery/disease state 
In the large pool these were: - 
2. Disease state 
14. Frame size 
6. Age 
7. Alcohol consumed daily 
20. Type of admission 
29. Socio-economic status 
31. Marital status 
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34. Time in recovery 
35. Duration of anaesthesia 
36. Cigarettes daily 
39. Housing conditions 
W, Wound closure technique 
46. Past medical history 
48. Pre-medication given 
49. Pre-operative mobility 
54. Type of anaesthesia 
55. Weight 
5b. Occupation 
59. Type of surgery 
65. Gender 
66. Past psychiatric history 
b7. Time since surgery 
72. Height 
73. Luration of surgery 
All these questions were regarding the patient before 
or during surgery, questions that could be used to place 
that patient in a context, and thus influence expectations. 
Subjects were then divided into two groups: - 
1. Subjects who asked the general questions more often 
in positions 1-3 compared with later in the task 
- the EARLY group. 
2. Subjects who asked their general questions eit her 
later in the task or as often late as early ---- LATER. 
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1'+Zeans of the Total Numbers of Westions Asked by Early and 
Later Subjects as a Function of Pool Size Restriction and 
Accuracy 
Table L. 5 





Small Pool correct 9.95 (20) 10.5 (13) 
Restricted 
incorr 11.3 (9) 11 (2) 
Large Pool correct 10.8 (19) 10.25 (12) 
incorr 11.3 (7) 11.7 (6) 
Small Pool correct 11.3 (25) 15.5 (6) 
Unrestricted 
incorr 14 (7) 17.2 (6) 
Large Pool correct 12.5 
(19) 1L. 5 15) 
incorr 12.3 (3) 18 (3) 
n in parenthesis 
Inspection of Table 4.5 shows that, in the restricted 
conditions, very little difference between the pool sizes or 
accurate/inaccurate subjects was apparent. In the unrestricted 
condition there are greater differences between the means. 
tIn the unrestricted condition there was only approximately 
one question difference between the pool s:: zes and the 
appropriate sub-groups of early, later, correct, incorrect 
subjects. These were therefore combined to give a more 
meaningful sample size. Table 4.6 shows the mean of the total 
questions asked by early or later subjects in the unrestricted 





Uprestricted Condition; Combined Pools: Mean of Total 
Question Use as a Function Stage of General Question 
Use and Accuracy 
CORRECT INCORRECT 
EARLY 11.8 (44) 
LATER 14.8 (21) 
13.5 (10) 
17.4 (9) 
n in parenthesis 
Visual inspection of the frequency distributions of 
the total questions used by the Early and Later groups 
revealed curves approximating to the normal distributions 
(App. 28). Therefore, an ANOVA, least squares solution 
for unequal cell frequencies and non-orthogonal date 
(Winer 1962) was computed (App. 29). 
There was amain effect of stage o. f use of the 
general questions (F = 9.69, df (1,80) p<0.01). People 
who asked their general question earlier asked fewer 
questions overall. There was a trend for inaccurate 
subjects to ask more questions overall (F = 3.3. df. (1X80) 
P <O. 10) . The interaction accuracy x stage of asking 
general questions, was not significant. Considering the 
frequency data a X2 was 'computed to compare the number of 
subjects asking general questions Early and those asking 
them later as a function of accuracy. This failed to 
approach-significance (App. 30). 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 effectively general 
question use was considered in terms of the proportion of 
these questions asked in the first and second halves of 
the task ie. the proportion of general question use compared 
with more specific questions use was calculated 
for both 
task halves. This gave an a_ritbji eti.. c range 0-50/'a. 
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Table 4.7 
Mean General Question Use in all Conditionsgj% Proportion 
Restricted 
Small Pool Large Pool 
TUnrestr: i. cted 
Small Pool Large Pool 
1st 2 19.9, n=33 20.8, n=31 20.8, n=31 18.07, n=36 (SD=9.1) (SD=10.6) (SD=10.6) (SD-11.9) 
Acc. 
2nd z 5.2, n=33 2.9, n=31 6.5, n=31 6.5, n=36 (SD =7.4) (SD=5.35) (SD=6.4) (SD=7.02 
1 st z 1 8.7, n=1 1 16.9, n=13 23.7, n=13 12.35, n=7 (SD=7.1) SD-- -5) (sD=9.35) (SD=6.7) 
Inacc. 
2nd tß. 2, n=11 7.15, n=13 6.9, n=13 9.8, n=7 (SD=9.2) (SD=6.7) (SD-10.1) (SD=10.5) 
To examine the critical condition of a large pool of 
potential questions where the subjects were restricted to 
asking 12 questions, the randomised test for two independent 
samples was considered to be a suitable test. The comparisons 
made were the percentages of general questions asked in the 
two halves of the tasks by accurate and inaccurate subjects. 
Where there are larger samples (n =L) the T--statistic is 
recommended rather than the randomised test (Pitman, 1937: 
frequency distribution App. 31). 
The t statistic was computed comparing the use of 
general questions by accurate and inaccurate subjects 
in the 
second half of the task. A larger proportion-of 
the second 
half of the -task was devoted to asking general questions 
by 
inaccurate subjects compared with accurate subjects 
(t = 2.23, 
d f. 42 p/, 0.025 for a 1-sided test: p <\'O. 
05 for a 2-sided 
test, App. 32). 
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A comparison of general infor-ý! ation use in the Birst 
half of the task failed to reach significance (tip; ). 33). 
As did both comme risons of differential use in the un- 
restricted large pool condition and no trends were ob se_r'ved 
(App. 34 and 35). Graphs of the distributions are 
appended (App. 36-38). It is evident from an inspection of 
the means for both the restricted and unrestricted conditions, 
with a small pool of questions, that there is little 
variability in the use of general information by accurate 
subjects, compared with inaccurate subjects. This is 





The rogue card present in the large pool of questions 
where the diagnosis was urinary retention will be discussed 
initially. In task 1, significantly more questions were 
asked by subjects making this diagnosis compared with those 
diagnosing a wound infect on. The question was as to whether 
or not this was due to uncertainty induced in the subjects 
by an abnormal sign that was irrelevant. This does not 
appear to have been the case. Table 4.2 illustrates the 
difference in the means of the total questions asked where 
the diagnosis for the first task performed was urinary 
retention and the second was wound infection. The different. 
scores observed where the first diagnosis was urinary 
retention compared with when this was not the case were 
4.8 ct 3.6, and 2.5 ct 2.8. A difference of 1 between the 
observed means would not be statistically significant. 
It was therefore concluded that further analysis was not 
invalidated. 
Hypothesis 1 received partial support. The people 
who did ask the general questions earlier in the task, which 
implied a deductive strategy of setting the patient in a 
general context at the outset, asked fewer questions overall. 
But this was not associated with increased accuracy. This 
was a replication of the findings of the first experiment 
and suggested that the nurses who asked their general 
questions early did adopt a strategy that served to reduce 
the number of available hypotheses initially.. However, it 
appeared to increase their speed to decision rather than 
their accuracy. There was a trend for inaccurate subjects 
to ask more questions overall (F = 3.3, df. (1,80) p<0.10')* 
But- this overall asking of more questions was not associated 
with any particular type of question order. 
The trend 
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could indicate a lower level of confidence amongst in- 
accurate subjects, but as this observation failed to 
reach the accepted 5ýo level of significance, it will not 
be discussed further. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. The suggestion was 
that when time was limited and people were restricted to 
asking up to 12 questions from a large pool of potential 
questions, asking general questions early in the task 
would prove to be a more efficient strategy. The pre- 
diction was that a deductive and, therefore, directed 
search for information from the beginning would prove to 
be more fruitful. This was not demonstrated, accurate 
subjects `did not ask a higher proportion of general 
questions in the first half of the task compared with 
their inaccurate colleagues. 
Hypothesis 3 was supported. The inaccurate subjects 
asked a higher proportion of general questions in the 
second half of the task, when they had a large pool of 
potential questions and were restricted to asking 12. A 
general, context question asked later could have provided 
useful information to corroborate a diagnosis. But where 
there was a limit to the number of questions that could 
have been asked, the more that were devoted to obtaining 
background information proportionately reduced the oppor- 
tunity to assess the current condition of that patient. 
If the subjects' objective had been to generate a further 
hypothesis, having rejected the first they then had in- 
sufficient time to test it and the response observed could 
have been a 'bad guess'. This was a similar finding to 
that of Gordon 1980. 
Overall, ' the result demonstrated that an early use 
of general information providing a context 
for a patient 
did result in asking fewer questions 
in total ie. earlier 
foreclosure. This was a direct replication of 
the same 
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effect present in experiment 1. The implication that 
people who adopted a particular search strategy were 
more decisive as a result of this strategy is of interest, 
and will be discussed further at a later stage in the 
discussion. But this would have been more interesting 
had it aided performance in the restricted case. From 
the results of this experiment there was only a slight 
indication that a search strategy adopted had a beneficial 
effect on the selectivity within attention, in terms of 
accuracy. 
The evidence suggested that any beneficial effect 
of initial selection between hypotheses and subsequent 
testing in a paradigm that involved recall of what it 
was necessary to know and retention of that information, 
must have been associated with a reduction of the cog- 
nitive load. But, before stating definitively that there 
was no independent. effect of search an inspection of the 
means is warranted. An inspection of the means from 
Table 1.. 7 reveals that there was 3.9 difference between 
the proportion of general information used in the first 
half of the task by accurate and-inaccurate subjects and 
4.25 in the second half. Yet, the difference in the 
second half proved to be statistically significant. 
This would be accounted for by the relatively small ratio 
of the difference between the means and the observed 
means in the first half compared with the second half 
(ie. 20.8 -r 16.9 = 3.9 & 7.15 -- 2.9. = 4.25) . Had more 
subjects been incorrect the difference between the means 
would have been inflated. This is suggested further 
when inspecting Table 4.6,50 of the subjects who asked 
general questions later were incorrect compared with 
25% of subjects in the early group. The lack of sig-- 
nificance of the X2 could again have been a reflection 
of the- tasks that were too easy and insufficient people 
were incorrect. 
108 
In the light of the significant observation in the 
second half of the task, coupled with the low number of 
inaccurate subjects, it is suggested that it cannot be 
unequivocally stated that there is no independent effect 
of a search strategy. It can be argued that an effect of 
cueing was still present with a provided list, however 
long. In terms of making the task more realistic and 
more like the situation encountered on the wards, in- 
formation was provided and the decision required was that 
of recognition of appropriate items. But, the selection 
of information available is not as overt in a ward as it 
is with the provision of a list of potential questions. 
In order to conclude unequivocally that deductive reason- 
ing does not organise search, ie. the selectivity within 
attention, in an orderly fashion that results in advantage 
for the nurse a further experiment is required. A further 
experiment employing a recall and recognition paradigm, 
where the nurses would be required to recall what they 
wish to know and record the answer to their questions. 
Returning to the observation that an early use of 
general questions resulted in fewer questions being asked 
overall, this was found to be a robust observation. The 
suggestion is that deducing from a reduced selection of 
alternatives determines a finite number of pieces of 
specific information that need to be examined. Whereas, 
induction from specific information does not circumscribe 
the questions that are potentially useful. The repeated 
observation that early use of general information leads 
to earlier foreclosure, strongly suggested that these 
subjects were effectively reducing the number of al- 
ternative hypotheses in a deductive fashion. This reduction 
of alternatives was independent of a retentive load on 
memory. 
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The restricted number of altern2: tive hypotheses 
selected on the basis of their "represent ativeriess" 
ter. _ s of the initial general information. This 
lead to the examination or retrieval o- a limited set 
of signs and symptoms associated with chosen hypotheses. 
This would be predicted by a script theory of memory, 
where diagnostic scripts have a form of unique identity 
(Abelson, 1976). The Prospect Theory of Tversky & 
Kahneman (1981) predicts an initial editing phase based 
on the context of the problem. The context would trigger_ 
a predisposition to behave in a way determined by the 
perception of the task and allo s acco rmodation of task 
specific effects. Prospect- Theory would predict the 
early foreclosure in terms of cost -benefit, but the 
Script Theory of Abelson gives no inform.. ation about 




The objective of this part of the study being 
reported was to examine what could usefully be applied. 
Other work has demonstrated the strategy of an initial 
selection of hypotheses amongst doctors and nurses 
(Kassirer & Gorry 1978; Tanner 1977). It was not the 
intention of the study to add directly and exclusively 
to the theoretical understanding of decision making. 
The objective had been to identify an aid to 
natural decision making that could be taught to inexperienced 
nurses. It had become evident that even . with an improved 
experimental design, if there were any effects that had 
previously been obscured and could have been demonstrated, 
they would have a very limited applied value. The strength 
of an effect of increased accuracy due to adopting a 
particular strategy would need to be strong to effectively 
improve performance after a general teaching intervention. 
The teaching intervention and the notion of attempt- 
ing a teaching intervention, can be seen to have been naive 
in terms of attempting to teach something that had not been 
clearly demonstrated in the past. Although the possibility 
exists for a use of such 'games' by student nurses, they 
could help them to define the information they require when 
making a decision about the condition of a patient 
in a 
variety of situations. 
111 
CHAPTER 5 
Literature Backgr ound for the Study 
_of 
Nur ns' Perceptions 
of Patient Affect 
The second clinical judge::: ent examined was nurses' 
perception- of patient affect. Hos-rpittal patients are 
known to experience feelings of negative affect and 
depression, to a greater or lesser extent. Their feel- 
ings were examined in relation to the degree to which 
nurses tiger. e aware of their presence. Higgins (1980) 
observed that the main emphasis in the study of clinical 
judgements had been directed at the diff¬"rent _al use of 
specified signs and symptoms. The interpersonal aspects 
of clinical judgement have received considerably less 
attention. 
This half of the work reported was concerned 
specifically with nurses' awareness of patient feelings 
of anxiety and depression comb . red with physical feelings 
such as tiredness. 
At the start of this review a brief account is given 
of work that identified the presence and significance of 
negative affect on hospital patients, thus presenting a 
rationale for the selection of this clinical judgement, 
In order to make any clinical judgement it is necessary 
to have information on which to base it. The potential 
information sources available to the nurse are considered.. 
The potential sources that would allow a nurse to make a 
judgement about a patient relate to the verbal and non- 
verbal behaviour of that patient, as well as information 
based on t , ', -, e previous experience 
of that nurse having 
encountered. patients in that context in the past. 
The 
relative use of each of the above as a potential source 
of information will be explored. 
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5.1 
Anxiety and Derýression in Ho. ital Patients 
Initially it is necessary to consider, briefly, 
the nature of anxiety and depression and whether or not 
patients do experience this whilst in L. ospital. Spiel- 
berger (1972) defined anxiety in terms of an emotional 
state that is palpable but transitory and is associated 
with feelings of tension and apprehension, plus hei'htened 
autonomic nervous system activity, which is often due to 
the threat of the unknowwwwn. This can be otherwise terr.. ed 
as a state of anxiety, where the trait or predisposition 
to experience anxiety determines the ease with which 
anxiety is experienced plus the intensity. A definition 
of depression included a low subjective mood, pessimistic 
and nihilistic attitudes, loss of spontaneity and specific 
negative signs (Beck, 1967). Becker (197L) had observed 
the overlap between anxiety and depression in component 
feelings and in clinical manifestations, and preferred to 
group anxiety and depression as 'affective states' with-, out 
distinguishing the separate emotions. But they are 
suggested to be subject to differences in cognitive app- 
rc isal ie. anxiety being a mobilisation to cope and 
depression, passive despair. 
That is a brief, and necessarily superficial, attempt 
to distinguish between the two emotions anxiety and de- 
pression which has taken no account of degree. inxiety 
has been implied by Becker (1974) to be the positive aspect 
of the 'affective state' impl`ing coping and control. 
W, ý'hereas, depression is suggestive of the abandon . ent of 
attempts to take control given experiences of events 
that 
are not the consequences of actions taken 
t(Seligman 1978; 
Miller & Nor,. j-an 1979; Yliller 1979). 
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To turn to whether or not patients experience 
negative affect whilst in hospital, Wilson-Barnett 
(1977) investigated aspects of ward life that evoked 
negative feelings for many people. The study employed 
an interview technique and patients were asked how they 
felt about 60 items that described various aspects of 
hospitalisation eg. admission to hospi Jal, having set 
visiting hours, being away from family. This study 
isolated seven items that had engendered responses that 
implied anxiety or depression. The items were those 
directly relating to illness and separation from the 
persons normal environment, and fear of the unknown. 
Further work demonstrated feelings of anxiety and de- 
pression amongst medical ward patients ('W`ilson-Barnett 
& Carrigy, 1978). 30 of the patients studied who had 
been in hospital for five days or longer reported having 
experienced 'strong emotional reactions'. 'Strong emotional 
reactions' were also associated with higher levels of 
trait anxiety on the E. P. I. (Eysenck & Eysenck 3 14 b9-) 
Other work has reported similar findings. Younger 
patients, those with a higher trait anxiety score and 
those with a better chance of recovery felt more distressed 
about being in hospital (De`iolfe, Barrell & Cummings, 1966). 
Cartwright (1964) and Hugh Jones, Tanser & Whitby (1964. ) 
identified specific patient concerns exacerbated by hospital 
admission. The fear of pain, the unknown and destruction 
of body image have been identified as patient concerns 
(Carnevali, 1966). 
Maguire, Julier, Hanson & Bancroft (1971) studied two 
hundred and thirty medical patients in two wards. 
They 
were given a standardised questionnaire and a psychiatric 
interview. 23°1 were considered to be psychiatrically 
ill 
and affective disorders were 
the commonest disorders en- 
countered. The prevalence of 
depressive and anxiety 
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Symptoms was equivalent among different disease class- 
ifications with the exception of the psychosomatic group. 
Moffic & Paykel (1975) in the United States found a 
similar profile, but with a higher overall percentage of 
patients who were depressed. These studies are not directly 
comparable because different criteria were employed, a 
problem when interpreting many studies of this type. 
Moffic & Paykel (1975) suggested that the severity of 
illness was directly related to the degree of depression. 
But with another group of patients anxiety and depression 
have been associated with the less severely ill and those 
recovering (Schwab, Bialow, Brown & Holzer, 1967). The 
overall percentage of patients affected was 22j, consistent 
with other studies. 
Depression is known to characterise a number of 
physical disorders as a result of biochemical abnormality 
(Lipo; vski, 1967; Castelnuovo-Tedescu, 1961). The presence 
of diagnosed 'clinical depression' has been specifically 
associated with a higher level of life events than for 
those who are not depressed.. (Brown, 1972; Mendell, 1976). 
Similarly a group of myocardial infarction patients were 
found to have past histories that reported more divorce, 
lonliness, sleep disturbances and feelings of nervous 
stress and depression compared with a matched group of 
controls (Thiel, Parker & Bruce, 1973). 
Kendall & Watson (1981) have reviewed the area of 
psychological preparation for surgery and provided con- 
vincing evidence for a relationship between raised levels 
of anxiety and recovery. Having acknowledged this as a 
problem for hospital patients, a considerable body of work 
has been directed towards reducing anxiety. Reducing the 
anxiety by means of an intervention offering information 
or coping strategies prior to an operation or procedure 
(Hayward, 1975; Wilson-Barnett, 1977j Ridgeýrray & Mathews 
1982). Further, there has been work tracing the natural 
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cause of anxiety be! ore and after surgery (Johnstone 1980). 
The suggestion was that high levels of anxiety were ex- 
perienced before admission to hospital, between ad: rission 
and surgery and following surgery. They were not restricted 
to the immediate pre-operative period. 
Overall, feelings of depression have been found in 
a sizeable proportion of hospital patients, as well as the 
better documented anxiety. The presence of negative affect 
in hospital patients, especially at high levels that are 
protracted, and its association with interrupted recovery 
was isolated as an important potential patient problem in 
this study. The question that emerged related to the 
accuracy of nurses' clinical judgements about their patients 
feelings, their knowledge of the range and extent of feelings 
that patients could experience. This was considered- im- 
. portant because appropriate intervention to 
facilitate 
recovery is dependent on knowledge of the patient's psycho- 
logical condition. 
The potential sources from which a nurse can obtain 
this information are several. How patients say They reel, 
their non-verbal behaviour and the context in -wich the 
patient is placed ie. the severity of the illness, its 
duration and possible outcome. These potential sources of 




The extent to which nurses talk to their patients 
has been the subject of recent s Ludy (gacleo- Ulark, 19b3). 
The frequency, duration and co-.,,, gent of nurse/patient 
verbal exchanges were investigated in a sample o-'' surgical 
ward patients. The sample of 56 hours of tape-recordings 
contained 310 nurse-patient conversations and the average 
conversation time was 1.71 minutes, and there were approx- 
imately 5.5 conversations per ho. ur. These recordings had 
sampled two-hour periods over the entire space of day duty. 
The nurses had spoken with their patients relatively in- 
frequently and for short durations. The contents of the 
to a task being majority of conversations were related 
performed by the nurse. ore importantly, enquiries 
regarding how the patient felt, on the rare occasion that 
they occurred, were posed in the form of a c. Losea question 
designed to elicit a desired response. This was a small 
study on a single population of nurses, but it was grell 
controlled and the results are supported by previous work. 
Goddard (1953) showed that nurses spent about of their 
time in conversation with. patients. Others ha re studied 
the time spent talking to patients and all have found that 
this represented a small part of the total day ('! Jianch. ester 
Study 1955; Adams & :. IcLl, %%4rait. i 1963; Altschull 1970; 
''Jells 
1975; Pepper 1977). Studies with cancer and gynaecological 
patients have also suggested that nurses tend 
to avoid 





The study of accuracy of social perception fills 
a large literature and divides into two broad areas. 
Firstly, there is the study of the recognition of emotion 
which centres largely around perception of facial ex- 
pression of emotion. Secondly, there has been work, most 
of which pre-dates 1965, concerned with the accuracy of 
judgement of enduring dispositions that are assumed to 
be present, within other people. This work also assu. aed 
a generalised ability to judge others. The first area 
will be considered in some depths and the second in terms 
of methodological problems encountered in measuring 
accuracy. The methodological problems involved in study- 
ing the accuracy of subjects' perceptions of anothers 
nonverbal messages are numerous. One of the chief problems 
is that of the criteria adopted to gauge the success of 
the judgement. 
The early work concerned with whether or not per- 
ceivers are accurate in judging emotional states on the 
basis of facial expression was initiated by Darwin (1872). 
He considered that facial expressions viere innate rather 
than learned within a culture and universal within a 
particular species. The method that he employed was adopted 
for subsequent research. This was the 'judgement study'. 
The investigator showed pictures or photographs of facial 
expression to a number of subjects and asked. them to judge 
the feelings that were being expressed. Darwin had con- 
cluded that people could judge emotion accurately, although 
there were several sources of inaccuracy. There Evas 
variability in the difficulty of the judgement task, be- 
tween different photographs and diffe-Lent emotions. SchneJder, 
Hastorff & Ellsworth (1979) point out that Darwin recognised 
that a judge's own emotional state could bias +V ne interpretation 
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of the state of another. Thoy also note the influence 
of expectations that the perceiver holds or the context 
on perception and ask whether peoples) judgements are a 
result of these biases rather than there being any 
underlying ability to judge facial expression accurately. 
The research question that dominated the early 
research in this area was the question of an innate link 
between emotion and facial expression. Alternatively, 
the facial expression of emotion could be determined 
within a culture and transmitted through learning. This 
has obvious implications for nurses nursing patients from 
other cultures. The early research cited in Schneider, 
Hastorf & Ellsworth (1979) concluded that not only was 
there no innate link but that there was little or no 
association between the face and emotion. However, the 
methodological problems that Schneider et al. enumerate 
make any interpretation of the data dubious. The judge- 
ment study designs employed inadequate stimulus materials 
and tended to study a very limited range of similar 
emotions, This made the judge's task to accurately dis- 
criminate an impossible one. 
Other studies that attempted more naturalistic 
designs also had problems. They employed unposed subjects 
to be judged when placed in situations that were intended 
to illicit a particular emotion. They failed to control 
the variety of emotions that could be elicited in different 
people exposed to the same stimuli, plus their possible 
reluctance to express it under certain circumstances 
(Landis 192+; 1929). Sherman (1927) concluded that people 
could not judge emotion accurately on the basis of 
their 
failure to discriminate the emotions he supposed two 
babies less than one week old to be experiencing. The 
result of the eliciting stimuli on all occasions was a 
crying baby. 
119 
The work that followed was based on the conclusion 
that people are unable to judge emotion from facial 
expression and studied the judge and enviro. ý. ental cues 
or context. Ho: waever, Fri j da (1969) observed that judges 
tended to rely on facial expression rather than context 
when the facial expression was unexpected within a given 
context. Mehrabian & Wiener (1967 ), 1, ehrabian & Ferris 
(1967) found that facial expression was the most important 
cue for subjects making judgements of emotion. 
Consideration of the face in relation to other 
sources resulted in a spate of studies that took an in- 
formation theory 'channels of processing' approach to 
research in this area. They dubbed the various information 
sources as 'channels' ie. the voice, speech, body movement 
and face and attempted to examine the relative importance 
of each channel for the perceiver. Most experimenters found 
that the face was more accurately judged, produced higher 
agreement between judges or correlated better with judge- 
ments based on full audio-visual input than did the voice 
or speech alone (Argyle, Alkema & Gilmour 1971; Burns & 
Beier 1973; DePaulo, Rosenthal, Eisenstat, Finkelstein & 
Rogers 1978; Zaidel & Mehrabian 1969). However, experiments 
were contrived and artificial by the very nature of 
separating the information sources. Van de Creek & Watkins 
(1972) in a series of studies of naturally occurring be- 
haviour concluded that what was said was more important 
than visual input and that knowledge of demographic in- 
formation produced as much accurate behavioural postdiction 
as did exposure to an audiovisual film. 
A further difficulty with the channel research was 
that observers judging the face 'channel' are usually 
shown, minus sound, facial expressions that occurred 
embedded in speech (Ekinan & Oster 1982). 
Ekman, Friesen, 
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O'Sullivan & Scherer (1980) found that the relative 
weight that people gave to facial express-ion, the tone of 
speech and body cues depended on the judgement task and 
the conditions in which the behaviour occurred. There 
were correlations of judgement made by observers who saw 
the face without speech and judgements of people who saw 
the face with speech. But these were quite low on some 
dimensions (calm-agitated) and high on others (outgoing 
-withdrawn). 
That there is an universality of the facial ex- 
pressions of emotions has been reliably demonstrated in 
the later ; -pork (Ekman & Oster 1982). Subjects in both 
literate and pre-literate societies showed the same 
facial movements when posing particular emotions. But 
only a small number of facial expressions have been 
demonstrated to have an universal expression - anger, 
disgust, happiness, sadness and fear/surprise combined. 
The differences of expression that occur between cultures 
are suggested to be due to different display rules that 
operate within diffez t cultures. American and Japanese 
subjects sitting alone watching either a stressful or a 
neutral film showed the same facial movements. But, when 
an authority figure was present Japanese subjects smiled 
more and showed more control of facial expression (Ekman 
1973; Friesen 1972). 
It has also been shown that people can judge 
static, posed facial expressions 
(Fkrnan, Sorenson & 
Friesen 1969; Izard -1971). They restricted themselves to 
a small sample of basic emotions and carefully selected 
photographs of faces that appeared to portray the emotions 
unambiguously. Taking as a criteria of accuracy 
the poser's 
intention, American judges showed almost perfect accuracy. 
Ekman et al. also obtained judgements from observers 
in 
New Guinea and Borneo who had had virtually no contact with 
Westerners. These judgements were not as accurate as 
the 
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American observers but they were above chance and there 
was agreement between the groups. 
The work examining the channels employed video film 
techniques, thus wa-s not static, however was still posed 
or acted. But what is of real interest to a study con- 
cerned with nurses' perceptions of affect is spontaneous 
expressions of emotion that occur in a natural setting. 
', dinkelmayer, Exline, Gottheil & Parades (1978) used filmed 
interview sequences of 'normal' and schizophrenic people. 
Both American, British and ýTexican observers were able to 
make judgements about emotion a ter seeing the films. 
Perhaps interesting is that the performance of the three 
groups was equivalent when judging the schizophrenic 
groups' facial expressions. But the Mexican group v. ere 
less accurate than the other two when judging ' normals' . 
This is an isolated finding that has not been replocated 
(Ekman & Oster 1982). Ekman (1973) in the study of 
American and Japanese subjects watching a film found similar 
accuracy between American and Japanese observers. Also, 
the same people overall were judged correctly by the accurate 
observers. But it must be unreasonable to extrapolate 
from this work and suggest that in the real world people 
from different cultures can readily gauge the emotions of 
each other on the basis of their facial expressions. Little 
is really known about the display rules that operate V-within 
various cultures. ; `then it is culturally or otherwise 
desirable to conceal emotion it would be of interest to 
know if the face evidenced any detectable 'leakage'. Or 
if a person experiencing emotional upheaval, it is in- 
appropriate to express it, attempts to conceal this by a 
fleeting expression or by partial expression (Ekman & Oster 
1982). 
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Overall, from the work reviewed so far people 
have been shown to be able to gauge a limited number of 
basic emotions such as anger, disgust, happiness, sadness 
and fear/surprise from facial expression. 'euch work has 
used the posed intentional expressions of actors. This 
small number of basic emotions also appear to be expressed 
similarly across cultures in terms of facial movement. 
But much facial expression has little to do with emotion 
(Ekman & Oster 1982). Little is known about how facial 
expressions used to punctuate speech (Ekman 1979) or show 
expressions that are socially required differ from those 
expressing emotion. There is some evidence for right 
hemisphere involvement in the spontaneous expression of 
emotion, but this is at an early stage of research (Ekman, 
Hagar & Friesen 1981). 
There is recent work concerned wi to identifying 
attributes of people who can gauge the emotional state of 
another with accuracy. Also of interest are characteristics 
of expressive people, individual differences and methods 
for studying these factors. These areas of work will be 
reviewed after a discussion of the problem that is central 
to this area, namely criterion validity. Ekman & Oster 
(1982) consider this problem in relation to the facial 
expression of emotion. They ask hour it is possible to 
determine if the information provided by a person's facial 
expression is accurate? This can be extended to the 
accuracy of information 'that could be conveyed by face, 
voice and body movement. It is necessary to have an in- 
dependent criterion to verify the presumed link between 
an emotion and the expression of that emotion. 
Methods employed to attempt to achieve criterion 
validity have not been without problems. 
Studies that 
have used stimuli to e licit desired emotional states 
in 
subjects such as positive or negative 
films may v ell elicit 
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different emotions in different people and possibly a 
range of negative feelings may be experienced by the 
same incIividuý, l watching negative film eg. disgust Lind 
embarrassment. 
Some studies have employed subject self-report 
after they have viewed stimulus material. But if the 
duration of the stimulus exposure was of a reasonable 
length of time eg. a short film, a range of ei otions 
experienced may not be recalled, not the order in which 
they occurred. Unfortunately for none of the ' channels' , 
such as voice pitch or body movement, is there evidence 
that a certain change is indicative of a par. -ticular 
emotional state. Therefore no one channel can serve to 
reliably validate another. The studies of the neural 
correlates of facial expression are in their infancy. 
Ekrnan & Oster (1982, p. 163), suggested that: - 
"Because there is no single, infallible way 
to determine a persons' 'true' emotional state, 
it is unfortunate that so few investigations 
have followed the approach of using multiple 
convergent measures to gain a more reliable 





It is now intended to consider work that has been 
concerned with individual differences in a person's 
ability to judge another. Most of the work in this area 
has been in relation to a possible 'trait' of accurate 
person perception ability, a general ability to, judge 
others. Adams (1927) suggested that good judges of 
anothers behaviours tended to be egotistic, cold-blooded 
and more interested in people as tools than as human 
beings. Much of this work was directed at the ability 
to judge assumed personality attributes of other people 
rather than their emotional state. It is described by 
Cook (1971) and will not be described in detail within 
this thesis because it bears no direct relevance. Rather, 
the difficulties encountered in measuring accurate per- 
formance will be discussed in some detail as they do have 
direct relevance to the discussion of the method adopted 
for this work. 
There was considerable controversy about whether a 
general ability, to judge others in fact existed and if 
it did, the methods employed to investigate the phenomena 
had been severely confounded. Cronbach (1955) notes that: - 
"These studies have usually been built around 
a particular operation in which a Judge (J) "pre- 
dicts" how another person (0) will respond. 
Often, for example, both persons describe them- 
selves on a personality inventory, and J is then 
asked to fill out the inventory as he thinks 0 
did. The extent to which the prediction agrees 
with O's actual response is taken as a measure 
of J's accuracy of social perception 
(or "empathy", 
"social sensitivity", "diagnostic competence" etc) ". 
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Cronbach suggested that if the enquiry is interested 
in identifying correlates of a general ability, such as a 
personality characteristic, to judge others not only are 
there two sources of error present in the data but also 
two types of accuracy. There could be a constant error 
in terms of differences in 'level' where a judge typically 
under/over estimates from the criterion by a fixed amount. 
There could also be error in terms of 'spread', where 
judges correctly identify the mean plus the direction of 
deviation from the mean but over estimates the size of the 
deviations. The first type of accuracy that he described 
was 'stereotype' accuracy, an error in correlation. The 
judge could fail to differentiate and use a mean score ie. 
identifying an average response. The second type of 
accuracy was the measure of interest but was obscured by 
the other three artifacts. However, in an investigation 
which is concerned with accuracy, itself regardless of 
type Cook (1971) suggest that: - 
"If we analyse each trait separately -a 
desirable proceeding in any case - we can 
use standard scores and so eliminate indiv- 
idual differences in level and spread". 
Cline (1964) points out that some judges adopt a 
strategy of assuming that they are similar to the person 
being judged. Smith (197) in a study concerning rapport 
and social perception in mother/adolescent relationships 
found that accuracy was due, in part, to the tendency of 
high rapport mothers to assume similarity with their 
daughters. This could present further problems in the 
study of accuracy because when a judge possesses high 
real similarity with respect to the person being judged, 
his/her accuracy will correlate perfectly with the degree 
to which the judge assumes similarity to the person 
being 
judged. Accuracy, as umed similarity and real similarity 
are therefore math. ~natically linked. 
So although some of 
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these early studies v ere directed toward clinical per- 
formance they are difficult to interprete. 
Similarly measurement difficulties have been 
encountered in the studies of therapeutic empathy (Bachrach 
1976). In this instance the empathy in question is that 
of the therapist for client within a psychotherapeutic 
relationship of a rather more intense relationship than 
that of nurse/patient in the general ward setting. 
Empathy being the ability of one person to experientially 
'know' what another pex'son is experiencing from their 
point of view . Truax 
(1966) had concluded that a theral. pi st s 
empathy could be studied without having heard what the 
patient said. Raters were able to rate therapists for 
varying degrees of emphathetic ability given only this 
information. This was without rater judgements of con- 
gruence of therapist response to patient and any outcomes 
or response measures to treatment. Bachrach (1976) con- 
cluded from a multif'actorial study of the various components 
of therpeutic skill that what had been rr. easured by the 
empathy studies had been a highly correlated complex of 
attributes associated with the raters' liking for the 
psychotherapist, and their judgement of 'goodness' of 
psychotherapy. 
A study of nurses' empathetic ability employed the 
Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan 1969) to assess empathetic 
ability and the Barre tG--Lennard Relationship 
Inventory 
(Barrett-Lennard 1967) to assess patients' perceptions of 
their nurses' empathic ability (Forsyth 1979). 
The study 
found that 5O of the nurses studied were regarded as 
empathic on the Hogan Scale, whereas 
98 of patients in 
the study saw their nurses as highly empathic. 
This is 
regardless of any criticism of external validation 
ie. 
therapeutic outcome, and is highly reminiscent of 
the 
reported levels of satisfaction with 
the patient sat- 
isfaction studies. 
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The issues regarding method will be referred to 
later in the text in relation to the method employed 
in this study. A very much more recent study tackled 
the issue of judgement accuracy of health professionals. 
Gottheil, Exline & 7inkelmayer (1979) had noted that in 
the early literature more distant and dispassionate 
people were suggested to have been better judges of emotion 
in another. They suggested that the judgement 
aof 
the 
emotional message of a psychiatric patient is/different 
type of task than judging more explicit behaviour of non- 
psychiatric subjects. A task that requires different 
characteristics of the judges. They employed 32 women 
student nurses training in psychiatric nursing. The 
students v, were shown a silent film of 10 'nor, -nail and 10 
schizophrenic women each recounting three personal ex- 
periences, one of which had made them sad, one happy and 
one angry. The nurses were tested ona number of measures 
designed to assess their sociability, specialisation in 
the physical sciences, emotional adjustment, interests 
and they had been assessed by nurse supervisors as to 
their professional skill in relating to patients. A 
higher score in relating to patients was correlated vb'ith 
successful judgement of the schizophrenic patients, although 
correlations with total hits did not differ from chance. 
The personal variables that significantly correlated with 
more accurate judgement of the schizophrenic women's affect 
were social involvement, introversion, religious activity, 
low verbal ability and interest in both the outdoors and 
music. The characteristics that were related to the 
successful judgements of the normal women were mechanical 
interest, social detachment and an interest in sciences. 
Overall the 'normal' women were judged more often correctly 
than the schizophrenic women. However the means were 
14.53 and 10.50 respectively and as these appear to have 
been calculated on the addition of each subjects' mean 
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number of hits for the three emotion conditions this 
does suggest a low overall hit rate. Although there 
are problems with validating ; hat the women acutally 
were feeling when they read the stor. ies, and the 
correlations described earlier were low, it does appear 
that judging a 'normal' and a schizophrenic person could 
be different types of task. However, the degree of 
schizo-affective behaviour, its type and its duration 
were not stated by the authors, although they did state 
that the stimulus pairs had been carefully matched there 
is a lack of detail. Accuracy of judgement by more 
socially distant people, was suggested by these authors, 
to be related to analytic judgement where individuals 
are judged in relation to previous, accumulated past 
experiences in terms of stereotypes. Therefore they can 
be expected to exhibit higher levels of stereotype accuracy. 
Whereas, where differential accuracy is required more 
socially involved people do better. 
Further individual differences have been reported. 
Schiffenbauer (1974) found that the emotional state of the 
observer influenced the emotion they attributed to a facial 
expression. The degree of expressiveness of the person 
being judged and observers judgements has been a topic of 
recent study (Buck, Baron, Goodman and Shapiro (1980). In 
these experiments those to be observed, 'senders', viewed 
and discussed a series. of emotionally, loaded slides (ie. 
familiar, sexual, scenic, unpleasant and unusual), the 
observers watched videos of their nonverbal, behavour. In 
order to study the use of cues by observers, the observers 
segmented the video recordings into meaningful action units 
ie. they indicated. v'here one piece of information finished 
and a new one began, denoting breakpoints. Female senders 
elicited more breakpoints than men overall. 
The number of 
breakpoints was strongly correlated with sending accuracy 
for female senders but not males. The observers saw more 
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breakpoints in the expressions of accurately decodable 
female senders than poor female senders which was not the 
case for ätnales. So apparently the more informative 
women by definition of the number of breakpoints they 
elicited were more accurately judged. This was, not the 
case for men. When men and women were divided into high 
and low expressiveness in terms of the degree of accuracy 
with which they had been judged in the past, the same 
pattern prevailed in that the more expressive females 
were judged more accurately than the more expressive males. 
But the nonexpressive female was judged less accurately 
than the nonexpressive male. Also, the expressive male 
sender elicited fewer breakpoints than did the nonexpress_ ve 
male sender. 
This -°as an interesting carefully conducted study 
which also indicated a sex difference in the decoding of 
the judges. Accurate female judge., tended to make fewer 
breakpoints than did less accurate female judges, this 
was not true of males. Therefore, the suggestion was 
that 
there are qualitive differences in the manner in which 
they 
receive and convey nonverbal information. 
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5.5 
The Context/Prior E 2ectations 
An interesting American study has been concerned 
with inferences that nurses make about the degree to 
which patients suffer (Davitz & Davitz 1981). They 
make the assumption that a nurse would form her in- 
ference of a particular patient's suffering based on 
what she would expect to feel were she in that situation 
ie. assuming that the patient would behave in a similar 
way to herself. The nurses own expectations of suffer- 
ing for herself were said to be a stereotype based on 
previous experience of pain and suffering. The context 
in which suffering occurs being determined in part, by 
the nurse's expectations, which would also be influenced 
by diagnosis and other sociodemographic var fables. 
The study employed a standardised questionnaire 
measure of nurses' inferences of patient suffering that 
consisted of a series of vignettes describing 60 different 
patient profiles. The nurses , fiere required to rate on 
two scales of 1-7 the degree of physical discomfort or 
pain and the degree of psychological distress that they 
would expect the patient described to experience. They 
also completed a variety of measures of individual 
characteristics. 94 nurses took part in this aspect of. 
the study, the majority of whom, had been born in the USA. 
Approximately half had Northern European backgrounds, the 
remainder represented other backgrounds. 
The results demonstrated that nurses who tended 
to 
infer relatively high physical pain also tended 
to report 
that they had suffered relatively high pain in their o'. vn 
experiences. Inferences of psychological 
distress were 
related to ethnic background. 
Nurses who came from Northern 
European backgrounds inferred. significantly less patient 
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suffering than colleagues from other European or African 
backgrounds. The suggestion was made on the basis of 
these findings that: - 
.... belief systems about the suffering of 
others are influenced both by an individual's 
own experiences of suffering and socially 
learned attitudes about pain and psychological 
distress. Thus, a nurse who has experienced a 
great deal of pain associated with a particular 
injury may believe that another person r ilh a 
similar injury is also experiencing a high level 
of pain. But this belief is also influenced by 
his or her attitudes toward pain, attitudes aquired 
as a consequence of his or her history of social 
learning". (Davi tz & Davitz 198-1). 
There were further observations from the correlation 
matrix that related to individual nurse experience. The 
number of years of nursing experience -las negatively 
correlated. with a measure of stoicism. These nurses re- 
ported more stoic attitudes, complained less of psychological 
distress and tended to prefer less stimulating situations. 
However, a X2 analysis had revealed no effect of length of 
experience on inferences of suffering \vhere the quartile 
of nurses who had inferred least suffering were compared 
with the quartile wvho had inferred most as a function of 
length of experience. 
Davitz & Davitz suggested that those subjects who 
inferred lot;: levels of patient suffering were employing 
psychological distance as a defence mechanism to help them 
to cope with the discomfort that they experienc in the 
face of patient distress. They suggested the method of 
coping was reinforced by cLIltural factors such as 
the 
accepted norms of emotional expression and stoicism. 
A 
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second series of studies im estigated the possibility 
that a tendency to cope by use of psychological distance 
may be reflected by behavioural distance. A behavioural 
scale was developed and observations were made of nursing 
behaviour. A study of 26 high inference and 23 low 
inference Ij(,:, dical-Surgical nurses found that high in- 
ference nurses tended to stand closer to their patients, 
conveyed a warmer emotional tone and touched their 
patients more. They explained to patients past or future 
nursing action more often and less frequently dismissed 
their pat--Lent's concerns. However, they did not explore 
feelings more frequently or offer more sympathetic under- 
standing of the patient's situation. A similar pattern 
of findings emerged in a paediatric setting but not on an 
obstetric unit. This would suggest that the situation in 
which a nurse works has a modifying effect on her behaviour 
despite predisposition. 
However, interesting as this study is in relating 
beliefs to behaviour, it did not attempt to capture %,; hat 
the nurse knew of hour the patient actually felt. It is 
of interest to note that those nurses w, )ho inferred relatively 
high patient suffering did not do so by exploring their 
patients feelings - they observed but did not act on this 
inf ormation. 
Other work has been concerned with beliefs and 
expectations nurses have- about different classes of patients. 
In the psychiatric setting nurses have been.. shown to have 
a tendency to be socialised into attitude clusters towards 
diagnostic labels (Anderson 1976; Brady 1976; `llallston, 
Wallston & de Vellis 1976). A similar effect has shown 
with cancer patients (Morrow, Craytor, Brown & 
Fass 1976). 
These studies suggested that the nurses' beliefs regarding 
the diagnostic label which may or may not be relevant in- 
fluenced their predictions of disease progress and outcome. 
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5.6 
Nurses' Accuracy in Judging Patients' Feelings 
The literature that is directly related to nurses' 
perceptions or knowledge of how their patients feel and 
what they fear is extremely sparse . Carnevali (1966 ) 
found that nurses accurately perceived pre-operative 
patients' fear of the unkno%ýn and concern over separation 
from home. But they did not so readily identify their 
patients' fears of pain, death and destruction of body 
image. Carnevali was reporting a series of three small, 
exploratory studies conducted by different workers. 
Interview techniques were employed and no statistical 
analyses were performed. Johnston (1976) asked surgical 
patients to complete an inventory to describe their worries 
and simultaneously a nurse completed a similar inventory 
to indicate how much she knev, Ti of the patient's worries. 
There was poor correspondence between nurse and patient 
that suggested the nurses had very little information 
about what concerned patients. The nurses were not only 
inaccurate, but they showed a strong response bias, 
identifying almost three times as many patient worries 
as were reported by patients. 
This study has been replicated using a fellow-patient 
and a nurse as informants (Johnston 1982). The study employed 
10 mutually selected pairs of post--operative gynaecological 
women. The nurses were identified by the patients in terms 
of the nurse with whom a patient reported most contact. 
The Hospital Adjustment Inventory (De`(ý, olfe, Büx-ill & Cuinr- 
ings 1966) containing 22 items that require a yes/no response 
was again employed. Nurses identified significantly more 
worries than either patients or fellow patients overall. 
Fellow patients correctly identified 49% of patients' 
worries and nurses 59; x, the higher percentage 
for the nurses 
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reflected the nurses' over-attribution of worries. `, ', hen 
the degree of congruence between patients and judges -; as 
compared, the fellow-patients were significantly more 
accurate than the nurses (p `. 02) , although the presence 
of high levels of false positives were present in both 
groups of judges. The nurses were most likely to over- 
estimate worries about discharge, occupation and progress, 
and to underestimate worries about catching disease, being 
confined and being liked by staff. 
However, as has been mentioned response bias was 
present for both fellow-patients and nurses. Their fals. e 
positive rates being 60 and 70S' respectively. Where this 
is uncontrolled the finding of clear superiority for fellow 
patients must be tentative. The false negative rates were 
16% and 30 ý for fellow-patients and nurses respectively. 
This is a very interesting study but what remains unknown 
is the degree of anxiety related to these concerns - there 
is no reason to assume a simple additive effect. One worry 
may cause a patient considerably more anxiety than several 
relatively minor worries. The study employed a yes/no task, 
therefore items could be marked as yes if they were slightly 




Clarification of the Research Problem 
The literature reviewed suggested that nurses tend 
not to spend time with patients discussing, even briefly, 
their fears and feelings. People are able to gauge the 
basic emotional state of another from their nonverbal be- 
haviour, but this i, subject to distortion due to individual 
differences in expressiveness, display rules, conscious 
concealment on the part of the person being judged and the 
complexity of facial expressions which are only partly 
concerned with expressing emotion. Distortion can also be 
present within the nurse due to a nurse's prior expec- 
tations of a patient's feelings influenced by the nurse's 
own experience or lack of it, the nurses socio-economic 
and cultural background, the patient's socio-economic and 
cultural background and the emotional state of that nurse. 
The work of Johnston (1976; 1982) suggested that 
nurses are not aware of what their patients worry about or 
over-estimate the total number of patient concerns. What 
has not been explored is when nurses are given the oppor- 
tunity to estimate the actual degree of anxiety experienced 
by their patients, rather than an all or none identification 
of concern, the overall accuracy of that estimate. It. is 
also unclear how well nurses perceive a wider range of 
feelings such as those concerned with a mood of unhappiness 
or depression and how this compares v ith their perceptions 
of physical feelings such as fatigue or vigor. The emphasis 
of traditional nurse education has been directed towards 
physical care and patient well-being. It is-not known how 
well nurses perceive their patients' physical feelings 
except in terms of the inferences that they made with respect 
to pain and hypothetical patients 
(Jiavitz & I)avitz 191). 
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It was considered essential at this point to 
investigate nurses' perceptions of a wider range of 
potential feelings that patients may experience. Doing 
this in a natural environment ie. the ward setting, 
rather than investigating inferences or clinical judge- 
ments made about fictional patients. The literature 
reviewed illustrated well that the measurement of accuracy 
is a difficult methodological problem. However, the 
presence of negative affect in hospital patients and its 
potentially deletereous effect on recovery is an important 
patient problem. Nurses are in the best position to make 
clinical judgements about patient affect because of their 
potential for patient contact. Therefore, attempting to 
establish the degree of accurate perception of grades of 
feeling, although difficult, was considered to be important. 
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6.2 
Specific Research Questions 
This part of the study sought to establish whether 
or not: - 
1. Nurses were able to estimate the degree of anxiety 
experienced by patients when they were allot ed to 
express this in terms of the degree of feeling rep- 
resented by an adjective describing a mood rather 
than an actual concrete concern eg. financial troubles. 
2. Nurses were aware of those patients experiencing un- 
happiness or depression. Further, were able to 
estimate the degree of these emotions. 
3. Nurses were able to estimate their patients feelings 
of physical fatigue or physical vigor. 
L. Experience in nursing increased the accuracy of nurses' 
perception of affect. 
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Lt-3 
Niethodolo icai Problems Inherent in Measuri 
Accuracy of Perception 
The methodological problems that were identified in 
the literature will now be discussed in terms of how they 
were dealt with in this study. 
A. Criterion Validity 
There are several problems. witn using the self- 
report of emotions or feelings as a valid criterion of 
the experience of those feelings. It was noted that 
people may not have a total recall of a range of emotions 
that they experienced when viewing an evocative film. In 
terms of this study of patient ar'recti, patients may not 
have had a total recollection of a range of feelings ex- 
perienced over the period of a morning and there could 
have been marked fluctuations over time. However, as no 
'channel' such as facial expression, voice pitch, body 
movement or any other external, observable validation can 
give a reliable valid. azion or a particular emotion, the 
patient's self-report was considered to be the closest 
that could be obtained to an accurate report of that 
experience. 
A rating--scale technique was employed in this study 
containing a range of possible descriptions that pertained 
to the feelings being investigated. When the patient was 
describing his/her experience there were available a 
number of adjectives that described a similar feeling that 
could have served as an aid to memory. The provision of 
a range of similar adjectives could have also helped to 
minimise differential use of language between individuals 
because this allowed analysis in terms of their correspondance 
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ie. similarity of use. 
The problem of fluctuatior. L of an experience such 
as an experience of heightened anxiety that was reduced 
by a critical event eg. a negative test result, was 
reduced by suggesting a specific time period for the 
assessment of feelings (eg. lunch time). Thus a 
criterion that relied upon the use of language and re- 
call from memory over time could be more exact but not 
perfect. 
B. Social Desirability Effect 
The effect of a socially desirable response (Edwards 
1957) being given was uncontrolled and reduced as much as 
possible by instructions to subjects an. dby the size of the 
patient sample. 
C. Scale Artifacts 
It was noted in the literature that there were two 
different types of accuracy present when rating scale 
methodologies were employed. The first was differential 
accuracy ie. the ability to differentiate between people 
and the second, stereotype accuracy, the ability to judge 
the typical response of a class of respondents. In a 
study designed to consider the accuracy of nurses' per- 
ceptions of patient affect, a coalescence of the two 
aspects of accuracy to give a global measure was con- 
sidered to be of interest. A pre-disposition to base 
judgement on the use of a stereotype was introduced into 
the design as an additional variable. 
The two sources of error that were present with 
the use of rating scales in terms of response bias ie. 
level and spread were eliminated by transformation of the 
scores and use of the standard deviation rather 
than the 
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mean when the accuracy of subgroups of nurses was being 
compared. 
D. Assumed Similarity 
A judgement strategy of assuming that another person 
would feel and respond in a similar way to oneself was 
well documented (Smith 1957: Davitz & Davitz 1981). Demo- 
graphic details of nurses and patients were recorded and 
the strategy of assuming similarity encorporated into the 
design as an additional variable. 
E. Sex Differences 
The possibility of qualitive differences between the 
sexes in the manner in which they transmit and judge 
emotional messages was controlled by employing all female 
judges/nurses who judged an equal number of male and female 
patients. The effect of the sex of the researcher was held 
constant. The researcher was always female. 
F. Expressiveness 
Individual variation in levels of expressiveness was 
uncontrolled. This was reduced as much as possible by 





The Selection of Measures 
The measure of affect selected was a simple self- 
report mood adjective check list (M. A. C. L) adapted by 
Lishman (1972) from 1{11cNair and Lorr (1964). I cNair & 
Lorr (1964) made the distinction between mood and 
emotional state, although they viewed them as overlapping 
categories they suggested that mood states are likely to 
be more persistent. They regard mood as a concept with 
the status of an intervening variable. It was conceptualised 
"as an organismic state definable in terms 
of the antecedent inducing operations and the 
correlated behaviour consequences". 
Intraorganic events such as an illness have been 
shown to be antecedent conditions inducing mood change as 
indicated by this MACL (Wilson-Barnett 1977). 
The check list had 24 adjectives that refer to five 
mood factors found by McNair & Lorr (1964). They were 
tension/anxiety, depression, fatigue, vigour- and hostility. 
Lishrran (1972) had reduced the list of adjectives from 
over 50 to 24. and derived the same mood factors. Wilson- 
Barnett (1977) in a series of studies involving 355 patients 
found test-retest reliability and sufficient sensitivity 
to detect mood changes as a result of an intervention. The 
original test-re e-st reliabilities for these factors were 
of the range r= . 61 -. 69 
(T'r cNair &- Lorr) . More detail 
of this measure and * its use follows below. 
A further measure employed was that of Cognitive 
Complexity (Bieri et al. 19.70). It was noted in the pre- 
ceding chapter that some people appeared to be more 
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accurate judges of the emotional messages of non/abnormal 
populations. They appeared to demonstrate superior stereo- 
type accuracy. However, when a schizophrenic population 
was studied the less socially distant subjects were the 
. better judges. The Cognitive Complexity measure vas 
suggestive of distance in terms of the amount of social 
information that a person has at their disposal. Bieri 
et al. (1970, p. 162) states: - 
"Cognitive Complexity may be defined as the 
tendency to construe social behaviour in a 
multidimensional way, such that a more cog- 
nitively complex individual has available a 
more versatile system for perceiving the 
behaviour of others than does a less cog- 
nitively complex person". 
They developed an index based on the extent to which 
individuals apply constructs differentially when successively 
categorising a series of acquaintances in a modification 
of Kelly's (1955) repertory grid methodology. People who 
sort these acquaintances in a similar way on several 
dimension are designated cognitively simple, whereas cog- 
nitive complexity is attributed to those who sort them 
differently on each dimension. The cognitively complex 
infers more social information. Leventhal (1957) found 
that cognitive complex people predicted less similarity 
between themselves and others. Adams--Webber (1967) failed 
to find a significant relation between cognitive complexity 
and predictive accuracy. However, Adams-, 'iebber (1969) found 
that relatively cognitively complex people showed more skill 
than relatively cognitively simple people in inferring the 
social constructs of others in social situations. 
_ 
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Reiteration of Research Questions 
1. Are nurses able to estimate the degree of anxiety 
experienced by patients? 
2. Are nurses aware of those patients experiencing 
unhappiness or depression? 
3. Are nurses able to estimate the extent of their 
patients feelings of physical fatigue or physical 
vigor? 
4. Does experience in nursing increase the accuracy of 
nurses' perceptions of affect? 
5. Do differing levels of cognitive complexity differ- 
entially affect nurses perceptions of affect? 
6. When do nurses employ strategies of a) assuming 
similarity to the patient they are judging and judge 
as they would feel themselves and b) use a stereotype 
based on previous experience to make that judgement? 
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De sign 
A questionnaire design was employed. The patients 
completed one questionnaire, the Mood Adjective Check 
List (MACL) as a measure of their affect or feelings. 
The nurses completed four questionnaires as measures of: - 
1. Their assessment of the patient 
2. Their assumption of their own similarity to the patient 
3. Their assessment of a stereotypical patient 
4. Their degree of Cognitive Complexity 
Each nurse assessed two patients, except where this 
was impossible. All nurses were tested at 2pm having been 
on duty that morning. They were asked to select two patients 
who had been allocated to their care that day and assess 
how they judged that those patients had felt that morning. 
If they considered there had been a significant change they 




The Patients' Questionnaire 
The MACL comprised 24 adjectives listed on one 
sheet beside four columns that were headed by a quanti. tive 
phase ie. "not at all", "a little", "quite a bit" or 
"extremely" and were scored 0,1,2, &3 respectively. 
The sheet was headed by the instruction: - 
"Below are a number of words which describe 
moods. Please put a cross to indicate how much 
you have felt the way desdribed today". 
(APP. 39). 
The Nurses' Questionnaire 
1. The MACL identical to that of the patients but with 
modified instructions ie: - 
"Below are a number of words 
different moods. please put 
appropriate column beside th 
how much you think each word 
patient has felt today". 
(App. 40) 
which describe 
a cross in the 
e words to indicate 
describes how this 
2. The MACL modified with the instruction: - 
"Imagine yourself in this patient's position. 
Please rate this list of words as you would 
expect to feel if you were this patient". 
(App. 41) 
3. The MACL modified with the instruction: - 
"Imagine a typical patient of the same sex 
suffering from the same condition. 
Please rate 
this list of words as you would expect a typical 
patient to feel". 
(App. L12) 
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These three questionnaires were stapled together 
in a fixed order where the nurses assessment of the 
patient was followed by her assessment of herself and 
finally her stereotype. This was done rather than 
balancing the order to control for the effect of a self- 
rating influencing the assessment of the patient and an 
influences- of the sterNotype measure on either of the 
preceding questionnaires. 
4. A cognitive Complexity Repretory Grid modified from 
Bieri et al. (1970). The subjects were presented 
with 10 roles that would fit' different people that 
they knew. (App. ). 
5. The nurses completed a sheet giving brief details of 
age, marital status, stage of training, ethnic origin 
and history of hospital admission. 
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The Pilot Procedures 
The nurse questionnaires were tested with a group 
of six nurses working on the cardiothorac. c wards of the 
hospital employed in the study. Approaches were made to 
the medical staff by the ward sister and formal ethical 
committee approval for the study had been obtained. The 
questionnaires were examined for: - 
1. Clarity of instructions 
2. Feasibility of completion 
3. The face validity of the task 
The nurses were seen in pairs at 2pm having been on 
duty that morning. They were asked to select two patients 
whom they had nursed for a large part of that day. Two 
sets of the three questionnaires, one for each patient, 
were provided and the nurses were asked to record the 
patient names in the space provided at the top of the 
first page of each set of questionnaires. The page of 
personal details was completed and followed by the first 
and second questionnaire and the cognitive complexity 
questionnaire. A full explanation was given on completion. 
When the nurses had completed the questionnaires 
the patients were approached. They were asked to complete 
a short questionnaire as part of a research study and the 
instructions at the top of the questionnaire were read 
aloud to them by the researcher. 
Both nurses and patients were co-operative and had 
no difficulty in completing the questionnaire. On in- 
spection the questionnaires were correctly completed. 
But two points were apparent. 
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1. It was necessary to answer the questions put by the 
nurses briefly and as fully as possible but without 
giving additional information. A full explanation 
was provided at the end of the procedure. 
2. The likelihood of a fluctuation in the mood state 
of an individual patient during the course of a 
morning was possible. Therefore, a criterion time 
of 12 mid-day was selected as being relatively 
recent in terms of the patients memory of their 
mood. The nurses would still have contact with 
their patients prior to preparing hand-over reports 
and staff lunches. 
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The Sample 
80 student and pupil nurses at various stages of 
training at one London Teaching Hospital acted as subjects. 
The age range was 18-35 years. All the nurses were born 
in the UK and the majority were of British origin. A 
small percentage (approx 10iä) were of West Indian origin. 
140 patients were assessed with an equal proportion 
of: - 
a) Male and female 
b) Medical and surgical 
c) Housed in long open wards and 
new 8 bedded units 
All patients had been in hospital at least one day 
but had varying degrees of severity of illness and were at 
varying stages of progress. A small proportion of patients 
(less than 10ý'o) had an origin which was other than British. 
A large London Teaching Hospital was employed in the 
study. All adult medical and general surgical wards were 
visited. 
The age range of patientswas 15-96 with a mean age 
of 60 years and a mode of 70-79 years. (App. 43 & 44). 
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Procedure 
Permission was obtained from the ethical committee, 
the medical and the senior nursing staff to conduct this 
part of the study. The researcher had visited the ward 
sisters prior to seeing the nurses in order to identify 
their availability. Nurses were not aware in advance, 
of the nature of the research or if and when they would 
be involved with it. No nurse was seen more than once. 
The nurses were all seen by the researcher between 
2 and 3pm in a quiet part of the* ward or a vacant office . 
Nurses who had been on duty that morning were involved. 
They were asked for their voluntary participation and 
were told that their contribution would be completely 
anonymous. They then read the following typed written 
instructions: - 
"Please think of two patients whom you have 
nursed for a large part of today. Please select 
patients who are fit enough to co-operate and 
are not confused. I am now going to give you 
two sets of three short questionnaires, one for 
each patient. I would like you to fill them in 
according to the instructions at the top of each 
sheet. Complete your patient 01 first and then 
02, write the names of your patients in the 
spaces provided. I shall also be asking the 
patients to complete a questionnaire. All the 
completed questionnaires are completely con- 
fidential. They will not be seen by anyone 
other than myself and I do not want you to write 
your name anywhere on the forms. You all have a 
subject number. 
Are there any questions? 
If there are any queries at any point please ask 
me and I will try to answer them. 
Thank you very much for your help". 
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The nurses then proceded to complete the sheet 
of personal details which was attached to the top of 
the set of questionnaires for patient 01. They then 
assessed their first patient, following this with how 
they imagined. they would feel in the same situation and 
finally how a typical patient would feel. The same 
procedure was followed for the second patient. Queries 
were answered as fully as possible but no extra infor- 
mation for questionnaire completion was given. All the 
nurses were instructed to use late morning as a criterion 
time if there had been a change in the patients condition. 
When the nurses had completed their assessments 
the researcher approached the patients and explained 
that she was a research nurse doing some research with 
the nurses, and that it would help very much if that 
patient could complete a short questionnaire. Only two 
patients were unwilling to co-operate, both were very 
sick. The researcher excluded another three on the basis 
of the gravity of their condition. 
The researcIier read aloud the instructions at the 
head of the MACL whilst the patient also read them. She 
then reiterated them, instructing patients to mark the 
appropriate box beside each word as it best described 
how 
they had felt that day. In the case of a change they were 
instructed to describe how they felt az 12 mia-day. Wnere 
patients required assistance the researcher gave 
that 
assistance, except in interpreting 
the words. 
Approximately 3 of patients required assistance to 
record their response. Where this was 
the case the re- 
searcher read the instructions clearly and 
slowly to the 
patients followed by each adjective 
in a standard fashion 
eg. 
"Does the word shakey apply not at all, 





Introduction to Analysis 
The measure used in this study employed an ordinal 
measure. The previous discussion outlined the con- 
siderations of validity that determined the selection of 
the MACL. However, the problems remained of an ordinal 
measure of limited range. 
Parametric correlational statistics were employed 
throughout the analysis. Siegel (1956, p26) stated quite 
categorically: - 
"That parametric statistical tests, which use 
means and standard deviations (ie. which require 
the operations of arithmetic on the original 
scores) ought not to be used with data on an 
ordinal scale. The properties of an ordinal 
scale are not isomorphic to the numerical 
system known as arithmetic". 
The concern is with the level of measurement. Only interval 
and ratio measures possess properties of ascending/de- 
cending rank relations between numbers of an eq, ýial and known 
distance between these numbers. The ordinal level of 
measurement is less high, the numbers alloted to categories 
have the property of a rank relationship, but the intervals 
between them on the scale are unequal or unkno, Yn. 
Anderson (1961) discussed the problem of an appropriate 
choice of test for a scale employed., and discussed the pre- 
disposing conditions for arithmetic operations. He cites 
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Lord (1953) and contradicts the statement made by Siegel 
suggesting that: - 
"The statistical test can hardly be cognizant 
of the empirical meaning of the numbers with 
which it deals. Consequently, the validity 
of a statistical inference cannot depend on 
the type of measuring scale used". 
Lord (1953) points out that with a sufficient sample size, 
numbers tend to behave in the same way regardless. 
Non-parametric statistical tests do not make 
assumptions about the distributions of the samples studied. 
They do not require normally distributed data sets. Boneau 
(1960) points out that non-parametric or distribution-free 
methods have coupled with their freedom from restricting 
assumptions a disregard for much information contained 
within the data. They frequently ignore the intercategory 
differences that do exist between scores. This lack of 
power can result in a tendency not to reject the null 
hypothesis when it is actually false. 
This problem is exacerbated in the case of a four- 
point scale and a large sample. There inevitably be 
a large number of ties for one or more of the categories 
and thus much lost information. Boneau (1960) found the 
t-test to be robust under conditions where there was a 
violation of the sample distributi-on assumption. The F-test 
has also been found to be useful when comparing scores on 
5-point scales (Hsu & Feldt 1969). 
Visual inspection of the. distributions in the current 
case (App. 45-49) does indicate a skew to 
the left especially 
in the patient data. The sample observed reflects 
the 
population skew that has been demonstrated extensively else-- 
197 
where with different patient groups 
('«'ilson--Barnett, 'x). 
154 
Given the large sample size and the problem of extensive 
ties, 2-tailed parametric tests were applied throughout. 
The analyses performed were: - 
1. Factor Analyses on both patient and nurse JTACL data. 
This was to investigate the similarity of inter r, i etation 
of the adjectives between the two groups in terms of the 
derived factors prior to further analysis. 
2. An overall comparison of the main factors was made 
between the two groups. Items within the factors 
were considered individually rather than as a total 
score for each factor because of the double correlation 
that would have been introduced, as well as a loss of 
sensitivity. Simple and partial correlation coefficients 
were computed controlling for any effects of cognitive 
complexity. 
3. The patient and nurse data was converted to two trans- 
formations (separately for both groups) prior to a 
breakdown comparison of differential accuracy between 
nurse sub-groups. This was performed to remove the 
effect of artificial rating tendencies between indi Tiduals, 
such as an extreme or cautious use of the scale that 
could result in a spurious correlation (Cook 1971). The 
rating of male and female patients was compared, first 
and second year nurses were compared and differing levels 
of Cognitive Complexity examined in more detail. 
The total data pool was examined on four occasions. 
Therefore a P<0.05 level of significance was accepted 
because there was >5`' likelihood of significance due to 
chance. 
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4. The final stage of the analysis involved the T/IACLs 
where the nurses put themselves in the position of 
the patient (Assumed Similarity) and rated a typical 
patient (stereotype). Partial correlation coefficients 
were computed between these measures and the nurses 
rating of the patients. The stage of nurse training 
and levels of cognitive complexity were examined. 
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7.2 
The Factor Analysis 
Factor- Analyses were performed on both patient and 
nurse MAUL data. Principal componc. rits with. iteration and 
an orthogenal varimax rotation was computed. The factors 
that were derived were the same as had been found in pre- 
vious work (Wilson-Barnett 1977, App. 60). 
Factor Analysis - Factors Derived from MACL 


























































(App-51 gives a full list of eigen values and percentages) 
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Factors Derived from T\; tACL Data on 150 Nurse. 06servafiýons 
Rating 
Factor Adjectives Loading Var Cum ö 
1. Fatigue 




































































(App-52 gives a full list of eigen values) 
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The Factor Analysis from both samples re výýealed an 
overall similarity of structure, although there ;, ere 
differences in the rank order. Factor 1 for the patient 
data and 3 for the nurse data, Vigor suggested a similar 
understanding of the adjectives concerned as did Factor 
4, Anxiety. 
Factor 2, Depression, in the case of the nurses, 
included an additional adjective 'Worthless'. This had a 
loading of . 21 in the patient data and suggested that the 
word may have had a dissimilar significance for the two 
groups. The word therefore was not included in an overall 
Factor structure. The adjective 'Discouraged' had a low 
loading for both groups (. 30 respec Live y) , but did suggest 
similar use and was therefore retained as part of Factor 2. 
The emergence of two Hostility Factors in the nurses 
data implied that they were not clear Factors and were 
therefore treated with caution. 'Resentful' and 'Angry' 
were the most clearly correlated adjectives, although both 
words had lower loadings in the patients data (. 28 & . 37). 
It was decided to retain the factor because of the rank 
importance evident in the patient data but interpret any 
findings with caution. The nurse data did suggesting that 
nurses did not have a concept of a factor of Hostility. 
The Factor, Fatigue, included the word 'Sluggish' in 
the nurse data. In the patient analysis 'Sluggish' had a 
loading of . 14 which indicated 
that it was not associated 
with the patient Fatigue factor and was there ore dropped. 
Shaky appeared to have been understood in a similar fashion 
and was retained despite lower loadings 
(. 29 & . 32). 
The final factors that emerged for comparison between 
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The remaining adjectives were dropped from the analysis. 
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7.3 
The Main Anal sis 
The appendices 45 to 49 show the cummulative 
distributions of the nurses and patients ratings ie. 
the distributions of the number of patients and nurses 
rating each word subsumed beneath each factor. 
Figure 7.1 shows the total percentage of patients 
rating each factor as applicable to them (ie. 'a little'/ 
'quite a bit'/'extremely') and the percentage of nurses 
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The Ratios of Patients /Nurses Ratings of the 'adjectives 
Relating; to Anxipttr_as a Function of. Depýree 
Patients Nurses Observed Ratings 
Nervous "a little" 1 1.7 41 : 69 
"quite a bit" 1 : 2.4 16 : 39 
"extremely" 1 : 3 2 :6 
Tense "a little" 1 : 1.9 39 : 74 
"quite a bit" 1 : 2 13 : 27 
"extremely" 1 1.5 4 :6 
On edge "a little" 1 : 2.1 28 : 59 
"quite a bit" 1 : 1.6 12 : 20 
"extremely" 1 : 3 1 :3 
Fig. 7. 2 shows the ratios of nurses to patients rating each 
of the adjectives under each level of degree. 
Simple zero-order correlation coefficients were 
computed correlating the patients and nurses ratings of 
items. Any effect of -cognitive complexity was 
then 
partialled out. The 5 factors will be presented 
in 
sequence preceded by the mean scores. 
Factor I Vi or 
Table 7.1 Mean Scores Patients/Nurses Rati'n s 
N_1 0 Vigorous Lively Full of pep 
Active 
Patients . 314 . 
864 . 386 . 757. 
Nurses . 327 . 





Sirn le (: orrelations of Nurse Patient atin s Factor 1 




p <. 088 
. 172 
p<. 01 2 
. 201 
p<. 07 
The correlations between nurses' and patients' adjectives 
Vigorous, Active and Full of Pep reached acceptable levels 
of significance. The Partial Correlation coefficient con- 
trolling effects of cognitive complexity gave an almost 
identical result (Table A. 1, App. 53). 
Factor 2 Depression 
Table 7.3 Mean Scores Patient/Nurse Ratings 
N=140 Unhappy Miserable Discouraged Depressed 
Patients . 479 . 521 . 293 . 593 
Nurses 1.087 . 880 . 673 . 920 
Range - 0-3 
Table 7.4 Correlations of Nurse Patient Ratings 
Unhappy Miserable Discouraged Depressed 
. 321 
p <. 0001 
. 281 
p <. 001 
. 099 
p <. 24 
. 068 
p <. 42 
The correlation between the nurses and patients for the 
adjectives Unhappy and Miserable reached highly acceptable 
levels of significance. Discouraged and Depressed failed 
to approach significance. The partial correlation con- 
trolling Cognitive Complexity displayed the same result 
(Table A. 2 App. 53). 
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Factor 3 Anxiety 
Table 7.5 Mean Scores Patient iNrse 'Ratings 
N=11+0 Nervous Tense On Edge 
Patient . 56 . 55 . 393 
Nurse 1.11ý 1.093 . 
84 
Range 0-3 
Table 7.6 Si_rn; )le Correlations of IýTurs PatientRat in s 
Nervous Tense On Edge 
-. 005 
Px. 95 
ý_ . 0096 
P<. 91 
-. 038 
P <. 65 
None of the correlations of the adjectives subsumed under 
this factor displayed any agreement between nurses and 
patients. The same was true when cognitive complexity was 
partialled outi (Table A. 3, App 53). 
Factor 4 Fatigue 
Table 7.7 Mean, Scores Patients/Nurse ratings 
N=11 0 Shaky Weary Tired Worn-out 
Patients . 693 . 
807 1.193 . 586 
Nurses . 993 1.240 
1.353 1.040 
Range O-3 
Table 7.8 Simple Correlations of Nure/Patients Rating 
Shaky Weary Tired Worn-out 
. 1407 
P -. 097 
1799 
P <. 033 
. 342 . 084 
P <. 0001 p <. 33 
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The correlation for the adjective Shaky sho-v, v; ed a trend at 
the 10l level. 'weary' attained an acceptable level of 
significance and the correlation for Tired was lightly 
significant. The correlation for 'Worn-out' was non- 
significant. Again the same was true for the patient 
(Table A-4, App. 53)" 
Factor 5 Hostil_it, y 
Table 7.9 Mean Scores Patient/Nurse Ratings 
N=140 Resentful Spiteful Angry Furious 
Patients . 150 . 086 . 171 . 079 
Nurses . 390 . 087 . 287 . 053 
Range 0-2 
Table 7.10 Simple Correlations of Nurse Patient Ratin s 
Resentful Spiteful Angry Furious 
. 172 




p <. 004 
. 189 
p <. 025 
The correlations for 'Resentful', 'Angry' and 'Furious' 
reach the 5%o level of significance, 'Spiteful' did not. 
The partial correlation controlling Cognitive Complexity 
affected the adjective 'Angry'. The correlation \; gas in- 
creased from . 2449 to . 2774, a small 
increase of . 0325, 
but this was sufficient to raise the level of significance 
from . 004 to . 
001. This may be artifactual and will be 
subject to further scrutiny 
(Table A. 5, App. 52). 
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7.4 
Breakdown Comparison of Accuracy 
The -Z score variable transformation was performed 
on both patient and nurse data. Pearson Product i, "oment 
Correlation Coeficients were computed for each item sub- 
summed beneath each of the five factors. Only minute 
discrepancies between the simple correlations on the raw 
scores and the correlations of the transformed scores 
were observed (App. 54). 
The total patient population was divided into male 
and female patients. There were 69 women and 71 men, and 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients were com- 
puted for the two groups using the transformed data (means 
for 5 factors, 
, 
Tables A6-A10, App. 55). 
Comparison of Correlations of Nurses Ratings wits 
Male/Female Patients 
Table 7.11 Factor I Vigor 
Vigorous Lively Full of Pep Active 
Male . 165 . 0165 . 
132 . 153 
P <"17 p <"89 P <. 27 p <. 203 
Female . 372 . 257 . 178 . 234 
p <. 002 p <. 033 p <. 143 p <. 053 
The correlations for the adjectives 'Vigorous' , 
'Lively' and 'Active' reached an acceptable level of 
significance in the female patient group, although 
'Full 
of Pep' failed to do so. All the correlations of nurses 
with male patients were non-significant . 
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1 able 7 1ý2 Factor 2 Depression 
Unhappy i,, iserable Discouraged Depressed 
Male 
. 285 . 353 . 218 . 135 
p< . 016 p <. 003 p 4.067 p<. 26 
Female 
. 365 . 231 _.. 032 . 002 
p <002 p . ß. 053 P<. 79 p ß. 98 
The nurse/patient correlation exceeded the p< . 05 
level of significance with the adjectives 'Unhappy' and 
'Miserable' for both male and female patients. In both 
patients groups 'Depressed' failed to reach significance. 
The correlation between nurses and male patients for 'Dis 
couraged' did approach the 5J level of significance, this 
was not the case for female patients. 
Table 7.13 Factor 3 Anxiety 
Nervous Tense On Edge 
Male . 0109 -. 0791 . 0943 
p<. 93 p 51 p<. L3 
Female -. 0691 . 0540 -. 1406 
p<"57 p<. 66 p<. 25 
None of the correlations for either male or female 
patients approached significance. 
Table 14 Factor 4 Fatigue 
Shaky 'Weary Tired Viorn-out 
Male . 2665 . 153 . 375 . 
059 
p. e"025 p <. 2 p <. 001 p <. 63 
Female . 048 . 
214 . 329 . 135 
p<. 69 p<. 08 p<. 006 p<. 27 
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The correlation between nurses'- and patients' ratings 
for the adjective 'Tired' was significant in both groups. 
'Shaky' was significant for male patients. 'Weary' de- 
monstrated a trend towards correlation for the female patients. 
Table 7.15 Factor 5 Hostility 
Resentful Spiteful Angry Furious 
IVlale . 227 -. 059 . 2795 . 233 
p <. 057 p 4.6 p 02 p (. 05 
Female . 084 . 379 . 149 __. 026 
p, .5 p <. 001 p<. 2 p<. 8 
The correlations between nurses' and male patients' 
scores were significant in the cases of 'Angry' and 
'Furious'. 'Resentful' approached significance. For 
female patients 'Spiteful' was highly significant (p<. 001). 
Furs/Patient Pearson Correlation Examining; the Stage of 
Training. 1st and 3rcl Year Nurses 
The stage of nurse training was examined for 
differential effects of accuracy. 1st year nurses ratings 
of their patients were compared with those of 3rd year 
nurses. There were 58 1st year nurses compared with 57 
in their 3rd year. (Table All--A4, App. 56 presents the 
means for the factors). 
Table 7.16 Factor 1 Vigor 
Vigorous Lively Full of Pep Active 
1st year . 262 . 3065 . 
411 . 339 
p <. 05 p <. 02 p c. 001 p <. 
009 
3rd year . 169 . 
235 . 016 -. 
013 
p, ß. 2 p, ß'. 08 P<"9 FZ"9 
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For the 1st year group the correlations between 
the nurse/patient ratings demonstrated significance in 
the case of all four adjectives. There were no significant 
correlations at the 5iö level in the 3rd year group, 
although a trend was demonstrated for the adjective 
'Lively'. 
Table 7.17 Factor 2 Depression 
Unhappy Miserable Discouraged Depressed 
1st year . 307 . 278 _. 029 . 027 
p e. 02 P. <. 035 p /. 8 p <. 8 
3rd year . 280 . 065 . 129 . 028 
p<. 035 p<. 6 p <. 34 p<. 8 
For the Ist year group the correlations between the 
nurse/patient rating of the adjectives 'Unhappy' and 
'Miserable' demonstrated significance, 'Discouraged' and 
'Depressed' did not. For the 3rd year group only 'Unhappy' 
was significant. 
Table 7.18 Factor 3 Anxiet 
Nervous Tense On Edge 
1st year . 073 -. 03 . 
042 
p "6 p <. 
8 p , C. 75 
3rd year . 047 . 
08 . 036 
p <. 73 p <. 55 pß. 8 
There were no significant correlations for any of 
the adjectives subsummed under this factor. 
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Table 7.19 Factor 4 Fatigue 
Shaky eary Tired V orte-out 
1st year -. 058 . 03 . 3ý_8 -. 09 
p z. 66 p <. 8 p <. 007 p <. 5 
3rd year . 324 . 264 . 487 . 119 
P<. 01 p <. 05 p-0.0001 p <. L 
The 3rd year group nurse/patient correlations of the 
adjectives 'Shaky' and 'Weary' were both significant. The 
correlation of 'Tired' was highly significant , although 
'Worn-out' failed to approach significance. The only 
adjective that was significant in the 1st year nurses was 
'Tired' (p x. 007). 
Table 7.20 Factor 5 Hostility 
Resentful Angry 
1st year . 323 . 331 
P<. 01 p. (. 01 
3rd year . 211 . 174 
p<. 115 p. <. 2 
The adjectives 'Spiteful' and 'Furious' were omitted 
from the analysis. No patient in this breakdown of the 
data had considered themselves to have felt 'Spiteful' and 
only two patients experienced any degree of 'Fury'. The 
remaining adjectives 'Resentful' and 'Angry' demonstrated 
significant correlations between patients and 1st year nurses 
rating but not between patients and 3rd year nurses. 
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Pearsons Correlation Coeffic_. e. nt-. of Nurse/Patient , tines 
Co? paring Pifferin Levels of Co ni give Complexity 
The total range of Cognitive Complexity scores for 
all the nurses was 108-259, the possible range gras 
40-4 50. Nurse subjects were divided. into three groups, 
the highest scoring -, the mid-scoring 3 and tine lowest 
scoring The number of subjects in each group and the 





The overall distribution of scores 
be skewed to the lower scoring end of th 
highest scoring group had a within group 
the mid-score group a range of 16 points 
31 points. (Table A15-A19, App. 57, Mean 
factors). 
Range 
183 - 259 
153--169 
108 - 139 
Table 7.21 Factor 1 Vi{; or 
can be seen to 
e range. The 
range of 76 points, 
and the lowest 
scores for the 
Vigorous Lively Full of Pep Active 
High . 006 _.. 
103 -. 197 . 265 
Scores p. 97 p-<. 55 p <" 25 pz. 12 
Mid . L23 . 283 . 
531 . 399 
Scores 01 p <. px:. 09 P<"001 px. 02 
Low . 163 . 039 . 
058 . 048 
Scores p . x. 35 p<. 
8 p <. 7 p <. 8 
The only correlations to reach an acceptable 
level 
of significance were for the miäa-range group of subjects. 
' Vigorous' ,' Full of 
Pep ` and ' Active' were signif ican'L. , 
'Lively' indicated a trend at the 10 level. 
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Table 7.22 Factor 2 Depression 






p <. 4 
Mid 
- 
. 164 "044 
Scores <. 3 p <. 8 
Low 120 . 002 
Scores <. 5 P <. 99 
The low score group failed to demonstrate significance 
for any adjective. 'Unhappy' had significant correlation 
for both high and mid scores and 'Miserable' was significantly 
correlated in the mid score group. 
Table 7.23 Factor 3 Anxie 
Nervous Tense On Edge 
High . 047 -. 269 230 
Score p -. 8 p <. 11 p c. 18 
Tvii d. . 192 . 17 5 . 011 
Score p <. 26 p <. 3 p <. 95 
Low . 079 -. 035 . 
071 
Score p <. 65 p <. 8 p <"7 
No correlation under this factor was of significance. 
Table 7.214. Factor ý. Fa I ; ue 






p <. 03 
. 381 
p <. 02 
. 148 














p.:: ý "3 
. 084 
p <" 6 
. 425 
p C. 01 
. 123 
p ý. 5 
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Significant nurse/patient correlations v, 'ere observed 
for the adjectives `Shaky', ' `, 7eary' and 'Tired' for the 
high scoring subjects. The adjective 'Tired' reached 
significance among mid and low scor.. ng subjects. 
Factor 5 Hostij_ity 
The adjectives 'Spiteful' and 'Furious' were again 
omitted from the analysis because of inadequate variability 
in sub-groups of patient data. 
Table 7.25 
Resentful Angry 
High . 06 . 5025 
Scores p .C .7 p <. 002 
Tý? id . 066 . 454 
Scores p <. 7 p <. 005 
Low . 302 . 265 
Scores p <. o8 p <. 125 
Significant correlations were obsered for the 
adjective 'Angry ' amongst high scoring subjects and mid 
scoring subjects. A trend was observed amongst the low 
scoring subjects and the adjective 'Resentful'. 
Table 7.26 is a summary of the correlations that 
reached an acceptable level of significance for the total 
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For a table of the composition of the subject 
groups see App. 58.1st and 2nd year nurses judged 
a-n equivalent ratio of female to male patients. There 
was an equivalent distribution of 1st and 3rd year 
nurses over the differing levels of cognitive complexity. 
A tendency was noted for high scoring or less cognitively 
complex subjects to judge male as opposed to female sub- 
jects. The overall ratio of male to female was 55: 53, 
for high scores it was 2)4: 14, for medium scores 15: 20 and 
low scores 16: 19. A X2 failed to demonstrate this as a 
significant difference between the groups (App. 59). The 
groups were therefore considered to be discrete. 
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7.5 
Analysis of Judgement Strategies 
The analysis of this section was confined to the 
nurses rating for the patient compared with: - 
1. The ratings as if they had been the patient (assumed 
similarity) and 
2. The rating of a typical patient (stereotype) 
The untransformed scores were used as the com- 
parison-being made was within subjects. Partial Correlation 
Coefficients were calculated controlling firstly for the 
effect of the stereotype measure on assumed similarity and 
secondly the assumed similarity measure on the stereotype. 
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Table 7.27 
Summary Table of Partial Correlation Coefficients of ý,;;: cse 
Ra ti? s for Patients v; ith the i, 'easure of 1- sumed Similarity 
Controlling Stereotype and the Stereotype -J, 1easure Co. -trolling 
Assumed Similarity 
Adjective Assumed Similarity Stereotype 
Vigorous . 299 
(p. <0.0001) 
Lively . 419 
(P<0.0001) 
Full/Pep . 2615 (p <0.002) . 3154 
(p /-0.0001) 
Active . 426 
(p <0.0001) 
Unhappy . 185 (p <0.03) . 2785 
(p X0.001) 




Discouraged . 293 
(p <O. 0001) . 254 
(p<0.003) 
Depressed . 277 
(p <0.0001) . 246 
(p <0.003') 
Nervous . 232 
(p <0.006) . 248 
(p <0.003) 
Tense . 398 (p <0.0001) 
On edge . 3045 
(p <0.0001) 
Shaky . 328 
(p <. 0.0001) . 240 
(p <0.004) 
Weary . 423 
(p <0.0001) . 2195 (p! 0.009) 
Tired . 391 
(P-<0.0001) . 389 
(P---, 0.0001) 
Worn-out . 2725 (p< 0.001) . 392 
(p <0.0001) 
Resentful . 243 
(p x: 0.004) 
Angry " 395 (p <0.0001) 
N 140 
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Table 7.27 gives the partial correlation co- 
efficients between the nurses' ratings of the patients 
and their ratings of Assumed Similarity and the stereo-- 
type. Only those correlation coefficients reaching the 
51 level of statistical significance are reported (for 
a complete table see App. 59). 
The nurses' rating for the patient of the adjectives 
relating to Physical Vigor, demonstrated correlation with 
the measure of Assumed Similarity with the exception of 
descriptor 'Full of Pep'. The ratings of this descriptor 
correlated with both the other ratings. 
The reverse was present with the rating for the 
patient of the adjectives relating to Anxiety and 
Hostility. The rating for the patient of these adjectives 
correlated with the ratings of the stereotype measure. 
This was with the exception of one adjective 'nervous' 
which correlated with both the other ratings. 
The rating for the patient of the adjectives re- 
lating to Depression and Fatigue correlated with both the 
Assumed Similarity and the stereotype measure. 
Comparison of Groups of Nurses and Their Ratings of Patients, 
the Assumed Similarity TJeaeure and the Ster_ eotliDe Measure 
Nurses were again divided into groups, firstly 
according to their stage of training and secondly their 
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Nurses in their 1st and 3rd year of training viere 
separately analysed. Table 7.28 gives the partial 
correlation coefficients between 1st and 3rd year student 
nurses' ratings of their patients and their ratings of 
Assumed Similarity and the Stereotype. Only those 
correlation coefficients reaching the 5ý level of statis- 
tical significance are reported (for a complete table 
see App. 60). 
The overall picture that emerged was that 1st year 
nurses demonstrated a more consistent correlation between 
their ratings of patients and their ratings of the Assumed 
Similarity measure. Of the 17 adjectives that were rated 
for the patient, 11 correlated with the rating of Assumed 
. Similarity compared with 4 with the stereotype measure. 
The 3rd year group presented a more complex picture where 
there were an equal number of significant observations 
with both measures (7 & 7). 
Levels of Co nitive Comple2ity 
Partial correlation coefficients were again computed 
between the nurses' ratings for the patients and the two 
measures. 
The highest scoring subjects (N=36) with a range of 
183-259 were compared with the lowest scoring subjects 
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The overall pattern of correlations suggested a 
tendency for subjects with high cognitive complexity 
scores to rate patients as they rated themselves 
(Assumed Similarity) more often than rating them as 
they perceived a typical patient (stereotype) would 
feel (9 & 3). Whereas, there was a tendency in the 
opposite direct ion for the lower scoring subjects 
(6 & 10). 
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CHAPTER 8 
Discussion of Resýal. t 
8.1 
The Factor Analysis 
The factor analysis was performed to identify the 
mood factors contained within the l. il. CL and to establish 
a consensual understanding of the language used to ex- 
press them by both the patients and the nurses. 
The factors derived from the patient data were 
identical to those derived by \Vilson-Barnett (1977). 
But there was dissimilarity in terms of the number of 
adjectives subsumed under one factor, Depression. 
Wilson-Barnett had identified eight adjectives related 
to and subsumed under Depression (App. 50). Whereas, 
the present study identified only four in the patient 
data and five in the nurses' data. The reason for this 
would be a result of comparing two heterogeneous sets 
of patient data. The words found to be unrelated in 
this set of patient data were helpless, guilty, hopeless 
and worthless. 
The component emotions of self-disgust and contempt, 
and guilt were found by Izard (1972) to characterise 
pathological manifestations of depres lion. Zung (1973) 
described depression as a human experience extending from 
normal mood swings to a pathological state. The factor 
analysis of this patient population suggested that the 
self -deprocating feelings experienced by many pathologically 
depressed patients were not being experienced. To take 
this a stage further and suggest that the current popu- 
lation did not contain any patients whose feelings of 
depression were similar to those described as pathological 
would be unjustified. But, the factor analysis suggested 
1L)J 
that psychopathological depressive states were not 
strongly represented. It is of further interest that 
the adjectives relating to feelings of self-deprocation 
and guilt were not related to the nurse factor, De- 
pression. This would suggest, either that nurses 
without specialist knowledge are unaware of the association 
between depression and feelings of self-deprocation, or 
that the nurses accurately perceived that none of their 
patients were experiencing this depth of depression. 
The lack of one clear factor representing Hostility 
within the nurse data could also have been indicative 
of unfamiliarity on the part of the nurses. Feelings of 
resentment and anger are not associated with the hospital 
experience in the teaching during nurse training. The 
nurses in this study were all student nurses and, therefore, 
had had less than three years experience in nursing. The 
experience and maturity in the job necessary to objectively 
appreciate that patients can feel resentment and anger about 
their illness and situation may take rather longer to 
develop. But, this interpretation is complicated by the 
small number of patients who reported feelings of hostility 
in this study (App. 49). Overall, less than 10iß of 
patients expressed such feelings. Despite these observations 
this factor was retained for the analysis because it was 
considered to be of interest to observe whether nurses 
could identify those patients who had reported Hostility. 
With the exception of the factor Hostility which has 
been qualified, the adjectives that were retained for the 
analysis had shown a clear association with the four 
factors which they identified by both the patients and 
nurses. This implied an equivalent understanding and use 
of language by both groups. Those words that 
showed no 
common understanding were not included 
in the analysis. 
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8.2 
The Main Analysis;: Overall Observations and 
Global Sensitivity 
The overall profile of feelings of anxiety and 
depression were similar to previous work (Wilson-Barnett 
1977). The actual proportion of patients reporting 
feelings relating to depression was larger in this study 
than had been reported in the studies of vlaguire et al. 
(1974) and Moffic et al. (1975). But these two studies 
reported the incidence of pathological depression that 
they believed to be present, and had employed a psychiatric 
assessment interview in the method and were, therefore, 
not directly comparable v, ith this study. The present 
study was concerned coley with the expression of feelings 
and when the four adjectives were considered together 
this represented slightly less than 3 of patients (31; x) . 
Slightly more than * of patients (37%) reported 
feelings of anxiety and the nurses reported anxiety for 
71.6; 0 of their patients and feelings of depression for 
61i/. This illustrated a consistent tendency on the part 
of the nurse to over-estimate the negative effect ex- 
perienced by their patients by 100%. Johnston (1982) 
observed that nurses identified two thirds more patient 
concerns overall than had been identified by those 
patients. The degree and intensity of anxiety implied 
by these worries had not been investigated within her 
study. Figure 7.2 shows the ratio of nurse 'to patient 
ratings of each of the adjectives according to their 
degree of intensity. The adjective nervous shows an 
ascending over-estimation by nurses as the intensity 
denoted by the scale increases ie. 1: 1.7,1: 2 and 1: 3. 
A similar profile emerged for the adjective 
On Edge, 
but there was less variation of rating for the adjective 
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Tense. But, when inspecting the small numbers of patients 
rated by nurses as 'extremely' anxious in terms of any 
three of the adjectives, and effect of a systematic 
tendency to differentially over-estimate was very slight 
(App. L5). These observations concur with t ose of 
Johnston that nurses tend to over-estimate in a general 
fashion as to the total amount of anxiety experienced bfr 
hospital patients. The profile for the rating of the 
adjectives denoting depression was similar (App. 41t) . 
By contrast to the large, global over-estimation 
of patient negative affect by the nurses, the ratings 
by nurses of their patients' physical feelings were 
over-estimated to a much lesser extent. The amount of 
physical fatigue and vigo. reported as being present by 
this population of patients was more similarly reported 
by the nurses on behalf of the population (App. 43 and 
46). 
Physical feelings of fat iguewere the feelings 
reported by a higher proportion of patients overall. 
They were the highest in rank importance for both the 
patients and nurses (Fig. 7.1). The second most important 
in rank order for the patients was vigour folloýved by the 
factors denoting emotional affect. The rank order of the 
nurse factors mirrored that of the patients factors except 
for the factor vigour, implying not a simple under-estimation 
by the nurses of the overall level of vigour experienced 
by their patients, but rather a gross over-estimation of 
anxiety and depression. 
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8'3 
The T. irain Analysis: Correlation Coefficients Between 
Patients' RatinFl and N'urses' Ratings for those Patients 
Individual adjectives have been correlated rather 
than combining the adjectives under each mood factor. 
For this reason the discussion will focus on `feelings' 
as opposed to moods. That the individual adjectives 
represent the moods has been demonstrated by the factor 
analysis. But the discussion of feelings as opposed to 
the more absolute state of a mood allows the discussion 
of situations where the correlational pattern is incomplete. 
`, Within the analysis of this section of the study a mood 
is viewed as a construct and those adjectives or feelings 
that are associated with the, mood are v _ew, w. wed as dimensions. 
In general the simple correlation coefficients 
observed were of a low order ranging from r, _ --. 005 to 
r= . 342. The range of correlations that achieved an 
acceptable degree of statistical- significance at the 5J 
level was r= . 172 
(P-<0.042) to r= . 342 (p.. -, -0.0001). 
In order to understand fully the low order correlations 
observed in relation to interpreting their meaning, it is 
necessary to consider the nature of the constructs that 
are represented by each of the five factors. Taking as 
an example the construct Depression, the factor analysis 
identified that the words unhappy, miserable, discouraged 
and depressed were used in association with each other in 
a relatively consistent fashion. These ,,,; ords were held 
to imply the construct depression on an individual basis 
for the purposes of the correlational analysis ie. each 
pair of patient and nurse adjectives were correlated in- 
dividually. There was no one-to-one relationship between 
that construct depression and a particular adjective. For 
example, to signify the construct depression a patient may 
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emphasise the word unhappy and, to a lesser extent, the 
word miserable, whereas the nurse may reverse this. 
Considering the patient to be depressed she may emphasise 
the words miserable and depressed and, to a lesser extent, 
unhappy. Although both parties have recognised the presence 
of feelings of depression, correlations of a relatively 
low order would result because of this differential and 
uncontrolled use of language. The large sample of 140 
patients would allow love order correlations to be stat- 
istically significant. It was decided, that because of 
the difficulty of the task with 1 in 4 chance of exact 
correspondence between adjectives used to describe the 
construct, to consider correlation coefficients of the 
order of r= .2 or more as meaningful for further in- 
terpretation. 
The first specific research questions posed during 
this study were concerned with whether or not nurses were 
aware of those patients experiencing anxiety or depression, 
and whether or not they could estimate the degree of those 
feelings of negative affect. In the case of anxiety there 
were no correlations between the patients and nurses rat- 
ings of any of these adjectives. It has already been dis- 
cussed that the nurses tended to over-estimate patient 
anxiety in a global and non-discriminating fashion this 
was reinforced by the absence of correlation. 
A global picture of a general and undiscriminating 
over-estimation of patient depression by the. nurses had 
also been observed. This was confirmed by the lack of 
correlation present between nurses and patient's ratings 
of the adjectives discouraged and depressed. But, the 
correlations between the nurses and patient ratings of the 
adjectives unhappy and miserable were r= . 321 and 
r= . 281 respectively 
(p, --'0.0001 and p, --_-_0.001). Inspection 
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of the cumulative distribution suggests that these ob- 
served correlations were, in fact, artitactual (App. 44). 
The nurses had rated 77.8% of patients as unhappy and 
62. bý%% of patients as miserable. The correlations had 
been achieved by rating a majority of patients as 'a 
little bit' unhappy or miserable and, therefore, in- 
cluded those patients who had so rated themselves. 
The third. question posed was whether or not nurses 
were able to estimate the extent oi' -their patients' 
physical vigouror fatigue. Inspection of the correlations 
bet een patients' and nurses' ratings of the adjectives 
subsumed under the factor Vigor indicated that nurses 
were aware of how vigorous and how active their patients 
felt (Table '(. 2). The adjectives 'vigorous and 'active' 
demonstrated correlations of r= . 2525 and r= . 201 
respectively and inspection or the rrequency distributions 
suggests that these were meaningful correlations (App-43). 
The ratings for the adjective lively failed to correlate 
and the correlation of the ratings of the descriptor 'full 
of pep' was of an unacceptably low order. The nurses did 
have some idea, as demonstrated by vigorous and active as 
to the degree of physical vigour their patients had felt. 
Table 7.8 shows the correlation coefficients between 
the patients and nurses ratings for the factor Fatigue. 
One of the adjectives, tired, demonstrated a highly sig- 
nificant correlation of-agreement between the nurses and 
patients ratings (r = . 342, p40.0001). 
That the nurses 
had a clear idea of how tired their patients felt was 
further indicated by the frequency distribution of scores 
(App. 46). 
Turning to the final factor Hostility, the only 
adjective to reach the criteria of acceptability 
was 
angry (r = . 245, p 
<0.004) Inspection of the frequency 
distribution suggests that this was an artifactual 
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observation. The nurses corresponded with those patients 
who had rated themselves as angry by over-estimating a 
sufficient proportion of patients to include those patients 
(APp. 47). The increase in the size of the correlation 
as a result of partialling out the effects of cognitive 
complexity must therefore be meaningless. Cognitive 
complexity was not found to be influential in this un- 
differentiated form and will be discussed in relation to 
the analysis that deals with specific comparisons of nurse 
sub-groups. 
The results did indicate that nurses knew which of 
their patients were feeling relatively vigorous and how 
active patients felt that they had been. They also had a 
clear idea of who felt tired and the degree of this tiredness. 
They were, however, unaware of the actual extent of feelings 
of anxiety amongst their patients and the correlation co- 
efficients indicated that they were also unaware of who was 
feeling anxious. The picture was the same for feelings of 
depression. 
The nurses' inaccuracy of judgement of the negative 
affect experienced by patients can be accounted for by 
several factors. There are qualitative- differences in the 
potential for expression between feelings of a1 hysical 
nature and those of psychological nature. Physical tiredness 
is spontaneously expressed by most people. It can also be 
readily inferred by the amount of activity that a patient 
feels able to tolerate and the number of rests that a person 
is observed to take. Feelings of physical vigoLx are also 
observable in terms of a relative increase in activity and 
the expression by the patient of feeling better. 
Feelings of Anxiety and Depression are more complex. 
A depressed person may complain of feelings of tiredness as 
a result of that depression, but may be rel. uc rant to e1_i re ;; 
feelings of unhapiness or misery unprc-mpted. The feelings 
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associated with depression can be less tangible and TM: ay 
well not be recognised by the patient for what they are. 
Anxiety, similarly, may be something patients are less 
willing to express unless prompted or encouraged. But, 
this aspect of the discus: ion must be speculative as 
little is known about how much hospital patients feel 
able to express about their negative feelings. What is 
known is that there are cultural differences regarding 
the expression of feelings and Northern Europeans ex- 
press fewer than do other cultures. Further, specific 
behaviours associated with a negative affect such as 
anxiety are more difficult to interpret than those 
associated with purely physical feelings. The anxious 
patient expressing that anxiety through complaint may be 
viewed by the nurse as simply difficult. Further, the 
nurses' behaviour in actively ignoring those who complain 
can save to discourage the expression of that affect 
(Stockwell 1975). 
The ways in which nurses could gain knowledge about 
their patients' mood or feelings was discussed in the 
literature review for this part of the study (Chapter 5). 
The area of the accuracy of non-verbal communication 
proved to be complex, but the human face gave the most in- 
formation in terns of accurate recognition of very simple 
emotions eg. anger, disgust, happiness, sadness and fear/ 
surprise. But it was noted that much facial expression 
has little to do with emotion (Ekman & Oster 1982). Ekman 
et al. (1980) found that the relative weight that observers 
gave to facial expression, the tone of speech and body cues 
depended on the judgement task and the condition in which 
the behaviour occurred. In this context the nurses' ability 
to make use of these cues would depend, firstly on her 
knowledge of their significance and secondly, her expect- 
ations of their occurrence. 
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Nurses are not taught routinely about non-verbal 
behaviour associated with particular emotional or mood 
states. Nor is there any formal teaching, v, 'ith the 
exception of one or two nurse education establi shr;: ents, 
about the emotional responses of patients to illness and 
hospitalisation. Further, it was nc; ted in chapter 5 that 
the patterns of verbal communication between nurses and 
patients do not allow much opportunity for nurses to gain 
this information. The studies of cancer and gynaecological 
patients suggested that nurses tended to avoid discussion 
of feelings (Pepper, 1977: Bond, 1978). Further, ? '+ acloed 
Clark (1983) found that nurse enquiries as to how patients 
felt occurred rarely, and when they did occur were posed 
in the form of a closed question designed to elicit a 
desired response. It is difficult to generalise from 
three relatively small and specific studies to the total 
nurse population in the U. K. But, these studies indicated 
a relatively low emphasis on communication per. se. on the 
part of nurses and a higher emphasis on the nursing tasks 
in need of completion. This reflected a realistic appreci- 
ation on the part of these nurses of the importance of 
physical care but a lack of appreciation of the importance 
of communication. 
There is a strong tradition of nurse education that 
has emphasised the physical consequences of illness and 
disease. It is not intended to in any way suggest that the 
teaching about the physical consequences of illness is 
unimportant, rather that the results of this part of the 
study do reflect the lack of teaching of psychological 
consequences and communication skills. The nurses' ability 
to estimate the degree of 'tiredness' experienced 
by patients 
and their feelings of physical vigour reflect, 
in part, the 
emphasis of nurse education. But, the differences 
between 
judging physical and psychological feelings complicate 
this 
as a simple conclusion. 
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The L. rtifactual correlations observed betvv: een the 
nurses' and patients' ratings of the adjectives unhappy 
and miserable do suggest the novelty for this group of 
nurses of thinking about feelings of depression in their 
patients. It was apparent that the strategy adopted by 
the nurses was to rate the majority of patients as feel- 
ing 'a little bit' miserable and 'a little bit' unhappy. 
This suggested that these nurses had not considered 
feelings of depression to be relevant for most of their 
patients. It was the demands of the rating task imposed 
by this study that elicited this response. 
The over-estimation of the overall presence of 
patient anxiety was a replication of previous findings 
(Johnston, 1982). The nurses in Johnston's study were 
shown to have been a, ý are of some of their patients' 
worries. The over-estimation coupled with the lack of 
correlation observed in this study suggest that the 
nurses expected a majority of patients to feel some anxiety, 
but were unaware of who was affected and to what degree. 
These observations will be discussed further in relation 
to the judgement strategies of' assuming similarity to the 
patient being judged or adopting a stereotype. 
Having considered the opportunities that nurses have 
for assessing the negative feelings of patients and the 
educational preparation they receive for that task, it is 
now intended to turn to their ability and strategies for 
coping with the negative feelings of patients. Davitz and 
Davitz (1981) found that when a fictional patient vignette 
was being judged, Northern European nurses tended 
to infer 
less patient suffering than did their Southern counterparts. 
Further., when two groups of high and low inference nurses 
were compared, the low inference nurses tended 
to be more 
physically distant when nursing patients. 
This was in- 
terpreted as a coping strategy of distancing and avoidance. 
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The Davitz & Davitz study lacked a study condition that 
considered the accuracy of the nurses' inferences of 
actual patient suffering. 
This part of the current study was primarily 
concerned with the nurses' judgemental accuracy of their 
patients' suffering expressed via the negative feelings 
of anxiety and depression. Although accuracy was not 
observed, the observation of over-estimation of patient 
Anxiety is a direct contradiction to the Davitz & Davitz 
findings. The low inference nurses were assigned to 
that category as a result of comparison with the other 
nurses. The likelihood exists that had the nurses' in- 
ferences of suffering been compared with patients' 
reports of suffering, both groups of nurses would have 
over-inferred the extent of that suffering. The suggestion 
of a coping strategy of distancing and avoidance appears 
less obvious in the present study where the nurses appeared 
able to infer the presence of Anxiety and Depression for 
a majority of their patients. But, the relatively un- 
differentiated ratings of these feelings in their patients 
still suggests psychological distance. An interesting 
twist in this study is that the nurses who were inferring 
overly high levels of anxiety were judging predominantly 
Northern European patients who also may be pre-disposed 
to under-infer suffering. The problems of self-report of 
feelings will be discussed in a later section. 
Turning now from psychological feelings to physical 
feelings, the nurses' ability to gauge the physical 
well-being of patients in terms of their tiredness and 
their feelings of vigour that was observed in this study 
has important implications for nursing care. A large 
proportion of care that a nurse gives to her patients 
is. 
physical care and recovery is associated with 
the attain- 
ment of physical milestones. The success of a nurse 
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mobilising a patient is dependent upon knowledge of that 
persons physical limitations. A nurse who knows when a 
patient is feeling relatively vigorous or is feeling 
tired can intelligently plan mobilisation in order that 
it is within the capacity of that patient. That tiredness 
is a more straightforward feeling to gauge in a patient, 
in terms of expectation of tiredness as a result of 
disability, does not make this any the less useful a 
finding. The need for an adequate provision for rest 
and sleep is important in the process of recovery and 
rehabilitation ('Wlilson-Barnett & Fordham 1982). 
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8.4 
Breakdown Comparison of Accuracy Between Patient 
and Nurse Sub-Group 
Male and Female Patients 
The correlation of the adjectives between nurses 
ratings and those of male and female patients for the 
factors Depression and Fatigue failed to show any 
different patterns. However, both Vigor and Hostility 
did demonstrate a degree of differential accuracy. For 
the factor Vigor, female patients were perceived more 
accurately on three of the adjectives, vigorous, lively 
and active (Table 7.26). Female patients expressed 
lower levels of vigouroverall than did male patients and 
the nurses appeared to recognise this (App. 55). The 
implication is that the nurses under-estimated the degree 
of Vigor that the male patients reported feeling. 
An interesting differential accuracy was observed 
for the factor Hostility. Male patients were more 
accurately perceived as feeling angry or furious and 
female patients were perceived as feeling spiteful when 
they reported that feeling. These observations are 
directly supported by t :e literature about sex role stereo 
type, where men are permitted to feel and express anger 
and spite is perceived as a female feeling (Rosenkrantz, 
Vogel, Bee, Broverman & Broverman, 1968). This was the 
only clear sex-appropriate expression of feeling that was 
differentially perceived by the nurses. 
The observation of differential accuracy in terms 
of female levels of expressed Vigor will be discussed 
further in relation to the use of judgement strategies. 
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First and Third Year. Student Nurses 
The research question posed was concerned with 
whether or not the accuracy with which nurses perceived 
how their patients feel increases with experience. 
However, the first year nurses had a clearer notion 
than their third year colleagues of their patients feel- 
ings of Vigor (Table 7.26). Each adjective subsumed 
under this factor achieved a statistically significant 
correlation between the first year nurse and patient 
ratings. The third year nurses did not show any 
correlations between their ratings and the patients' 
ratings of Vigor. But, the third year nurses did 
demonstrate a higher degree of perception of patient 
fatigue. The ratings between these nurses and their 
patients correlated for three of the four adjectives. 
This was a stronger observation than had been the case 
for the total group. The observations relating to 
Factor 3, Depression, can again be seen to be due to 
inclusion of a large number of patients as a 'little 
bit' unhappy or miserable (App. 62 & 63). 
These observations suggested that in the initial 
stages of nursing experience nurses are more aware of 
patients' feelings of well-being. But as experience 
increases this awareness diminishes. The reason for 
this could well be due to a gradual sensitisation of these 
nurses to the physical consequences of disease that 
results in an inability to recognise well-being when it 
is present. A problem that may occur where--'t here is a 
failure to recognise well-being could be in terms of 
recognising progress during recovery. But, the third 
year nurses had an accurate overall estimate of Fatigue 
amongst patients and this could imply that they would 
recognise diminishing fatigue when that occurs. The 
necessity for this knowledge has been discussed in re- 




Different Levels of Cognitive Complexity 
The nurse and patient ratings were compared for 
three groups of nurses having low, mid-range and high 
cognitive complexity scores. These imply relative 
cognitive complexity, medium complexity and relative 
cognitive simplicity respectively. The two groups of 
relatively less complex nurses achieved more correlation 
between their ratings and their patients ratings than 
did the relatively complex group (Table 7.26). When the 
factor Depression was excluded the medium and less 
complex presented a similar picture with the less 
complex demonstrating perception of their patients' feel- 
ings of Fatigue and the medium group perceiving feelings 
of Vigor. 6 
What was of more interest was that these nurses 
who were relatively more complex achieved one single 
correlation between their ratings and those of their 
patients. This was with the adjective tired, which has 
been shown to be the most robust overall. The slight 
increased accuracy of judgement shown by the medium and 
less complex nurses can be explained in terms of the 
more complex. The complex nurses were more inclined to 
differentiate between patients, any general responses of 
people in hospital could be lost. Taking the factor 
Fatigue, the less complex nurses were able to detect 
consistency between the use of the adjectives that served 
as dimensions of this factor. This was not the case for 
either the medium or more complex nurses. In general the 
over-differentiation of the more complex nurses lead to 
a loss of accuracy. 
The socially involved nurses of Gottheil et al. 
(1978) were more perceptive in gauging the feelings of 
schizophrenic women from their less predicable non-verbal 
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behaviour. However, those nurses who were less socially 
involved were more perceptive in gauging the feelings of 
'normal' women. This suggests a degree of equivalence 
where detachment is equated with the use of fewer con- 
structs ie. the more complex nurses behaved in a socially 




The Use of Judgement Str-at? c 
In general the observations derived from the 
measures where the nurses put themselves in the patients' 
position Assuming Similarity to that patient and, 
imagined a Stereotype Patient were far from clear. For 
the factors Depression and Fatigue the Assumed Similarity 
measure and the Stereotype measure were both correlated 
with the nurses ratings of their patients. 
The other three factors were treated differently. 
For the factor Vigor, the nurses' ratings for the 
patients correlated predominantly with their ratings of 
themselves as if they were that patients. This applied 
to three of the adjectives subsumed under this factor but 
not to the descriptor ' full of pep' . The lack of a clear 
rating pattern with this descriptor could well indicate 
the apparent lack of likelihood of nurses considering this 
to be a feeling that many people would experience as 
patients. 
The observation of the nurses' Assuming Similarity 
to the patients when rating overall levels of 'vigour is of 
interest in relation to their overall increased accuracy 
when judging the degree of vigour reported by female 
patients. The group of nurses acting as subjects were 
all female and were able to gauge the feelings of 'Yigour 
of female patients more clearly than males. As this 
strategy was adopted by the majority of nurse subjects, 
there výas unlikely to have been a link between Assumed and 
actual Similarity present in the data. The female 
patients were from a widely differing range of ages and 
social background. The suggestion is, therefore, that in 
terms of feelings of well-being, when a hospital patient, 
females are likely to respond in a similar fashion overall, 
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and this can be judged by a proportion of female nurses. 
this interpretation must be qualified, however, by the 
third year nurses inability to gauge feelings of well- 
being. 
The factor Hostility presented a picture of the 
use of a stereotype by the nurses, as if they knew that 
they would not feel like that, but considered that a 
typical patient may feel that way. The adjectives 
'Spiteful' and 'Furious' had been omitted from further 
analysis so no further comments can be made about them. 
But the adjective 'Angry' had been found to be correlated 
when nurses and male patients ratings were compared. 
This further reinforces the notion of the use of a stereo- 
type that was sex typed. 
The factor Anxiety also presented a picture of the use 
of a stereotype by the nurses with the exception of the 
adjective Nervous. This again suggested different ex- 
pectations for the nurses of themselves than of . patients. 
Given the observed generalised over-estimation of Anxiety 
by the nurses, this further reinforces their expectation 
for hospital patients to feel-very anxious. The nurses 
had only rated the adjective nervous as they would have 
expected to feel. 
It is not possible to interpret the observation for 
the factors Depression and Fatigue due to methodological 
problems present in the design of this part. of the study. 
This will be expanded in the section discussing the method 
problems in this part of the study.. 
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First Year Nurses Compared with Third Year Nurses 
An overall pattern emerged where first year nurses 
presented a clearer picture of rating themselves in the 
patient's position as they had rated the patient, rather 
than rating the stereotypical patient as they had rated 
the patient with an observed ratio of 1: 3. They were 
three times more likely to consider that their patient 
had felt as they imagined they would have felt. The 
third year nurses presented a picture of being equally 
likely to rate the patient similarly to themselves or to 
a stereotypical patient (7: 7). The general picture was 
one of progressing awareness of differences between 
people and the development of expectations based on ex- 
perience, but the differences between the two groups was 
not subjected to statistical testing and will be discussed 
no further. The observation of a stronger tendency for 
both the first and third year nurses' ratings of patients 
to correlate with their ratings of themselves is perplexing 
given the overall correlational profile. But this again 
by a reflection of distortion due to problems with the 
method employed. 
Levels of Cognitive Complexity 
The summary table of the overall correlation pattern 
of the nurses ratings of their patients and the two measure 
of judgement strategy does suggest a difference in strategy 
use between the relatively complex and those who were 
relatively less complex. Those nurses with. high scores, 
the relatively less complex were more inclined to rate 
the 
patient in a similar way to themselves at the ratio of 
10: 3. The low scores or more complex subjects did not 
present such a decisive picture but they more 
inclined to 
rate the patient as they had rated a stereotypical at 
the 
ratio of 10: 6. The pattern of the correlation present 
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does suggest that there could be an effect present that 
is worthy of further study. It is likely that those 
people who are relatively more complex are less inclined 
to adopt a judgement strategy of assuming others to 
respond as they would respond. But no assumptions of 
the accuracy of a stereotype held could be assumed, as 




The first major short--coming in a study of this 
type is in the crudeness of the measures emppl. oyed. 
The M. A. C. L. was selected because of validity in erred 
from the original development of the measure by , cýair 
& Lorr (1964) and Lishman (1972). Viilson-Barnett (1977) 
had found the MACL sufficiently sensitive to detect change 
in mood over time. However, in a study where the ob- 
jective was to measure nurses' perceptions of their 
patients feelings, a i:: a j or problem is that of validity 
of response. The effect of response bias in this study 
is unknown. It is not known how veridical a record the 
MACL was of the patients actual feelings. In other 
words whether or not patients were choosing not to dis- 
close how they felt. 
Although there can be no absolute criteria of 
external validity of a mood state or feeling, the factor 
analysis on the current data presented a similar profile 
to that of the previous v. ork discussed. The failure of 
the adjectives describing feelings of self-deprocation 
to correspond to the factor Depression 'as present not 
only in the patient data but also in the nurse data. 
This did imply that Depression, in this instance, had 
achieved consensual understanding. This point does 
lead on to the differential use of language. 
Although gross similarities had been observed in 
the use of language by the nurses and the patients throe h 
the factor analysis, it was likely that individual words 
were used in slightly dissimilar ways. It was not possible 
to correlate single patient and nurse factors because of 
the problem of double correlation. Items that had been 
206 
found to correlate once within the factor analysis 
would have been correlated for a second time had a 
comparison of single factors been performed. That this 
was not done, however, did allow fine differences in 
the use of language to be reflected in the correlation 
that were observed. 
The use of a different method had been considered. 
Johnstoni (1982) had employed lists of specific concerns 
or worries and inferred anxiety from their presence. It 
has already been discussed that this method is insensitive 
to questions of degree and it is specific to anxiety. It 
was not considered feasible to isolate antecedent con- 
ditions of Depression of Fatigue because what affects one 
person may not have the same affect on another. This is 
also true of inferring anxiety from patient concerns. The 
use of ranking adjectives or descriptors as a technique 
was also considered and it was considered to be too 
difficult a task to firstly discriminate between feelings 
experienced in rank order and secondly for another to 
judge this discrimination. 
In sum, although there are apparent shortcomings 
with the method employed, the task of judging the feelings 
of another must be a task of approximation, a measure that 
allows an overall profile to be observed may be the most 
appropriate to employ. 
The second major methodological issue-. in this 
section of the study was in relation to the measurement 
of judgement strategies. The nurses first completed the 
MACL as they thought that their patients had felt. They 
then completed it as they might have expected to feel had 
they been in that patients position, and lastly how they 
expected a typical patient to have felt. But the 
basic 
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problem of eliciting a response as was done in, this study 
may well have influenced the observations. The effect 
of contamination by order is unknown. The fixed order 
was maintained because of the effect of eliciting a 
stereotype on both these measures. But the observations 
of strategy use for the factors fatigue and depression 
were not possible to interpret for this reason. This 
part of the study can give directions for future work, 
however, where matched pairs of sub-groups of nurses are 
compared. 
No account was taken of rnathmatical relationships 
between the actual similarities between patients and 
nurses. This was not done because of the differences 
between the patients and nurses employed in the study. 
The patients were predominantly much older than the nurses 
and half were male. But there may have been a small 
degree of actual similarity present that was undetected. 
This must qualify the observations of the nurses' judge- 
ments of well-being of female patients to a point. But, 
there is a good case for including a dimension of similarity 
such as gender and observing any effects. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The first half of this thesis concentrated upon the 
effect on judgement accuracy of adopting a particular 
strategy to start the judgement or decision process. That 
is, it examined the effect of the initial acquisition of 
information on further acquisition in relation to the 
accuracy of a clinical decision. There was an emphasis 
on mechanisms in relation to accuracy in the hope of 
identifying a strategy that could be taught and serve as 
an aid to decisions. The second half of the thes; s aimed 
to simply describe the accuracy of another type of judge- 
ment. The exploration of mechanisms or strategy use was 
different in this case. The strategies identified for 
examination implied their use for the total process rather 
than simply initiating the process, and this was irrespective 
of their effect on accuracy which was not explored. 
The work reported in the first half of the thesis 
-' did not demonstrate an advantage 
--to 
performance of adopting 
a particular strategy in terms of the accuracy of a 
diagnosis. But, there was a consistent finding that the 
early use of general information that allowed a 'represen- 
tative' context to be established led to the use of less 
information overall. The work reported in the second half 
of the thesis concentrated upon a clinical judgement of 
feelings or mood, a neglected area of study (Higgins, 19O). 
Physical feelings of tiredness or vigor were found to be 
judged more easily than those of anxiety or-, depression. 
The amount of anxiety or depression that patients experienced 
was overestimated by the nurses in an undifferentiated 
fashion. Further, awareness of physical feelings appeared 
to increase with experience. The actual strategy was unclear. 
There was some indication that less experienced nurses assumed 
patients_to be similar to themselves, as did those who were 
relatively less cognitively complex. These exploratory 
findings can only be tentative and could be further explored 
in future research. 
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The work reported has highlighted some of the many 
methodological difficultie present. -, There the task was 
to dia"nose a post-operative complication, the method 
employed. made that task too easy to allow effective ana-l_,, sis 
of the relationship of strategy use and accurate diagno. syis. 
The e. _ploravion of strategy use in the second half of. tine 
thesis hid problems 7;: hick have been d -scussed and there vas 
a failure to include of her potential strategies that the 
nurse could have been employing rather, than the t-Y, 'o -, -den- 
-tit ied from the lite. i atture. The use of strategies could 
have been explored in both of the situations studied by the 
use of a common method ie. self-remor, protocols. This is 
where subjects give a verbal report of the information that 
they are selecting and the reason for that selection, but 
this method has the problem of the effects that are induced 
and influence behaviour by introspection and self'-re )or t. 
Overall, there was an initial concentration on -poch-- 
ani ý. ý with. the intention of address irýg accuracy in t' -, e first 
half of the thesis ý The e nphasis in the second half con- 
centrated on accuracy with an initial exploration of r ech-- 
anis gis, _i. 
triouc-h the two v; ere not directly- related as part 
of the study. 
It was suggested in the introduction. trau the issues 
surrounding clinical judgement are important for nursing. 
A necessary pre-requisite for a nurse effectively caring 
for a patient is that he/she accurately perceives that 
patient's current need, and this has implications for a 
'nursing process' or problem solving approach to patient 
care (McGilloway, 1980). This approach to the organisation 
of care pre-supposes that nurses can identify patient problems, 
both of a physical and l sycLI. ological nature. The first par to 
of the thesis reported. P. c. -i faculty of the experimental task 
being too easy. This, in turn, suggested that this group 
of student nurses were well able to diagnose a physical 
complication such as a post-operative cor: plication. 
The ain 
of the initial work reported was to identity a means of 
improving the performance of student nurses by teaching a 
strategy that characterised the performance of experienced 
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nurses and doctors (Gordon, 1980; Eistein et. al. , 1978). 
The. strategy was that of early hypothesis formation that 
serves to direct search by delineating an end-point/goal 
and relevant attributes for testing. But, rather than 
providing explicit instructions to adopt a specific strategy 
(e. g. through the use of the task itself), the teaching 
intervention comprised an account of a hypothesised memory 
organisation. This could only have served to co. --fuse rather 
than provide direct instructions about hew to rrocede and 
as a consequence could not have had any effect. 
'T'he second part of the work shared the common theme of 
an ability by nurses to identify the physical condition or 
patients. There was an overall ability to judge both how 
tired patients felt and how vigorous they reported feeling. 
The correlations observed, although statistically significant, 
were of a low order (r = 0.342 and r=0.252, respectively). 
This was suggested to reflect the difficulty of judging the 
experience of another 'UI. -_'-rough the use of a rating task. 
However, there is a common theme of awareness of physical 
condition that runs throughout this work. But, there was 
no awareness of psychological feelings. As has been discussed, 
this was in line with the findings of Johnston (1982). The 
problem-solving studies of Newell & Simon (1972) and the 
clinical reasoning studies of .: lstein et. al. (19`(8) suggested 
that subjects employed a small number of heuristics or 
strategies. Further, a common and powerful heuristic adopted 
by subjects is to find analogies between the present problem 
and those experienced in the past. To extrapolate -Co the 
current case, it was evident that the nurses in this study 
when asked to rate the feelings of anxiety and depression 
experienced by their patients were unable to do so 
because 
of inexperience with a consideration of these 
feelings. There 
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were. no analogies to draw upon from past experience. The 
evidence of a generalised over-estimation of anxiety and 
depression suggests that the nurses were making a "best guess" 
(Gettys, Kelly & Peterson, 1973). 
In terms of nursing the two pieces of work complement 
each other in that the first is concerned with a judgement of 
the physical condition of a hypothetical patient in a class-- 
room. setting, whereas the second is concerned with a judgement 
of both the physical and psychological condition of actual 
patients in a natural setting. It is of interest that 
judgement about physical condition was consistent throughout. 
Of further interest is the observation that first year nurses 
inferred more unhappiness and misery in patients than did 
their third year colleagues, even though this was in an 
undiscriminated form. This poses implications gor the 
socialisation process within nursing in terms of reduced 
awareness of psychological factors as training and experience 
progress. 
A consideration of the implications of the work for 
nursing directs itself mainly to nurse education. The type 
of problem-solving. task employed in the first half can be 
adapted for a number of situations, i. e. different patient 
problems. It is suggested that this would be memorable, 
although it begs the question of effectiveness compared with 
other teaching methods. Real implications for nurse education 
lie in the province of teaching about psychological factors 
relating to hospital and illness. The work of McGuire et. al. 
(1974) and M2offic et. al. (1975) indicates the potential 
presence of psychopathology in a sizable minority of 
hospital 
patients. Nurses, because of their proximity 
to patients 
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are in a position to be alerted and alert other:; to a 
possible need for expert intervention. 
The considerable work documenting the presence of 
anxiety, its association with recovery and coping strategies 
(Johnston, 1980; Wilson-Barnett, 1977; Ridgeway & Mathe',, %s, 
1982) suggests the importance of sustained anxiety as a 
patient problem. Yet these nurses were unaware of which 
patients were experiencing anxiety an to what extent. 
Nurses require teaching about the occurence of high levels 
of anxiety for certain patients, the issues that concern 
patients and the ways in which they can help their patients 
to cope. It was noted earlier that the most junior/inexperie. nced 
nurses inferred the most suffering and this does suggest 
desensisitisation as training progresses. It appears that 
there is a very real need for effective nurse teaching about 
psychological aspects of hospitalisation. 
A summary of the main findings suggests that these 
nurses could judge the physical condition of patients 
in 
both a classroom and a natural setting, but had little 




The aim of this talk is to tell you about the re- 
search that you are taking part in. I want to explain 
what I am doing and why, so that you can gain insight 
into some of the reasoning processes that may be involved 
in making a clinical judgement. 
As nurses, we aim to be accurate in our clinical 
judgements. We aim to make an accurate diagnosis of the 
possibility of surgical complications in order to avail 
our patients of the medical care that they need, when 
they need it. 
Currently, nurses are not taught how to use the 
relevant sign and symptom information. 
This skill does not limit itself to surgical compli- 
cations. It is necessary in any situation where we assess 
the well-being of a patient and plan the appropriate care, 
ie. a situation where we make a clinical judgement. 
An example of a clinical judgement we all make fre- 
quently is the diagnosis of the experience of pain. 
In order to improve this skill, it is necessary to 
attempt to understand what we are doing when making judge-- 
ments of this nature. 
This can be done by concentrating on the type of 
information that we need to look for and the best way to 
use it. 
The first task that you did involved measuring the 
number of angles that you typically use to view people in 
your social world. The more angles from which you view 
a person, the more information you have at your disposal 
and the more accurate your 
impression is likely to be. 
I will return to the relevance of this measure later. 
The insistence that no-one should write their name on any, 
of the questionnaires is to ensure that they are completely 
anonymous. The entire purpose of. this-study is for you to 
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get some benefit from it. There is no need for in- 
dividual scores to be known. 
I now want to talk to you about something that you 
may not have considered before. That is how human memory 
may operate and what sort of information will be of use 
to you when making a clinical judgement. Considering 
this information in relation to memory. The intention is 
to provide you with a strategy for making clinical judge- 
ments and a reason for using it. 
Human memory can be described as a series of scripts 
or pictures. These scripts are the result of experiences 
that have been recorded and stored in memory. 
Try to imagine your memory as a series of pictures 
that have been stores away. The pictures or scripts can be 
different types, they can be about an event like a convey- 
sation that you have had, or they can be a recorded memory 
of a clinical judgement that you have learned about. A 
clinical judgement such as a post-operative complication. 
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This is a representation of 3 scripts, A, B and C. 
As you can see, stored along with the scripts are items 
of information. Items of context information and items 
of specific information. 
Context information is general, relatively un- 
changing information. Specific information items are 
items that may change over relatively short periods. 
These specific information items are facts that are 
associated with a particular script. 
Whereas, the context information can be associated 
with one or more scripts. 
The distinction between these two types of infor- 
mation will become clearer. 
In order to retrieve or remember a script, the 
general, context information can serve as a clue or cue. 
This will help you to remember one script or more 
than one. 
To decide whether the script you are looking at is 
correct, or to distinguish between two scripts, it is 
necessary to check to see whether the specific information 
items associated with the script are present in the environ- 
ment. 
Context information can distinguish between the gross 
freatures of two scripts. But the specific lacks of the 
remaining script need to be checked. It is not only 
necessary to look for facts to confirm a script. It is also 
necessary to test the script. 
I want you to get used to the idea of testing the 
script that you are looking at. 
Testing it by looking to see if there are specific 
facts about the patient that are not associated with the 
script and therefore indicate that the script is incorrect. 
This may well seem rather abstract at present, and I 
will now illustrate all that I have been talking about in 
relation to the tasks that you have just performed. 
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The task that you have just done was designed to 
look at the strategies that people used when making 
clinical judgements That were based on the information 
that was available. 
I shall be looking at the sort of information that 
people used first and if people, who were relatively more 
accurate, used different pieces of information or the same 
items in a different order. 
The two types of information that i have just des- 
cribed were identified to be present in a clinical judge- 
ment situation by a study in the U. S. A. 
VIS. -AID 2 
1. Information about features of the patient that are 
relatively stable, eg. sex, time since surgery, type 
of surgery etc. 
ie. context information 
2. Information about the state of the patient that can 
change over short periods of time eg. pulse, blood 
pressure, respirations, how the patient feels etc. 
ie. state/specific information 
The U. S. study found that the nurses they tested were. 
very accurate in their clinical judgements. 
They were people who had done a Masters Degree course, 
specialising in surgical nursing. 
They used the first type of general or context inf'or- 
mation to set the scene and rule out an unlikely diagnosis. 
They then used the second, more precise, patient state 
information, ie. specific information. 
So, if you imagine dividing each of the tasks you have 
done in half, in the first half of the task these nurses set 
the scene, i. e. retrieved the relevant scripts with context 
information. 
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In the second half, they examined t he: 3e scripts us_rg 
specific information items. 
For an example, take the diagnosis of the experience 
of pain. It is likely that a patient ", "vho has had a rela- 
tively minor procedure, such as a cystosco ý-, "", ' ill ex- 
perience some immediate post-operative discomfort on mric- 
turition. 
The general, context information, that the patient 
has had a cystoscopy sets the scene. 
You will expect this patient to experience less dis-- 
comfort than the wound pain after abdominal surgery. 
However, to obtain an accurate picture of exactly ho v,, 
much pain this patient is experiencing - we need to ask the 
patient. 
It may be possible to alleviate this discoi;.. i ort. 
Another example is two patients who have had identical 
surgery are unlikely to experience identical discomfort. 
People do have very individual responses to surgery. 
So, we can start with general information such as the 
knowledge that someone has had a specific operation. 
This will lead us to expect therr. to experience a certain 
amount of pain; but the exact amount and the frequency with 
which to administer analgesia can only be gauged after asking 
the individual patient. 
Asking for specific facts about that patient's curre: t 
state that are not stable. People will be less accurate 
if 
they fail to use this specific information. 
Another example that can be considered is the use of 
the general piece of context information - length of time 
since surgery. 
This can be used to distinguish between two scripts 
that have been retrieved because of the information, that a 
patient has started to vomit after abdominal surgery. 
Four 
days after abdominal surgery, you would not expect a 
diagnosis 
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of par'Jly tic ileus for a patient who has recently started 
to Vomit. 
Therefore the context information does rule out an 
unlikely diagnosis for a patient who has started to vomit 
four days after surgery. 
But you would need to know more specific details before 
you could distinguish between a gastrointestinal infection 
or an adverse reaction to a recently prescribed, drug, eg. 
an antibiotic. 
Information that could serve to reject one picture and 
confirm the other. Such as the patient's temperature, the 
pattern of drug prescription or laboratory reports. 
Information checking the content of the script, ie. 
testing the scripts, rejecting one and accepting the one 
more likely to be correct. 
Accuracy in the American study was associated with the 
initial use of general information, followed by the use of 
specific information relating to the current state of the 
patient . 
Are there any questions so far? 
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she context information, len th of time since 
surgery, can rule out the paralytic ileus -picture, be- 
cause you know that surgery was four days' ago. But in 
order to distinguish between the other two, you need to 
know the specific signs that relate to the current patient 
" state. 
So you first form a general picture of the situation 
context using the general information. 
Then you identify the appropriate script by looking 
at specific clues. To return to the relevance of the 
measure that assesses the number of angles people use to 
view their social world. Use of very few angles may in- 
dicate a reliance on the use of stereotypes of patients. 
A stereo type in this context being "an expectation for a 
patient to feel, respond and behave in a particular manner- 
-Based on previous experience of people who appeared to be 
similar to that person or on nursing mythology". Take a 
simple and very obvious example of a patient that you know 
nothing about, other than that they have had a cholecý; -st-- 
ectomy. The myth or stereotype associated with people who 
suffer from cholecystitis is fair, fat, forty and female. 
However, cholecystitis is by no means confined to fair, fat 
females in middle-age. It occurs quite frequently in men 
and older people. 
So this stereotype could be misleading if used as the 
sole basis for prediction in the absence of concrete evidence 
gained from personal knowledge of the person concerned or their 
records. The informational relevance of stereotypes is that 
they can be seen as scripts that are surrounded with general 
information from v; hich we make predictions. 
They can also be seen as a source of context infoimation. 
The stereotype script also has specific information items 
encoded with it - these are the expectations that we have 
for 
that patient that I referred to earlier. 
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A stereotype can serve as a basis from which to 
start processing. ; ýe all need a basis to start. 
If we had no expectations of how a person may re- 
spond after abdominal surgery, life would be impossible. 
We do have an idea of a typical patient after a 
particular operation. Stereotype scripts are used to 
start processing, they set the scene and suggest the specific 
information items that may be present. 
However, to obtain an accurate clinical picture we 
need to try and disprove the stereotype. Test it by look- 
ing for specific facts about the-patient that are not en- 
coded with our stereotype script. 
What I am saying is that we need to go beyond the fact -s 
that the stereotypical picture lead us to expect, and look 
at other specific facts about the current state of the patient, 
in relation to the diagnosis of the experience of pain. 
We have the stereotypical expectations, referred to 
earlier, in relation to types of surgery. 
What is specific and is not associated with the stereo- 
typical script is what the patient says about the experience, 
pulse rate and other signs of distress. 
Not only do we have the useful expectations associated 
with different types of surgery, but nurses do have different 
expectations of the experience of pain for men and women. 
Both in how much members of each group experience pain 
and in how much we think that they should express it. 
Men are expected to be more stoic. Yet there is no 
c-onclusive evidence that demonstrates a difference in pain 
perception between the sexes. So we need to ask the patient 
and look for specific signs. Another possibility in relation 
to stereotypes is not just the obvious one that we have con- 
sidered of their limited information content, but the possi- 
bility that we rarely know that we are using them. The more 
often that an item is retrieved from memory, the easier it 
becomes to retrieve. 
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Research in memory has shown this effect with items 
that are frequently retrieved. 
`, Words that occur frequently in the English language, 
ie. common, everyday w%, ords, are easier to recall in a test 
of meinory. 
In these tests, people are typically shown a list of 
words, then a short time later asked to remember as many as 
possible. It does seem likely that we improve with practise 
when retrieving items from memory. 
The fact that we do not recognise that we are using a 
stereotype may be the reverse side of the same coin. 
In a simple recognition task where people look at a 
list of words that was presented earlier, and recognise as 
many as they can rather than writing them down without the 
original list, the rare English words are easier to recognise 
than the common ones. 
So stereotypes are often used to start processing. They 
pop out easily, but because they are so familiar, we do not 
recognise that we are using them. They serve to start pro- 
cessing but we must look for specific facts to disconfirm our 
expectations, not just items to confirm them. 
In order to be as accurate as possible, we need to use the 
available information in a way that promotes more accurate 
reasoning. 
VI S. AID 
1. Realise that a general picture is obtained to start with, 
using general, relatively unchanging co: ltext information. 
This may lead to a stereotypical picture and if we stop 
there we may make a mistake. 
2. Look at the state of the individual patient, the current 




PLEASE DO NOT ; WRITE YOUR NA 7,1E OINK ANY OF TIE TEST I, 1ATERIALS 
The following details are neeessar; T for an analysis of 
people's results and I \f-ould be grateful if you could 
supply the following: -- 
AGE: - 
SEX: - 
NUTEER OF 'A' LEVELS: - 
NUMBER OF ' A' LEVELS: -- 
DEGREE, SUBJECT & CLASS: - 
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SECTION 1 
In this section you are presented with 10 roles t'! -! at 
will fit different people you know, the roles are: - 
1. Yourself 
2. A person that you dislike 
3. Mother 
4. A patient you would like to help 
5. Father 
6. Friend of the same sex 
7. Friend of the opposite sex (or spouse) 
8. Patient with whom you feel most uncomfortable 
9. Ward Sister 
10. Patient difficult to understand 
For each role please select a different person that you 
know and pencil their initials beside the role for which you 
have been selected. These initials can be erasea after you 
have finished to maintain complete anonymity. 
Your task is now to rate on each of the scales below, 
there are no wrong or right answers. Just circle the number 
that you think best describes the person. 
EXATTPLE 
1. Yourself Outgoing +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 shy 
Adjusted +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 maladjusted 
You may see yourself as being moderately shy so you have 
put a circle around -2 and you also see-yourself as being 
well-adjusted so you have out a circle around +3. That 
was an example, now please rate each person on the scales 




Outgoing +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Shy 
Adjusted +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Maladjusted 
Decisive +3 +2 +1 --1 -2 -3 Indecisive 
Calm +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Excitable 
Interested +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Self-absored in others 
Cheerful +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Ill-humoured 
Responsible +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Irresponsible 
Considerate +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Inconsiderate 
Independent +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Dependent 
Interesting +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 Dull 
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Appendix 3 
Question: "that or ho'N : auch? 
Cared Order An er 
1 Cigarettes smoked 
daily 
2 Pain now 
3 Analgesia received 
4 Nausea/vomiting 
5 Anti-emetic 
6 Type of admission 
7 Type of surgery 
8 Time since surgery 
9 Time in theatre 
10 Level of 
consciousness 
11 Skin appearance 
12 Skin to touch 
13 Muscle tone 
14 Facial expression 
15 Level of anxiety/ 
distress 
16 B/P Pre-op 
17 B/P Current 
18 Pulse Pre-op 
19 Pulse current 
20 Temp. Pre-op 
21 Temp. current 
22 Resp. Pre-op 




Card n_ svp er 
5 Expectoration 
26 Age ---- -- - -, 
27 Gender 
28 `, '1eight 
29 I. V. I 
30 Naso-gastric 
tube 
31 Fluid chart 
32 Oral fluids 
currently taken 
33 Passed urine - 
bladder 
34. Bowel sounds 
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Question: ', shat or how rruch? Paralytic Ileus 
Card - -- ý-- r An >! " er 
1 Cig. smoked daily Does not smoke 
2 Pain now Abdominal discomfort 
3 Analgesia rec. Peth. 100x_. Js x2 since op 
tý. Nausea/ vomiting x6 since op 
5 Anti-emetic i; "axalon x 2, nil effect 
6 Type of admission Emergency 
7 Type of surgery Appendicectomy 
8 Time since surgery 3 days 
9 Time in theatre 1 hour 
10 Level of Consc. Alert 
11 Skin appearance Pallor 
12 Skin to touch Mod. dry 
13 Muscle tone Rigid abdomen 
11 Facial expression Mod. distress 
15 Level of anxiety/ 
distress 
, od. distress 
16 B/P Pre-op 120/80 
17 B/P current 120/80 
18 Pulse Pre--op 80 













24 Cyanosis Tone 





Order - Answer. 
26 Age 24 years 
27 Gender ale 
28 Ve ight 11 st 
29 I. V. I D/S + kve 
30 Naso-gastric tube Nil 
31 Fluid chart Yes 
32 Oral fluids 30 mis 
currently taken 
33 Passed urine 400 mis 
- bladder 
34 Bowel sounds Not present 
35 App. of abdomen Distension 
36 Dressing/ Nil 
Drainage 
37 Patients mobility Full 
previously 
38 Emotional & Nil 
psychological 
history 






. 'hat or how ý muc:!: ý? Pulmo a_rýý Embolism 
Card 
1 Cig. smoked daily 
Order ' E r nUy; er 
40+ da. ly 
2 Pain now Unilat. chest 
3 Analgesia Rec. 100mgs Petri 1 hr ago 
4 Nausea/vomiting J 
l Nil 
5 Anti-emetic Nil 
6 Type of admission Emergency 
7 Type of surgery Append cectomy 
8 Time since surgery 24 hours 
9 Time in theatre 1 hour 
10 Level of consc. I'Jod. alert 
11 Skin appearance Pallor 
12 Skin to touch Cold and clammy 
13 ib uscle tone Normal 
14 Facial expression Distress 
15 Level of anxiety/ 
distress 
Distress 
16 B/P Pre-op 140/80 
17 B/P current 130/80 
18 Pulse Pre-op 78 
19 Pulse current 94 
20 Temp. Pre-op TN 
21 Temp. current 35 
22 Resp. Pre-op 24-28 
23 Resp. current 32, d-Tspnoea 
24 Cyanosis Cyanosis 
25 Expectoration Frothy ihael?, optysis 
2 21 
Card Order 
26 Age 40 
27 Gender Female 
28 Weight 11 st 0 
29 I. V. I 12 hours 1-'o st-op 
30 INaso-gastric tube Nil 
31 Fluid chart Yes 
32 Oral fluids 
currently taken 
Free fluids 
33 Passed urine 
- bladder 
400 mis 
34 Bowel sounds Present 
35 App. of abdomen NAD 
36 Dressing/drainage NAD 
37 Patients mobility 
previously 
Full 
38 Emotional & 
psychological 
history Nil 





Question: What or how rmuch? Urinary) Retention 
Card 
- ý_ ---- 
-urd. er Arer 4ý 
1 Cig. smoked daily None 
2 Pain now Abdominal 
3 Analgesia rec. Peth 100 x2 
4 Nausea/vomiting Nil 
5 Anti-emetic 1ý 
6 Type of admission Emergency 
7 Type of surgery A-ppendicectomy 
8 Time since surgery 16 hours 
9 Time in theatre 1 hour 
10 Level of consc. Alert 
11 Skin appearance NAD 
12 Skin to touch Slightly moist 
13 JJuscle tone Tense 
14 Facial expression Mod. distress 
15 Level of anxiety/ 
distress 
Some distress 
16 B/P Pre-op 130/70 
17 B/P current 130/70 
18 Pulse Pre-op 82 
19 Pulse current 90 
20 Temp. Pre-op 35 
21 Temp. current 34.8 
22 Resp. Pre-op 24 
23 Resp. current 30 
24 Cyanosis Nil 
25 Expectoration ,i 
0 '9 
Gard Order jin raer 
26 Age 60 
27 Gender T- , gale 
28 e ight 12 st 
29 I. V. I D/S + kve 
30 I aso-Gastric tube Nil 
31 Fluid chart Yes 
32 Oral fluids 
currently taken 
30mis hourly 
33 Passed urine 
- bladder 
HNPU 
3L Bowel sounds Present 
35 App. of abdomen Bladder palpable 
36 Dressing/drainage NAD 
37 Patients mobility 
previously 
Full 









POSSIBLE PATIENT STATES 
1. Peritonitis 
2. No complication 
3. Pulmonary embolism 
4.. Haemorrhagic shock 
5. Chest infection 
6. Paralytic ileus 
7. Urinary retention 
8. Thrombo-phlebitis 
9. Chest infection 
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APPENDIX 6 
Introduction and General Instructions 
1y name is Sheila Ope n Shaw ;I arm: a Nursing Re- 
searcher from. Chelsea College. 0' l, rullen is helping 
me with my current research project. The session and 
the tasks that you are about to do are part of that 
research project. This project is investigating the 
ways in which nurses make clinical judgements or 
diagnoses. It is also investigating reasoning strategies 
that can be taught to improve this skill. I shall be 
very grateful if you will help me by acting as subjects. 
The intention is that participation will be of practical 
use to you and I will explain it all to you after you 
have done the work. 
I will now hand out a Questionnaire that I would 
like you to complete as quickly as possible. After this, 
I would like you to do two short tasks and I will explain 
what is involved after the Questionnaires have been com- 
pleted. Each of you has a number, so please do not write 
your names on any of the sheets. 
Please start by - reading the instructions and then 
fill out the Questionnaire and the personal details asked 
for. Please do not stop to think for too long about any 
item - do the task as quickly as possible. 
; What is of 
interest is the first answer that you think of. There are 
no right or wrong answers to these sorts of-. questions. 
If 
there are any difficulties, I will come and explain. 
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APP-E'NDIX 7 
DiaUnostic Task Instructions 
Now I want you to do the two tasks and I will tell 
you what is involved. I want you to imagine that you 
are caring for a post-operative general patient. Your 
task is to judge the current condition of this patient. 
I want you to do this twice on each occasion, the patient's 
condition will be different. I will now give you a list 
of the possible conditions, between ",., hich you xjust decide. 
Plus two packs of cards and two lists (hand out - stating 
1st and 2nd pack). Please do not touch anything yet. 
'What I want you to do is to take your 1st list and pack. 
Do not look at the pack yet, just your list. Please do not 
at any point from now on look to see what your neighbour is 
doing. It will help me more if people do these tasks en- 
tirely alone. 
As you can see, your lists contain a series of 
questions about information that you may wish to know about 
your patient. What I want you to do is to decide which 
question you wish to ask first. You can start anywhere in 
the list - there is no order - do not decide on No. 1 unless 
you do really want that answer. There is no logic in the 
order. 
Now, each question has a number beside it. Take the 
card with that number on it and only the card with that 
number on it -- turn it over and you have the- answer to your 
question. Now you all have your 1st answers. 'write that 
down on your list beside the question that you asked, and 
put a No. 1 in the column labelled order. It is important 
for me to know the order in which you ask each question, 
so write ' 2' for the second question, '3' for the third etc. 
Then, in the final space write down quickly the reason that 
you wanted to know that answer - very quickly and briefly. 
Now ask a second question and look at each card in turn, 
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as you ask your question. Please do not look at any card 
that you are not specifically interested in. Ask as many 
questions as you need to, to assess the current condition 
of your patient. Not all the questions will be relevant 
- you will need to ask fewer than one-third. So start no,, 
by asking your questions, one by one. Record the answers, 
the order used and your reason for asking. So you will 
decide on Question 2- write a ''2' beside it - and look at 
the appropriate card. 71rite down the answer and your 
reason for asking. Then choose Question 3, and so on, 
until you have finished. Then write down your. clinical 
judgement in the space provided at the bottom of your 
list. ºVhen you have done this, I want you to do the second 
task in an identical manner. Each task should take about 
five minutes each - please try to be quick, there is a lot 
to get through. 
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APPENDIX 8 
CHI SQUARE COL'PARING SUBJECTS USING 12 ITEM. S 1VITH SUBJEC'S 
USING -< 12. ITE S, FOR THE GENERAL ITEýLýS, TYPE OF 3UFPGERY ATS-) 
LENGTH OF T II`I ' SINCE SURGERY 
2tid Task 
2x2 contingency table derived from Ss group 
N. 11 and < 12 Ss group N. 8. 
Therefore the three most commonly occurring scores were 
deleted from j12 group. 





E. F. = 8.75 E. F. = 17.24 
C D 
18 51 
E. F. = 23.2 E. F. = 45.7 
26 
69 
32 63 95 
E. F. = expected frequency 
2 
X2 N (AD--BC/-- N) d. f .1 
(A+B) (C+D) B+D) 
= 5.32 
From tables with d. f . l, the table value of p-, -, -'0.05 
is 3.84, the observed value 5.32 exceeds the table value. 
Therefore the Null hypothesis can be rejected at the 
p, -<0.05 level of significance. 
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ýPPF1'TDzx 9 
CHI SQUARE CO-ldPARIN'N; G SUBJECTS USING f-12 ITE',: S VI ýL SUBJFS 
USING -<12 ITEMS FOR GENERAL ITEMTS, TYPE OF SURGERY 
LENGTH OF TIME SINCE SURGERY 
3rd Task 
2x2 contingency table derived from raw data of >-Ss n. 12 
and <12 Ss n. 8, the n of scores was equalised by delec ti on 
of the most commonly occurring in group 12, ie. 
12 type surgery 
n. 12 time surgery 
<12 type surgery 3,3, ), 5,1 ,1,4 







E. F. = 10 E. F. = 20 
C D 
21 39 





E. F. = expected frequency 
X2 - N (1AD-BC1- 2) d. f 1' 
A+B C+D A+C B+D 
= . 51 
The observed value X2 . 51 fails to exceed 
the table value 





COMPAKIi3ON OF USE OF GENERAL INFORý'elATION IN THE 2nd HALF OF 
THE TASK, COMPARING SUBJECTS WHO WERE ACCURATE WITH THOSE 
WHO WERE INACCURATE 
' INSTAT package on HARRIS computer 








T. DF. SIG. 
0.30 27 . 763 
TASK 2 
N MEAN EQUAL VARIAN CES 
RIGHT 20 10.4.1 T. DF. SIG. 
WRONG 9 17.1+2 1.31 27 . 203 
TASK 
N MEAN EQUAL VARIANCES 
RIGHT 16 15.34 T. DF. SIG. 





The aim of this talk is to tell you about the research 
that you are taking part in. I want to explain what I am 
doing and why, so that you can gain insight into some of the 
reasoning processes that may be involved in making a clinical 
j udgemeýlt . 
As nurses we aim to be accurate in all clinical judge- 
ments. We aim to make an accurate diagnosis of the possibility 
of surgical complications in order to avail all patients of 
the medical care that they need, when they need it. 
Currently nurses are not taught how to use the relevant 
sign and symptom information. 
This skill does not limit itself to surgical compli- 
cations. It is necessary in any situation <<ihere we assess 
the well-being of a patient and plan the appropriate care 
ie. a situation where Nye make a clinical judgement. 
An example of a clinical judgement we all make fre- 
quently is the diagnosis of the experience of pain. 
In order to improve this skill, it is necessary to attempt 
to understand what we are doing, when making judgements of 
this nature. 
This can be done by concentrating on the type of in- 
formation that we need to look for and the best way to use it. 
The first task that you did involved measuring the number 
of angles that you typically use to view people in your social 
world. The more angles from which you view a person, the 
more information you have at your disposal and the more 
accurate your impression is likely to be. 
The insistence that no-one should write their name on 
any of the questionnaires is to ensure that they are com- 
pletely anonymous. The entire purpose of this study is for 
you to get some benefit from it, there is no need for in- 
dividual scores to be known. 
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I now want to talk to you about somet: hing' that you 
may not have considered before. That is }got; l human memory 
may operate and what sort of information will be of use 
to you when making a clinical judgement. Consider tnis in- 
formation in relation to memory. The intention is to pro- 
vide you with a strategy for making clinical judgements 
and reason for using it. 
Human memory can be described as a series of scripts 
or pictures. 
These scripts are the result of experiences that have 
been recorded and stored in memory. 
Try and imagine your memory as a series of pictures 
that have been stored away. 
The pictures or scripts can be of different types, 
they can be about an event like a conversation that you have 
had, or they can be a recorded memory of a clinical judgement 
that you have learned about. 
A clinical judgement such as a postoperative complication. 

















This is a representation of three scripts A, B and C. 
As you can see, stored along with the scripts are 
items of information. 
Items of context information and items of specific 
information. 
Context information is general, relatively unchang- 
ing information. 
Specific information items, are items that may change 
over relatively short periods. 
These specific information items are facts that are 
associated with a particular. script . 
`Whereas, the context information can be associated 
with one or more scripts. 
The distinction between these two types of information 
will become clearer. 
In order to retrieve or remember a script the general 
context information can serve as a clue or cue. 
This will help you to remember one script or more 
than one. 
To decide whether the script you are looking at is 
correct, or to distinguish between two scripts, it is 
necessary to check to see whether the specific information 
items associated with the script are present in the en- 
vironment. 
Context information can distinguish between the gross 
features of two scripts. 
But the specific facts of the remaining script need 
to be checked. 
It is not only necessary to look for facts to confirm 
a script 
it is also rp cessary to test the script. 
I want you to get used to the idea of testing the 
script that you are looking at. 
Testing it by looking to see if there are specific 
facts about the patient that are not associated with the 
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script and therefore indicate that the script is incorrect. 
This may well seem rather abstract at present and I 
will now illustrate all that I have been talking about in 
relation to the tasks that you have just performed. 
The task that you have just done was designed to look 
at the strategies that people used when making clinical 
judgements that were based on the information that was 
available. 
I shall be looking at the sort of information that 
people used first, and if people who were relatively more 
accurate used different pieces of information or the same 
items in a different order. 
The two types of information that I have just des- 
cribed were identified to be present in a clinical judge- 
ment situation by a study in the U. S. A. 
VIS. AID 2 
1. Info. about features of the patient that are 
relatively stable eg. age, sex, time since surgery, 
type of surgery etc. 
ie. Context information 
2. Info. about the state of the patient that can change 
over short periods of time eg. pulse, B. P, respirations, 
how the patient feels etc. 
ie. State/specific info. 
The U. S. study found that the nurses they tested were 
very accurate in their clinical judgements. 
They were people who had done a Masters Degree course 
specialising in surgical nursing. 
They used the first type of general or context 
infor- 
mation to set the scene and rule out an unlikely 
diagnosis. 
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Then they used the second, more precise patient state 
information ie. specific information. 
So, if you imagine dividing each of the tasks you have 
done in half, 
in the first half of the task these nurses set the scene 
ie. retrieved the relevant scripts with contý/ext information. 
In the second half they examined these scripts using 
specific information items. 
For an example take the diagnosis of the experience of 
pain. 
It is likely that a patient who has had a relatively 
minor procedure 
The general, context information, that the patient has 
had a cystoscopy sets the scene. 
You will expect this patient to experience less discomfort 
than the wound pain after abdominal surgery. 
However, to obtain an accurate picture of exactly how much 
pain this patient is experiencing we need to ask the patient. 
It may be possible to alleviate this discomfort. 
Another example is two patients who have had identical 
surgery, 
are unlikely to experience identical discomfort. 
People do have very individual responses to surgery. 
So we can start with general information such as the 
knowledge that someone has had a specific operation. 
This will lead us to expect them to experience a certain 
amount of pain, 
but the exact amount and the frequency with which to 
administer analgesia can only be guaged after asking the 
individual patient. 
Asking for specific facts about that patient's current 
state that are not stable. 
People will be less accurate if they fail to use this 
specific information. 
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Another example that can be considered is the use of 
the general piece of context information - legt'1 of time 
since surgery. 
This can be used to distinguish between two scripts 
that have been retrieved because of the information that 
a patient has started to vomit after abdominal surgery. 
Four days after abdominal surgery you would not 
expect a diagnosis of an adverse reaction to anaesthesia 
for a patient who has recently started to vomit. 
Therefore the context information does rule out an 
unlikely diagnosis for a patient who has started to vomit 
four days after surgery. 
But you would need to know more specific details be- 
fore you could distinguish between a gastrointestinal in- 
fection or an adverse reaction to a recently prescribed 
drug eg. an antibiotic. 
Information that could serve to reject one picture 
and confirm the other such as the patient's temperature, 
the pattern of drug prescription or laboratory reports. 
Information checking the content of the script ie. 
testing the scripts, rejecting one and accepting the one 
more likely to be correct. 
Accuracy in the American study was associated with the 
initial use of general information. Followed by the use of 
specific information relating to the current state of the 
patient. 
Are there any questions so far? 
To return to the processes involved in memory and 
how the information items relate to them. 
Human memory is a lot more complex than the model 
that I have described and no-one really knows the exact 
structure. 
But one of the very important findings is that scripts 
or pictures are encoded with their context and the context 
can retrieve the corresponding script. 
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In the example of a patient vomiting after abdominal 
surgery. 
The general information that the surgery was aLdomin: l 
plus the abnormal patient state can lead to the retrieval of 
three possible diagnostic pictures. 
Adverse anaesthetic reaction, a gastrointestinal in- 
fection and an adverse drug reaction. 
All three being possible cause of vomiting after 
surgery. 




REACTION DRUG NFECTIO REACTION Yý SCRIPT SCRIPT , 
SPECIFI SPECIFIC 
ý--- INFO INFO 




The context information, length of time since surgery, 
can rule out the anaesthetic reaction picture because you 
know that surgery was four days ago. 
21T4 
But in order to distinguish between 
you need to know the specific signs that 
current patient state. 
So you first form a general picture 
context using t:: 'Ie general information. 
Then you identify the appropriate s 
at specific clues 
VI S. AID 
the other two 
relate to the 
of the situation 
cript by looking 
1. Realise that a general picture is obtained to start 
with, using general, relatively unchanging, context 
information. This may lead to a stereotypical pic- 
ture and if we stop there we may make a mistake. 
2. Look at the state of the individual patient, the 
current facts that change with the patient's state. 
2L15 
APPENDIX 12 
POSSIBLE PATIENT STATES 
1. HAET}ZORRHAGIC SHOCK 
2. DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS 
3. SUBPHRENIC ABSCESS 
4. ILIAC ABSCESS 
5. NO COMPLICATION 
6. BREAKDO'! 7N OF ANASTOMOSIS 
7. RENAL FAILURE 
8. URINARY RENTENTION 
9. BURST WOUND 
10. REDUCED BLOOD VOLUME 
11. ATELECTASIS 
12. PULMONARY TIBOLI STA 
13. INHALATION OF VOMIT 
14. ADHESIONS 
15. PERITONITIS 
16. PELVIC ABSCESS 
17. WOUND INFECTION 
18. CHEST INFECTION 
19. PARALYTIC ILEUS 
20. SEPT IC AEIVMI A 









I3ý MASK 2 13ýT-- TASffl 
S- Ji l '02 c1 C2 G cl- 2 
- 16.7 40 40 50 16.7 163.4 42.9 42.9 42.9 28.6 20 20 197.3 11.1 33.3 28.6 - 28.6 - 101.6 42.9 - 33.2 12.5 40 20 148.7 33.3 - 33.3 12.5 40 20 139.1 33.3 33.3 50 25 33.3 33.3 208.2 36.4 16.2 37.5 37.5 33.3 33.3 196.2 40 40 37.5 25 42.9 14.3 1997.7 2602.4 20 10 75 - 16.7 16.7 138.4 33.3 - 100 - 50 - 183.3 36.4 18.2 40 30 57.1 - 181.7 42.9 30 20 57.1 - 150 22.2 11.1 28.6 - 25 - 86.9 60 10 71.4 - 83.3 - 224.7 25 25 16.7 16.7 33.3 33.3 150 


















"1 37.5 25 42.9 - 169 
X6.2 13.3 26.7 14.3 14.3 122.5 
'0 40. 20 44.4 - 184.4 ? 8.6 28.6 14.3 50 - 150.1 
- 55.6 - 66.7 - 159.8 10 57.1 - 6b. 7 22.2 196 16.7 33.3 11.1 28.6 28.6 151.6 
? 2.2 40 10 42.9 14.3 1,40.5 
i2.9 42.9 14.3 30 - 144.4 
- 33.3 22.2 57.1 - 162.6 
- 37.5 25 57.1 -1 162.5 ?0 60 - 50 -1 1,70 
- 50 - 60 - 167.1 
)7.1 50 16.7 50 25 213.1 
'5.6 57.1 - 42.9 - 157.2 )5 9.1 9.1 28.6 28.6 1 125.4 














1 5711 6. 
F max = 328.4 = 2.2 when there are 6 -columns and n--1 is 31 df 
(6.31) . Fr 
ýA''lables 
at p <0.05 df (6.30) F'3.81 ; the 
observed valve of 2.2 fails to reach significance and we c:: n 





ABC SU'VJý'IARY TABLE 
B1 `1 B2 
Cý C2 C C2 





A2 544.9 326.1 645.3 194.4 732.2 133 2576.2 
TA 992.8 661.3 1343.4 464.4 1376.1 340.6 5178.6 
AB SU131ARY TABLE 
B1 B2 B3 TA 
A1 782.8 968.1 851.5 2602.4 
A2 871.3 839.7 865.2 2576.2 
TB 1654.1 1807.8 1716.7 5178.6 
AC SUMMARY TABLE 
C C2 TA 
Al 1789.9 812.5 2602.4 
A2 1922.4 653.8 2576.2 
TC 3712.3 1466.3 5178.6 
BC SUTvLvýARY TABLE 
Cý C2 TB 
B1 992.8. 661.3 1654.1 
B2 1343.4 464.4 1807.8 
B3 1376.1 340.6 17 16.7 









_ Half of task c=2 
n= 16 
1= (EX)2 = 5175.62 = 139676.6 (1612 TT-27 
2= EX2 
_ 215363.71 




nbc 17 6737T-2T- 
4= 
_B_ = 
(1654.12+1807.82+1716.72) = 139563.2 
nac 16)(2 2 
5= 6Ck2 = (3712.32+1466.32) = 165950.06 
nab 16 3) 




7= IACik2 = (1759.92+512.52+1922.42+653. 82) = 166395.3 
ab (16)(3) 
8= FBCjk2 = (992.. 82+661.32+1343.42+464.42+1376.11+340.62) 
na 32 
= 170406.9 
9= ý-ABCijk2 = (414-7.92+...... +1332) = 171386.4 
n 1o 
10 = ETs2 = (163.12+...... +125.42) = 144804.6 
n 
11 - 
t-TBs2 =. (93168.2+112o87.1+99738.1) = 152496.7 
12 = (-TCs2 = (1+29954.6+101249.3) = 177068. 
c3 
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ANOVA SUS, i, 1ARY TABLE 
Source of' df Sums of Mean Variance Procabilil 
variance Squares Squares Ratio 
Between 31 5127.9 
subjects 
(A) 
Cognitive 15 3.5 0.233 . 0006 n. s Comp. 
Between groups 30 5124.4 170.8 
error 
Within subjects 160 70559.2 
(B) 
Tasks 2 186.6 93.3 . 48 n. s 
AxB 2 379.4 189.7 1.6 n. s 
Cog Com x Tasks 
Within subjects 60 7126.2 118.77 
error B 
Half of task 1 26273.5 26273.5 142.09 p< 0.001 
AxC 1 441.7 441.7 2.4 n. s 
Cog Comp x -2 
task 
Within subjects 30 5548.3 184.9 
error C 
Task x1 task 2 4270.24 2135.12 4.9 p <0.025 
BC 
AxBxC 2 155.06 77.5 . 177 n"s 
Be within sub- 60 26178.4 436.3 
jects error 
TOTAL 191 75687.1 
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APPENDIX 14 
STUDENT'S t--TEST FOR INDEPENDENT MEANS 
TASK I CO'I' PARING GENERAL INFO ', ATION USE IN THE S ýCOND HALF 
OF THE TASK FOR ACCURATE AND I N7 kCCURAI'F SUBJECT S 
a 4(b 
n= 33 n= 15 
1) E- %a = 612.5 
2) f )Ca2 = 19588.01 
3) ((xa)2 = 375156.25 
4) n= 33 
5) : a2 = 11368.4 
n 




ýU<b2 = 10414.3 
(ýxb)2 = 112359.4 
n= 15 
ýýcb)2 = 7490.6 
1Cb = 22.35 
E2b -- (Ekb)2 
= 2923.7 
-Ka - Xb 
2 (ß a)2 2_ (ß b)2 X1+1 
nn na nb 
(na - 1) + 
(nb - 1) 
-3.75 
11143.31 x . 09667 
46 
- . 774 
Observed value -<1 , `ti fails 




STUDENT' S t-TEST FOR INDEPENDENT I'. ANS 
TASK II COi ARING CONTEXT INFORMATION USE IN THE SECOND HALF 
OF THE TASK FOR ACCURATE AND INACCURATE SUBJECTS 
'j2 
21 - 30 
1) 0ca2 - 524.8 
2) Cka2 = 17) 38.62 
3) (ýka) 2= 275415-04 
4) n= 30 
5) (¬ka)2 - 9180.5 
6) a = 17.5 












(ýkb)2 = 3321.1 
-kb = 13.6 
b2 - (E)b)2 
n 
34 . 21 26 
a- Xb 
a2 -- 
( ý-ýca) 2+ kb 2- 
(na - 1) + (nb - 1) 
1 
-----ý- i x+ 
_n -ý- na nb 
10892.33 x 0.0889 
46 
t= . 85 
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APPENDIX 16 
STUDENT'S t--TEST FOR INDEPENDENT MEANS 
TASK III COMPARING CONTEXT INFORMATION USE IN THE SECOND HALF 
OF THE TASK FOR ACCURATE AND INACCURATE SUBJECTS 
ACCURATE is 
E_Aa = 438.3 
Ica = 11.2 
n 39 
__. - 
. .ýa_ xb 
INACCURATE b 
uxb = 75.4 
Xb = 8.4 
n=9 
= 2.8 
The observed difference between the means renders the com- 






2x2 ANOVA - UNEQUAL CELL FREQUENCIES - LEAST SQUARES 




















b1 b2 b3 TOTAL 
a1 n11 14 n12 7 n13 11 n1 j 32 
a2 n21 4 n22 3 n23 8 n2j 15 
nij 18 n2j 10 n3i 19 47 
("1 T, T, TOIP AT1S 
b2 b 
aý AB, , 179 
AB12 99 AB13 209 A1 487 
a2 AB21 59 X22 42 AB23 146 A2 247 
Bi 238 B2 141 B3 355 G 734 
Li)4 
(1) = G2/n 
ý2) =2 
(3) = (Ai2/ni) = 4872 + 
2172 
32 15 
=11 +6 2.9 
= 12708 
11478.8 
(4) = (Bj2/nj) = 2382/18+1412/10+3552/19 = 11767.9 
(5) = (ABij2/nij) = 1792 + 992 + 2092 + 592 + 422 + 1462 
14 7 11 48 
= 11782.45 
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S. S. ab (adj) 
CELL MEANS 
a1 12.8 14.14 19 
a2 14.75 14 18.25 
dj -1.95 . 14 . 75 
wj 3.1 2.1 4.6 wj = 9.8 
wjdj 1.15 .3 3.45 wjdj = 4.9 
SS ab(ddj) = wjd2j -( Nv'd')2 
wj 
= 11.8 + . 042 + 2.6 - 
(1+. 9)2 
9.8. ` 
14.4 - 2.45 
11.98 
SS cells = (5) - (1) = 319.55 
SSa = (3) -- (1) = 15.9 
SSb = (4) - (1) - 305 
The adjusted sums of squares 
SSa (adj) = SS cells - SSab (adj) - SSb = 2.57 
SSb (adj) = SS cells - SSab 
(adj) - SSa = 291.7 
SS error. = (2) - (5) = 925.55 
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SUJýr MARY TAJIJE 
Source of SS df 
mvIS 
VR P variance 
A Correct/ 2.57 1 2.57 . 115 ns Incorrect 
B Question 291.7 2 145.53 6.4 P-- 01 Use 
AB 11.98 2 5.99 . 26 ns 
Error 925.55 41 22.6 
The table value for p<0.01 df (2-40) is 5.18 . 
*. an observed 
value of 6.4 df (2.41) can reject the Null hypothesis of 
no difference in question use over the three conditions of 
B at the p<0.01 level of significance. 
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APPENDIX 20 
2x2 ANOVA - U1', ; QUAL CELL FREQUENCIES 
LEAST SQUARE SOLUTION T ASIA II 
CELLS 
1-3)b1 (1-3=4-ß)b2 (4+)b3 
20,14,11,6,18, 29,9,13, 
Correct 14,9,17,8, 16,10,11,21,11 15,18,19, 
Subjects 4,14,16,15 9,18 
a1 6,8,12,16 
Incorrect 19,13,7,11,19,19 8,15,5,17 24,15 
Subjects 19,14,14,15,9,13 
a2 
CFT, T, FRFOTT'P-vr(ý; TFS 
bl b2 b3 TOTAL 
a1 n11 17 n12 5 n13 8 n1i 30 
a2 n21 12 n22 4 n23 2 n2i 18 
nij 29 n2j 9 n31 10 48 
P T1T T rn nm ATc V 1J L 1J 1V 1- t-y 
vý .. dam o- ý. ýr ,.. e 
b1 b2 b3 
a1 AB11 208 AB12 69 AB13 130 
A1 407 
a2 AB21 170 AB22 45 AB23 39 A2 
254 
B1 378 B2 114 B3 169 G 661 
25b 
(1) = G2/n = 9102.5 
(2) = .. 
1(2 
= 10327 
(3) _ L(A21In1) = 4072 f 254 
2= 9105.8 
30 1cß 
(4) = E_(B2j/nj) = 3782 + 1142 + 1692 = 9227.13 29 9 10 
(5) = (AB2ij/nij) = 2082 + 692 -j- 1302 + 1702 + 45 + 39 
17 5 12 42 
= 9284.65 
29 
S. S. ab (adj) 
CELL MEANS 
Ui p2 b3 
a1 12.2 13.8 16.25 
a2 12 11.25 19.5 
dj .2 2.55 -3.25 
wj 7.03 2.2 1.6 
wjdj 1.4 5.61 -1.65 
ýwj = 10.83 
Ewjdj = 5.36 
SS ab(adj) = ýwjd2) -- (ýrv'd')2 
wj 
. 28 + 14.3 + 16.9 - 2.7 = 28.8 
SS cells = (5) - (1) = 182.2 
SSa = (3) - (1) = 3.3 
SSb = (4) - (1) - 12.6 
The adjusted sums of squares 
SSa (adj) = SS cells - SSab (adj) - SSb =. 28.8 
SSb (adj) = SS cells - SSab (adj) - SSa = 150.1 
SS error (2) - (5) = 1042.4 
0 
2b0 
gource o SS df ms VR P 
variance 
A Correct/ 28.8 1 28.8 1.2 ns 
Incorrect 
B Question 150.1 2 75.05 3.03 <. 10 
Use ns 
AB 28.8 2 14.4 . 58 ns 
Error 1042.4 42 24.8 
The table value for <0.05 df (2.40) is 3.23, df (2.60) 
= 3.15 . ", an observed value 
for A, B& AB do not allow 




Difference in the number of subject s askin the general 
questions more in position 1-3 and those asking Lore 
later in the task as a function of the tasks I-III. 
TASK I TASK II TASK III 






1-3 = 4+ 7 6.7) 5 (6.2) 9 21 
+ 11 (6.97 97)l ) 58 6. ) (8.5) 
3 22 
32 30 39 101 
Expected frequencies 
It can be observed that the expected frequencies of those 
subjects asking an equal number of questions in positions 
1-3 and later in the task are less than one v, -hole number 
different to the observed frequencies and have been dropped 
from the analysis. 
Adjusted T. ble 
TASK I TASK II TASK III 
1-3 14 C18. 17 018.1) 27 1.75) 
58 












= 8.175 df (3-1)(2-1) =2 
Table value df 2 at p<0.025 7.38 -. vi th an observed i. ralýfe 
of 8.175 the Null ry-, TUothesis of no di ferences c-. } be re jeered 
2b2 
APPENDIX 22 
FISHER EXACT PROBABILITY 
Inaccurate subjects. The diff e ence in the number of 
subjects asking more general questions in positions 1-3 
and those asking more later in the task as a function of 
Tasks I& II. 
TASK I TASK II 
1-3 4 12 16 
4+ 8 2 10 
12 14 26 
In order to use significance levels in Siegel (1956) observed 




C+D=5B=0 at p<0.05 level-of significance 
B_6 
. 
%, an observed value of B=1 does not allow rejection of 
the Null hypothesis. 
J 
mecca T TtSV. TT 
APPENDIX 23 
FISHER EXACT PROBABILITY 
Inaccurate subjects. The difference bet: -peen the number 
of subjects asking more general questions in position 1-3 






Table value of D=0 and 
observed value of D=0 
at p <' 0 . 02.5 
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APPENDIX 24 
Question: `ilolhat or how much? 
Card Question Order Ansv,, er 
1 Level of consciousness 
2 Disease State 
3 Appearance/Dressing 
4 Frame-size 
5 State of bladder 
6 Age 
7 Alcohol/daily 
8 Respirations pre-op 
9 Frequency of PA care 
10 Pulse pre-op 
11- Pre-op oral fluids 
12 Urinalysis-lab 
13 Clotting--time current 
14 Skin appearance 
15 Naso-gastric tube 
16 Wound-swab report 




Draina :e tubes 
Type/admission 
21 Fluid chart 
22 Current oral fluids 
23 Indwelling catheter 
24 B/P pre--op 
25 Cur. rent diet 
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Card Question Order t: h sý er 
26 Respirations current 




Frequency of dressings 
Socio-economic status 
30 Platelets current 
31 iiiarital status 
32 Skin to touch 
33 ? bowels opened 
34 Time in recovery 
35 Duration of anaesthesia 
36 Cigarettes smoked daily 
37 Appearance/wound 
38 Appearance/abdomen 
39 Housing conditions 
40 Temperature current 
41 ESR current 
42 B/P current 
43 Current antibiotic 
44 . 'found closure technique 
45 Vomiting 
46 Past medical history 
47 Expectoration 






Card Question Order A. n. s,,: er 




Appearance of drainage 
Type of anaesthesia 
55 ,; 7efight 
56 Occupation 
57 Anti-emetic received 
58 Analgesia received 
59 Type/surgery 
60 Time since redressing 
61 Urinalysis ward 
62 Facial expression 




66 Past psychiatric hist. 
67 Pre-op diet 
68 Time since surgery 
69 ý, Iluscle tone 
70 Quantity/drainage 









A. PARALYTIC ILEUS 
GENERAL 
1. Gender : 4ale 
2. Age 24 years 
3. Weight 11 st 
4. Height 5' 10" 
5. Frame size Medium 
6. Marital status Single 
7. Socio-economic status Single 
8. Housing conditions 0-, vn flat 
9. Occupation Accountant 
10. Past medical history No previous hospital admission 
11. Past psychiatric history None 
12. Cigarettes smoked daily Does not smoke 
13. Alcohol consumed daily 1-2 pints beer 
14. Pre-surgical mobility Full 
15. Type of admission Emergency 
16. Disease state Acute appendicitis 
17. Type of surgery Appendectomy 
18. Pre-med given Atropine lung Pethidine 100mgs 
19. Type of anaesthesia General--Intubated-'. i}.. ý: scle relaxed 
20. Duration of anaesthesia 1 hour 
21. Duration of surgery 1 hour 
22. Time in recovery 45 minutes 
23. Time since surgery 3 days 
24. Wound closure technique clips 
25. Frequency of dressings Wound sprayed-Inspected daily 
26. Frequency of. PA care 3-4 hly prn 
27. Drainage tubes Nil 
28. IVI Dextrose/saline + YVO 
29. Nasogastric tube None 
30. Indwelling catheter Nil 
31. Fluid chart On fluid chart 
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SPECIFIC 
32. Level of consciousness Alert 
33. Facial expression Moderate distress' 
34. Skin appearance Pallor 
35. Skin to touch Dry 
36. Muscle tone Rigid abdomen 
37. Current mobility Walks short distances 
38. Level of reported 
anxiety/distress Moderate distress 
39. Degree of depression None 
40. B/P pre-op 120/80 
41. B/P current 120/80 
42. Pulse pre-op 80 
43. Pulse current 90 
44. Temp. pre-op Normal 
45. Temp. current Normal 
46. Resp. Pre-op 24 
47. Resp. current 30 
48. Cyanosis None 
49. Expectoration None 
50. Pre-op oral fluids Nil wanted by patient 
51. Current oral fluids 30mis hourly 
52. Pre-op diet Nil immediately before 
53. Current diet H2O only 
54. Nausea Recurrent. Relieved by vomiting 
55. Vomiting x6 since surgery 
56. Anti-emetic received Maxalon x 2. Nil effect 
57. Bowel sounds Nil 
58. ? Bowels opened No 
59. ? Passed urine 400mls since surgery 
60. State of bladder Not palpable or uncomfortable 
61. Pain now Wound discomfort 
62. Analgesia received Pethidine 100mgs x2 since surgery 
63. Appearance of abdomen Distension 
64. Appearance of wound Satisfactory 
65. Appearance of dressing Nil 
66. Time since re-dressed Not dressed 
67. Appearance of drainage Nil 
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68. Quantity of drainage 
69. Current antibiotic 
70. Urinalysis ward 
71. Urinalysis lab 
72. 7/ound swab report 
73. Haemoglobin current 
74.. ESR current 
75. Clotting time current 
76. Platelets current 
Nil 
Ampicillin 250: Tigs hly, 
Cloxacillin 25Omgs 
+ve protein-nil else 
No pathogens 
I' . ot taken 
15g per 100ml 
15mm in one hour 
9.5 mins 
2.77,000 per c. rnm 
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5. Frame size 
6. Marital status 
7. Socio-economic status 
8. Housing conditions 
9. Occupation 
10. Past medical history 
11. Past Psych. history 
12. Cigarettes smoked daily 
13. Alcohol consumed daily 
14. Pre-surgical mobility 
15. Type of admission 
16. Disease state 
17. Type of surgery 
18. Pre-med given 
19. Type of anaesthesia 
20. Duration of anaesthesia 
21. Duration of surgery 
22. Time in recovery 
23. Time since surgery 
24. Wound closure technique 
25. Frequency of dressings 
26. Frequency of PA care 
27. Drainage tubes 
28. IVI 
29. Nasogastric tube 
30. Indwelling catheter 










1972-D & C, Recurrent bronchitis 
None 
40+ 












Wound sprayed, daily inspection 
3-4 hourly 
Nil 
Taken down 12 hours post-op 
None 
Nil 
On fluid chart 
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SPECIFIC 
1. Level of consciousness 
2. Facial expression 
3. Skin appearance 
4. Skin to touch 
5. Muscle tone 
6. Current mobility 
7. Level of reported 
anxiety/distress 
8. Degree of depression 
9. B/P pre-op 
10. B/P current 
11. Pulse pre-op 
12. Pulse current 
13. Temp. pre-op 
14. Temp. current 
15. Resps. pre-op 
16. Resps current 
17. Cyanosis 
18. Expectoration 
19. Pre-op oral fluids 
20. Current oral fluids 
21. Pre-op diet 
22. Current diet 
23. Nausea 
24. Vomiting 
25. Anti-emetic received 
26. Bowel sounds 
27. ? bowels opened 
28. Passed urine 
29. State of bladder 
30. Pain now 
31. Analgesia received 
32. Appearance of abdomen 
33. Appearance of wound 
34. Appearance of dressing 




























Has passed 400mis total 
NAD 
Unilateral chest pain 





36. Appearance of drainage 
37. Quantity of drainage 
38. Current antibiotic 
39. Urinalysis-ward 
40. Urinalysis-lab 
41. Wound swab report 
42. Haemoglobin-current 
43. ESR - current 
44. Clotting time - current 
45. Platelets - current 
No drainage 
Nil 




13g per 100ml 
14mm in 1 hour 
3.5 wins 
400,000 per c . mm 
? 73 




3. 'V`Te ight 
4. Height 
5. Frame size 
6. Marital status 
7. Socio-economic state 
8. Housing conditions 
9. Occupation 
10. Past medical history 
11. Past psych. history 
12. Cigarettes smoked daily 
13. Alcohol consumed daily 
14. Pre-surgical mobility 
15. Type of admission 
16. Disease state 
17. Type of surgery 
18. Pre-med given 
19. Type anaesthesia 
20. Duration anaesthesia 
21. Duration surgery 
22. Time in recovery 
23. Time since surgery 
24. Wound closure technique 
25. Frequency of dressings 
26. Frequency of PA care 
27. Drainage tubes 
28. IVI 
29. Nasogastirc tube 
30. Indwelling catheter 








Local authority flat 
Factory worker 
1976 myocardial infarct, no recurrence 
NAD 
















Dextrose/saline + KVO 
None 
None 
On fluid chart 
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SPECIFIC 
rýaa. rrý. rý 
1. Level of consciousness 
2. Facial expression 
3. Skin appearance 
4. Skin to touch 
5. Muscle tone 
6. Current mobility 
7. Level of reported 
anxiety/distress 
8. Degree of depression 
9. B/P pre-op 
10. B/P current 
11. Pulse pre-op 
12. Pulse current 
13. Temp. pre-op 
14. Temp. current 
15. Resps. pre-op 
16. Resps. current 
17. Cyanosis 
18. Expectoration 
19. Pre-op fluids 
20. Current oral fluids 
21. Pre-op diet 
22. Current diet 
23. Nausea 
214.. Vomiting 
25. Anti-emetic received 
26. Bowel sounds 
27. ? bowels opened 
28. ? passed urine 
29. State of bladder 
30. Pain now 
31. Analgesia received 
32. Appearance of abdomen 
33. Appearance of wound 




























Has not passed urine 
Bladder palpable 
Abdominal pain 




2 r7 r 
35. Time since re-dressed Daily inspection 
36. Appearance of drainage Nil 
37. Quantity of drainage Nil 
38. Current antibiotic Ampicillin 250mgs, 
39. Urinalysis - ward +ve protein trace 
40. Urinalysis - lab No pathogens 
14.1. Wound swab report None sent 
42. Haemoglobin - current 15g per 100ml 
43. ESR -- current 16.5mm in 1 hour 
14L1. Clotting time - current 6 minutes 
1.5. Platelets - current 320,000 per c. mm 
Clox 250,: s L. hly 
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4. He igi. t 
5. Frame size 
6. Marital status 
7. Socio-economic state 
8. Housing conditions 
9. Occupation 
10. Past medical history 
11. Past Psych. history 
12. Cigarettes smoked daily 
13. Alcohol consumed daily 
11-. Pre-surgical mobility 
15. Type of admission 
16. Disease state 
17. Type of surgery 
18. Pre-med given 
19. Type anaesthesia 
20. Duration of anaesthesia 
21. Duration of surgery 
22. Time in recovery 
23. Time since surgery 
24. `Wound closure technique 
25. Frequency of dressings 
26. Frequency of PA care 
27. Drainage tubes 
28. IVI 
29. Nasogastric tube 
30. Indwelling catheter 








Local authority flat 
Retired bus driver 
History of intermit. pain L calf 





Booked from ". T . L. 
Inter_i. nit tend claudication L 
Lumbar sympathectomy L 
















1.. Level of consciousness 
2. Facial expression 
3. Skin appearance 
4. Skin to touch 
5. Muscle tone 
6. Current mobility 
7. Level of reported 
anxiety distress 
8. Degree of depression 
9. B/P pre-op 
10. B/P current 
11. Pulse pre-op 
12. Pulse current 
13. Temp. pre-op 
14. Temp. current 
15. Resps. pre-op 
16. Resps. current 
17. Cyanosis 
18. Expectoration 
19. Pre-op oral fluids 
20. Current oral fluids 
21. Pre-op diet 
22. Current diet 
23. Nausea 
24. Vomiting 
25. Anti-emetic received 
26. Bowel sounds 
27. ? Bowels opened 
28. ? passed urine 
29. State of bladder 
30. Pain now 
31. Analgesia received 
32. Appearance of abdomen 
33. Appearance of wound 
Alert 
Does not indicate distress 
NAD. Left foot pink 
NAD. Left foot alarm 
NAD 






















passed urine normally 
Not palpable 
Some wound discomfort 




3)4. Appearance of dressing 
35. Time since re-dressed 
36. Appearance of drainage 
37. Quantity of drainage 
38. Current antibiotic 
39. Urinalysis - ward 
40. Urinalysis - lab 
141. Wound swab report 
42. Haemoglobin - current 
L3. ESR - current 
44. Clotting time - current 
45. Platelets - current 




Ampicillin 250mgs, Clox. 
NLD 
Not performed 
Swab sent to lab this am 
15g per 100ml 
16mm in 1 hour 
7 minutes 




TASK. IN S'' RT CT IO Iý S 
In front of you are two packs of cards and two lists, 
please do not touch them at present. I want you to 
that you are caring for a general surgical patient post- 
operatively. Your task is to diagnose/judge ,I 'ne I current 
condition of this pats ent .I want you to do this t'=; ice 
and on each occasion the patient's condition viill be 
different. I will now give you a list of the possible 
patient conditions that you could diagnose. The diagnosis 
that you make will be one of the conditions on that list. 
When you have finished reading the patient conditions 
please take the list that is on top of the materials in 
front of you. 
At this point I want to ask you NOT to look at what 
your neighbours are doing. At no point will two people 
sitting next to each other be doing the same task. That 
is, the diagnoses that you will make will be different. I 
should also like to ask you not to talk at any point until 
we have finished. The reason for this is that different 
people have different ways of doing things any what is useful 
for one person may confuse Someone else. What is more useful 
for you and for me is to do these tasks as you would do them 
naturally, other peoples' strategies may cause you to make 
a mistake. 
As you can see your lists contain a series of questions 
about information that you may wiche to kno. about your 
patient. There is no logic in the order of the questions 
so do not start with question 1 unless you wish to know the 
answer to that question, start anywhere in the list . "o 
decide what you first want to know about your patient on 
your list and put a number 1 in the column marked order beside 
that question. Now take the top pack of cards in front of 
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you, the question that you wish to ask has a list r_umber_ 
beside it. Take the card with that list number on it 
from your pack - turn it over and you have the an wer. 
write that answer down on your list beside the question 
that you asked. Do not look at any other card other 
than the question that you are currently asking. 
Having recorded the answer to question 1 then pro- 
ceed to number 2 and put a2 in the column beside that 
question - look at the appropriate card and record the 
answer. It is important for me to know the order in vvhich 
you ask each question, so please do not forget to write 
2 for the second, 3 for the third etc. Then ask a third 
question and look at each card in turn, as you ask your 
question. Please do not look at any card that you are 
not specifically interested in. On one occasion you can 
ask as many questions as you like, on the other you are 
limited to 12 questions. When you are limited to 12 
questions this is written on the top of the list. Please 
do exactly that and just ask 12 questions when instructed 
to do so and as many as you like when not so instructed. 
Not all the questions will be relevant, do not ask any more 
than you feel you need to. St start now by asking the 
questions, one by one. 
Record the answer and the order used. 
When you have finished a task write your diagnosis 
for your patient in the space provided at the bottom of your 
list. When you have done this do your 2nd task, either 
asking 12 questions or as many as you want to according to 
any instructions at the top of the sheet. The two lists 
are different - please do not worry about this. 
These first 
two tasks are for you to practice so that you get the hang 
of what to do, when you have finished I will give you two 
more task packs. Do exactly the same again. 
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If you have any worries ask rr. e to coi: ie over and 
whisper your query to me. 
Please do this all in silence - it doesn't in fact 
take all that long and do not look at your neighbours 
either side. 
I'll tell you exactly what I'm up to and answer 
any questions when you have finished. 
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A1'PENDI _X 27 
Anoya Summa- ry Table -- Ta Ü?: I 
Source of Variance ,S 11S F 
ýP. 
Main effects 138. c, ), 43 3 46.314 3.896 0.012 
Task (cord) 63.920 1 63.920 5.377 0.023 
Pool (small or large) 4.102 1 4.102 0.345 0.559 
Restriction 70.920 1 70.920 5.965 0.017 
2-way interact on L8.580 3 16.193 1.362 0.260 
Task x pool 0.557 1 0.557 0.047 0.829 
Task x restriction 48.011 1 48.011 4.038 0. C1+8 
Pool x restriction 0.011 1 0.011 0.001 0.975 
3-way interaction 0.102 1 0.102 0.009 0.91-16 
Task x pool x restr. 0.102 1 0.102 0.009 0.926 
Explained 187.625 7 26.804 2.255 0.038 
Residual 951.091 80 11.889 
Total 1138.716 87 13.089 
Anova Summary Table -- Task II 
Source of Variance SS DF F P. 
Main effects 245.125 3 81.708' 5.745 0.001 
Task (Cord) 8.284 1 8.281 0.582 0. x+48 
Pool (small or large) l 17.284 1 17.284 1.215 0.27 4 
Restriction 219.557 1 219.557 15.437 0.000 
2-way interactions 6.125 3 2.042 0.144 0.934. 
Task x pool 0.920 1 0.920 0.065 
0.81; 0 
Task x restriction 3.284 1 3.281 0.231 
0.632 
Pool x restriction 1.920 1 1.920 
0.135 0.714 
3-way interaction 1.375 1 1.375 0.097 0.757 
Task x pool x re str . 1.375 
1 1 . 37 5 0.097 
0.7 57 
Explained 252.625 7 36.089 2.537 0.021 
Residual 1137.818 80 14.223 
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Unrestricted Both Pools 
Anov, ý. Least Squares Solution Total Kurober of 4cuestions 
Asked by Subjects Asking General Q st " ue or: s Earlier oT 
Subject Askin , Later 
Right b1 ron gb2 
L 23 5 14 22 16 11 
A 15 15 21 16 24 23 
T 
E 17 9 19 19 14 13 
12 12 12 15 23 
A 1 12 11 11 18 
17 15 13 
21 11 14 21 10 7 10 
E 7 9 23 9 6 17 8 11 9 
R R 14 11 5 11 9 14 14 9 
L 17 9 13 14 5 10 12 19 
Y 
11 18 18 10 12 14 18 12 
A2 
8 9 19 18 9 10 20 11 
12 7 8 11 6 13 
Cell Frequencies 
b1 b2 
a1 21 9 n1=30 
a2 44 10 n2=54 
n1=65 n2e19 84 
Cell Totals 
a1 AB1=310 AB2=157 Al=467 
a2 AB3=519 AB4=1.35 A2=654 
B1-829 B2=292 s =1121 
(1) _ G2/n _ 
14960 
(2) _ EX2 _ 16877 
(s. D, 4+. 8) 
(3) = Ak2/ni) = 15190.3 
(4) _ ý(Bj2/nj) = 
15060.5 



















SSab(adj) _ Cwjdj2 - wdj)2 
wj 
Cwj = 18.9 
Ewjdj = 60.93 
Lwjdj2 = (3)( 2.6) = (3.9)(18.33) = 199.29 
SSab(adj) = 199.29 - (60.93)2 = 2.86 
18.9 
SS cells = (5) - (1) = 299.3 
SSa = (3) - (1) = 230.3 
SSb = (4) - (1) = 100.5 
SSa(adj) = SS cells - SSab(adj) - 
SSb 
299.3 - 2.86 - 100.5 = 195.94 
SSb(adj) = SS cells - SSab(adj) - 
SSa - 299. -. 3 - 2.86 - 230.3 
= 66.14 
SS - error = 




ss df S Y1 VR p< 
Stage A 195.94 1 195.94 9.69 df 1.60 
p <0.01 
Accuracy B 66.14 1 66.14 3.3 0.10 
AB 2.86 2 1.43 . 070 n. s 
Error 1617.7 80 20.22 
The observed valve of A, 9.69, exceeds the table va]_ae of 
F 7.08 df 1.60 :. the Null hypothesis can be rejected at 
p 0.01 level of oe, 
The observed value of B, 3.3, exceeds the table value of 
F=2.79 df 1.60 p 0.10 does not allow rejection of the 




Unrestricted - Bot o Pools 
X2 Cor: iparing the number of subjects asking questions - gener=al, 
context questions in positions 1-3 (early) more often than 
other positions cf those asking them more often later as a 
function of accuracy. 
Early Later 
Correct 44 21 65 
41.8 23.2 
Incorrect 10 9 19 
12.2 6.8 
54 30 
X2 - N(1AD-BC1-)2 
(A+B)(C+D)(A+C)(B+D) 
x2 . 87 df1 
84 
From tables X2 >2.71 where p<0.10 df 11 -we canno 
U 
reject the Null hypothesis with observed 
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General Context Question Use in the Second Half of Both 
Tasks - Restricted Large Pool, t Statistic 
Incorrect 
9.09 0 0 
25.0 0 0 
8.3 1L.. 3 0 
0 0 0 
0 8.3 0 
0 0 8.3 
8.3 0 0 
8.3 0 0 
8.3 0 0 
9.09 16.7 0 
8.3 8.3 0 
0 0 0 
8.3 9.09 0 
Correct 
1= 13 N2 = 31 










(ný-1) + (n2-1) 
t=2.23 df (n1-1) + (n2-1) 42 
From table 
o( . 025 the value of 
t >2.021 df 40 
2 oC . 05 
., the observed value 
t=2.23 can reject tre `'o at 
p<0.025 for a one sided test. 
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Restricted Large Pool. General Context Question use in 
the First Half of Task 1 and II. 
Incorrect Correct 
9.09 36.4 8.3 18.2 
25 25 16.7 18.2 
16.7 25 25 14.3 
33.3 16.7 22.2 25 
33.3 25 11.1 0 
10 8.3 22.2 
16.7 25 16.7 
16.7 33.3 16.7 
16.7 22.2 25 
0 8.3 0 
16.7 50 16.7 
16.7 22.2 25 
8.3 40 27.3 
N1 = 13 N2 = 31 
t_X -- 
X2 
6. X (, XI)2 +LXS X2 
n, n2 
ýn1-ýý ßn2-ýý 
t-1.15 df (n1-1) + (n2°1) = 42 
x1+1 
n1 n2 
Table value for one -sided test at the p <0.10 
trend level 
t=1 . 303 df 
(40)* 
2 '- "i 
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Unrestricted Large Pool. General Context Question use 
the Second Half of Both 'asks. t statistics. 
Incorrect 
Correct 
0 4.3 5.9 0 
0 0 0 20.0 
25.0 6.7 8.3 0 
20.8 11.8 25.0 22.2 
14.3 0 5.9 0 
0 0 0 6.7 




11.1 7. 1 
0 8. 7 
14.3 20 
0 5. 3 
4.8 7. 7 
tZ X1 - X2 
X- (ý X 1) 
2+ ýX2 -- (ý A2 
2x1+1 
--n 
n n1 n2 
(n1-1) (n2-l ý 
t=1.0476 df (n1-1) + (n2-1) = 41 a 
Table value z>( (one--si de') p 0.05, t >1 . 684 df 40 
p . 40. 25, t>0.681 df 40 
& pß .17 t )1.303 
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Unrestricted Large Pool. General Context Question use 
in the First -Ialf of Both Tasks. t Statistic 
Incorrect Correct 
9.09 8.7 11.8 0 25 
0 9.5 18.2 20 0 
12.5 6.7 41.7 18.2 44.4 
12.5 0 25 33.3 13.3 
21.4 42.8 35.3 18.2 7.1 
14.3 0 37.5 13.3 11.1 
16.7 21.4 16.7 11.1 14.3 









t= x1 - x2 
5X 2- (F-x 
1) 
2+ ßX2 _( 2) 
2x1+ 
n n2 n1 n2 
(n1-1) + (n2-1) 
t 1.224 df (n1-1) + (n2-2) = 41 
From table t >1 . 303 df 40, p<0.1 for a one-sided 
test (si , 
''. with an observed t=1.224 
the Mio is accepted at the 
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APPENDIX 39 
Name ....................... '` lard ............... IDate............ 
Below are a number of words which describe moods. Please put 














Full of pep 
Active 
`, `Jorthiess 











Name ........................ 'e .. 
lard...... 
- -----nntP -------- 
Below are a number of words which describe di1 ierent moods. 
Please put a cross in the approýjriate column beside the ., Mords 
to indicate how much you think each word describes hove' this 

























nC (i 1 
APPENDIX 141 
Name ......................... ' r` lard............... Date............ 
Im=agine yourself in this patient's position. Please rate 




























INarne ............................. lard............ '.. Date .......... 
Imagine a typical patient of the sC: r.: e sex suf fey ir. g re 
same condition. Please rate this list of words, as you v ou c. 
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Factor I V1 Or 
Cumulat. 
-ye 
Di: , ribution 
The ý-er oý : 'atients 
ß: F1' rýý_y:: li 
off' Nurses' Patients Rat 
and 
Nurses 140 
Patients N= 140 
V 











































J Factor 2 T; eprer_ion'_ 
Cumulative Distribution of i ursec Patio nts Rat ýrý 
The Numbers c1' Patients and 'i; ry tý o E'-r 
Nurses N= 114.0 




















































_actor 3 Anxiety 1, FPE : IX 47 
Cumulative Distribution of Nurses/Patients Ratings 
The Numbers of Patients and Nurses Rating Each Mord 
Nurses N= 140 
Patients N= 140 
N 
E 























Patients Nurse s 
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Patients Nurses 
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Section 3, a-d: Data from the Mood Adjective List 
The Factor Analysis 
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Factor Analysis Nurses 
Eigen Value Yo Vaýý . ar . Cur, 'Tar, 
2.84595 15.5 15.4 
2.52629 14 29.5 
2.40345 13 42.5. 
1.83349 10 52.5 
1.22812 7 59.5 
1.20169 6.5 66 
. 99595 5.5 71.5 
. 77984 4 75.5 
. 70886 4 79.5 
. 6131 3.5 
83 
. 60044 3 
86 
. 59823 3 
89 
. 53969 3 
92 
. 33692 2 
94 










. 0932 . 
05 99.55 
. 07707 . 
04 99.59 
. 05546 . 
03 99.6 
. 05074 . 
02 99.6 




Partial_ Correlation Coefficients of 'Nurse /Patient 
Controllir fcr the Effects oý Co ni tve Cor , exit~ 
Table A. 1 
Factor 1 -_Vi 






p. <. 042 
. 1983 
pc. Oll 9 
Table A. 2 
Factor 2- Depression 






p <. 237 
. 0666 
p <. 436 
Table A. 3 
Factor 3- Anxiety 
Nervous Tense On ed :e 
-. 0025 




p <. 656 
Table A. 4 
Factor L1. - Fatigue 
r Shaky Weary Tired 
' rnout 
. 1500 




. 3419 . 
0864 
p 4.000 p<"310 
31 11 
Table A. 5 
Factor 5- Hostility 
Resentful Spiteful Angry Furious 
. 1718 








APP ý'NDI X 5! } 
Correlation Coefficients of Z Score ?r -1 ransfcr: «tions 
Factor 1 
Vi-, or our 
_ 
Lively Act i_ ire 
scores . 2515 . 1465 . 1723 . 19: 42 
p<. 003 p . 084 p<. 042 p4.021 
Raw Data . 2515 . 1448 . 1723 . 2013 
p <. 003 p e. 088 p 4.042 p , /. 017 
Factor 2 
Unria) LT - serbale Tscovrý ý_ eä epreýsed 
-Z- scores . 32 10 . 2857 . 0945 . 0698 
p <. 000 p0 01 p< . 265 p <. 413 
Raw Data . 3210 . 2812 . 0992 . 0683 
p ,-. 000 p . 0.001 p, <. 243 p, ß. 422 
Factor 3 
Nervous Tense On edge 
-- scores ,,. 0035 _. 
0102 . _. 0298 
p<. 967 p<. 905 p<"73 
Raw Data .. ý . 
0052 -. 0096 0384 
p <. 951 p <. 911 p <. 652 
Factor 1+ 
Shaky Fear ired 'Joi'n-ouT 
scores . 1500 . 
179 . 3419 . 0864 
077 P, < " 033 p <. 
000 p . 310 
Raw Data . 1407 . 
1799 . 3419 . 0836 




Resentful S iteful Angry Furious 
-a scores . 1717 . 0587 . 2449 . 1890 
p. <. 043 p <. 49 p <. 004 p x. 02 5 
Raw Data . 1717 . 0587 . 2449 . 1890 
p. x. 043 p<. 49 p<. 004 p<. 025 
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Fern'ile/L al e Patients 
Table A. 6 
F1 Vigor 
Fei-,, ale :; gale 
Patient Nurse Patient Kurse '' 
Vigor . _. 1194 -. 0333 . 116 . 101 
Lively -. 1843 _. _, . 1142 . 179 . 181 
Pep _. 218 _. 068 . 21 . 117 
Active -. 203 _. 217 . 198 . 246 
Table A. 7 
F2 - Depression 
Female 1: ale 
Patient Nurse Patient , purse 
Unhappy -. 0525 . 0244 . 05 . -. 074 
Miserable . 0524 . 0581 -. 05 - . 
146 
Discouraged _. 005 -. 029 . 005 . 
004 
Depressed . 125 . 006 _. 
122 -. 08,8 
Table A. 8 
F3 - Anxiety 
Female ,,,! ale 
Patient : Nurse Patient Nurse 
Nervous . 156 . 













Table A. 9 
FL. - Fatigue 
ema ale , ale 
Patient Nurse Patient Nurse 4 
Shaky -. 032 . 026 . 031 -. 078 
Weary -. 012 . 074 . 01 !. 147 J 
Tired _. 037 . 126 . 036 -. 205 
Worn-out -. 041 . 16 . 04 -. 234 
316 
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Stage of Training 
Table A. 11 





Vigor -. 006 . 027 . 06 . 115 
Lively _.. 096 . 259 1.8 _. 196 
Pep . 059 . 092 -. 014 -. 036 
Active -. 02 . 178 7.0 ,. 01 
Table A. 12 
F2 - Depression 
Year 1 Yea r3 
Patient Nurse Patient urse 
Unhappy . 149 _. 109 _.. 153 . 068 
Miserable . 057 __. 022 1.099 _. 
003 
Discouraged . 081 . 023 __. 
015 . 235 
Depressed . 055 -. 
068 _. 102 . 
09 
Table A. 13 
F3 - Anxiety 
Year 1 Year 3 








. _. -. 098 
-. 044 
. 059 
On Edge -- . 046 . 
006 1.06 "069 
317 
Table A. 14 
FL. - Fatigue 
Year 1 Ye r3 
Patient Nurse Patient Nurse 
Shaky -. 046 -. 225 . 01 . 223 
Weary . 096 -. 018 -. 02 . 108 
Tired -- . 042 -. 056 . 097 . 02 




Table A. 15 
Low Scores 111id scores Scores 
Patient Nurse Patient urse Patient urse 
Vigor . 0414 . 067 . 189 -. 073 -. 174 -. 073 
Lively . 23 . 181 -. 0035 _. 0705 . 148 -. 07 
Pep . 092 . 172 . 112 -. 0325 . 04 . 004 
Active . 18 . 095 . 151 _. 041 -. 008 _. 175 
Table A. 16 
Low Scores :. .d 
Scores Hit, h Scor 
Patient Nurse Patient . Jurse patient :; ýurse 
Unhappy -. 094 -. 07 . 117 -. 039 __. 008 .1 
:; iiserable . 128 -. 202 _. 1255 . 248 _. 
026 _. 159 
Discour. . 056 . 017 -. 0235 . 107 . 
02 _. 161 
Depressed . 113 -. 112 _-. 079 . 155 -. 079 -" 
004 











_. 0285 _. 
059 
_. 155 _. 
153 




061 -. 132 
. 142 . 
1785 
. 166 _. 
277 




-. 123 . 034 




; iid Scores 
PaBientu \urse 
_. 




182 . 12 





. 062 -. 
001 





ie nJ lLl ._G 
103 
053 
"035 .0L _ 





-. 075 . 210 
_. 
156 . 21 
320 
-. id Scores 
Patient Nurse 
. 035 -. 007 
_. 211 _. 108 
Pa ien ý ur _e 
-. 081 _-. 051 
. 143 _. ?ý; 
APPENDIX 58 
Corny osi. tion of Sub-Gr_ou2s of Subjects 
1st year 3rd year High 
Score 




Male 29 31 24 15 16 
Patients 
Female 
Patients 27 26 14 20 19 
1st year 2nd, year 3rd year ,, tale Female 
Pat. Pat. 
High 12 11 13 24 14 
Scores 
: Medium 18 " 5 15 15 20 
Scores 
Lo; 17 2 16 16 19 
Scores 
x2 TiIale/Female Distribution as a Function of Cognitive Co.:: ýlex 










Total 55 53 
rk 2_ ý- (Oii - Ei_ýj 
)2 








Partial Correlation Coefficients of Nurses <i . ting fo, Patien, s 
with Ratings of Assumed Similarity leas ; r. e (Can trsllii g Stereo- 
type) and Stereotype , ieasure (Controlling Asse:: d Si::: lar tý, -) . 
N- 11+0 Assumed Similarity : stereot ype with Judge,: e 
with Judgement of of Pati ent Patient 
Vigorous . 299 
(p <. 0001) . 0965 
(p<. 2. -58) 
Lively . 419 (p <. 0001) . 0832 (D< . 330) 
Full/Pep . 2615 (p. <. 002) . 3154 
(P< 
. 0001) 
Active . 426 
(p <. 0001) . 0713 
(p < . 404) 
Unhappy . 185 
(p <. 03) . 2785 
(p<. 001 ) 
Miserable . 293 
(p <. 0001) . 222 
(p <. 009) 
Discouraged . 293 
(p x. 0001) . 251 
(p <. 003) 
Depressed 277 (p < . 001) . 246 
(p. <. 003) 
Nervous . 232 
(p <. 006) . 248 
(p <. 003) 
Tense . 150 
(p <. 08) . 398 
(p<. 0001) 
On Edge . 139 
(p <. 10) . 3045 
(p< 
. 0001) 
Shaky . 328 
(p <. 0001) . 240 
(p. <. 004) 
', 'Teary . 423 
(p <. 0001) . 2195 
(p<. 009) 
Tired . 391 
(p <. 0001) . 389 
(p<. 0001 ) 
Worn-out . 2725 
( p. ß. 001) . 392 
(p <. 0001) 
Resentful . 08 
(P. <. 3') " 243 
(p -. "004) 
Angry . 063 
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Curnulati've Distribution of Patients and 1st ye=a- 












































Frequency Distribution of Patients and 3rd Year Nurses 
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